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VABSTRACT
Educational Revisionism and Recent School Reform:
The Case of Rochester 1960-1973
May 1977
John B. Russo, B.S., Michigan State University
M.S. , State University of New York at Brockport,
Ed . D
. ,
University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Harvey B. Scribner
Using case study and documentary research methods, the
disserta-
tion studies recent attempts at educational reform
in Rochester, New
York. Rochester was chosen for the study because
its recent history seems
to indicate the extensive demographic change,
influential liberal commu-
nity, urban unrest, and ethnic and economic
stratification that represents
the period nationwide. Further, the organization
of production, the prox-
imity and close association between the corporate
and public sectors, and
attempts at major educational reforms (school reorganization
and desegre-
gation) seem to invite the type of analysis intimated
by the radical
scholars of American education.
Distinct from the work of earlier historians
and social scien-
tists, the revisionist historians of education
and radical economists
have concluded that schooling in the United
States has permitted minimal
social and economic mobility to lower social
and ethnic groups. Accord-
ing to these radical scholars, this has
systematically occurred through
the repressive aspects of educational
promotion, the selection of certain
personality traits, and acceptance of
organizational forms which compli-
ment the values and modes of production in
the economic system. When
VI
this historical perspective has focused or periods of school reform,
these radical scholars have concluded that: (1) School reform has
largely been a response to major demographic changes. (2) School reform
often represents a liberal response to a threatened socio-economic order.
(3) School reform has been the result of a discontinuity between the
social relations in the workplace and the social relations in the
schools. (4) In the school reform process, the corporate sector plays a
decisive role in determining the direction and content of the reform.
(5) The most lasting school reforms reflect a more efficient
mechanism of
performing schooling's traditional functions of educational expansion,
sorting, and socializing of students.
The results of the dissertation indicate that demographic changes
in Rochester necessitated by lower class labor mobility and
fueled by the
contradictions in material life and racism acted as a catalyst
for the
riots of 1964 and eventually at attempts at social and
educational reform.
Many of these reforms both reflected modern liberal
philosophy and the
transformations in the production process while attempting to
reproduce
the types of social relations necessary to function
in the workplace.
Despite the social conflict (riots and the organization
of non-white com-
munity by Saul Alinsky}, business and corporate leaders
were able to
maintain their hegemony through their active participation
in the defini-
tion and resolution of community grievances.
Finally, despite the
attempts to alter the structure and content of
schooling in Rochester,
most major school reforms initiated in recent years have
not survived the
reform period. Those reforms that have survived
seem to have the capabil-
ity to perform the traditional school functions
more efficiently than their
predecessors while preparing students for future
socio-economic roles.
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. INTRODUCTION
American educational history has been subject to a drastic and
controversial reinterpretation in the last fifteen years through the work
of modern revisionist historians and radical economists. ' Approaching
the subject of schooling with ideological and methodological differences,
these scholars nonetheless hold in common the contention that schooling
in the United States has served the controlling power structure and
allowed lower social and ethnic groups only minimal economic and social
mobility. The historical outlines drawn by these scholars have focused
on the periods of major educational reform: the "Common School" and
Proaressi ve eras. Only recently have these critics of American education
begun to study the most recent period of pedagogical and social reform
Among the most influential revisionist studies are Michael Katz,
Thp Ironv of Early School Reform: Eriucatl on JJI E-l
: Beacon Press 13 SBTT CccT
TTnFTlind
-
the RisiTaPthe Corporate State, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1%8),(Hew York:
Li a vie " McKay~Co7 i' 1 c . ,'"1976 JTTlarvTn Lazerson, Ongwis efthe
Urba'*
Crnnnl- Public Education in Massac h us et fsJ8TO^fl X, ( Cam^Tilge s rva r
d
IJiTTviFsl’tyTres s , 197TT; Clarence Karier, ei.al .,
Roots_^CnsijjAm^-
i ran Education in the Twentieth Century, (Chicago:
RaHiTTic^nFe
JiOOjt^se^, (Hew York: ree
The one BestJystem^AJ^^
Urban Education , (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974).
2
Ihe most important studies by radical economists ar
® Samuel
Bowles and Herbert Gintis, SchoollnsJnC^ imperialism
Basic Books, 1976) and Martin Carnoy, Educational^ 1
tural^ir£enaj_i_s_,
(Hew York: David McKay, 1974).
2initiated in the 196Q‘s--the Alternative School Movement."*
The analysis of recent reform by the revisionists and radical
scholars is of general importance to everyone interested in education and
social change. It is so, for at least two important reasons: First,
with the resurgence of the "Back to Basics" movement, educational
reforms
initiated during the 1960's have declined or have been reinterpreted in
the traditional context where they serve to facilitate the
schools tradi-
tional functions (extended education [holding], conservative socializa-
tion, and economic sorting). How this occurred is at once both
perplex-
ing and critical for those involved in change. Second,
and more specifi-
cally, the interpretation of these events by revisionist
and radical
scholars seriously questions both the functioning and
the motives of
modern educational reformers. Consequently, it raises
the following
questions: Is recent educational reform simply a
response to the econo-
mic and demographic changes that occurred during
the 1960's? Do the re-
forms merely represent a liberal response to
the threatened social order
caused by the Civil Rights and Anti-War Movements?
Did the corporate
sector play a decisive role in determining
the direction of educational
reform? Were the reforms initiated during
this period merely reflections
of changes in the organization and the
social relations associated with
the work place? Is the "Back to Basics"
movement and the generally con-
servative atmosphere that presently exists
in 1976 reminiscent of the
3conservatism that followed earlier reform eras in education?
At this time, most research on recent educational reform by the
revisionists and radical economists has concerned itself with general
educational policies initiated during the 1960‘s J However, relatively
few case studies exist that explore the process and impact of modern
school reform at any specific locale. Yet, such research is of particu-
lar importance because it complements the static historical outlines
suggested by the radical scholars. In so doing, it provides concrete
examples to validate historical and philosophical claims while providing
a mechanism to explore subtle influences that are often overlooked
in the
systematic analysis. Without this body of scholarship, the work
of the
revisionist historians and radical scholars can be viewed as being
incon-
clusive.
Purpose of the Study
This dissertation attempts to study modern education
reform at
the local level. Using methodologies associated with
documentary case
study and comparative analysis, it aims to
synthesize information gained
by such analysis in light of revisionist and
radical economic thought.
Specifically, this will be done in two ways: First,
the study will focus
on the demographic, sociological, and economic
characteristics of
Rochester, New York, during the 1960‘s. Rochester
seems appropriate for
this type of analysis because its recent
history seems to indicate the
extensive demographic changes, influential
liberal community, urban
Bowles and Gintis, op. cit.; Joel
Spring, op. cit
4unrest, and ethnic and economic stratification that are representative of
the period nationwide. Further, the proximity and close association be-
tween the corporate and public sectors seem to invite the type of analy-
sis intimated by the revisionist historians.
Second, the dissertation studies the initiation of educational
reforms both citywide and individual school levels. The citywide analy-
sis will attempt to determine the individuals and forces that provided
the impetus for educational change, the educational reforms that were
enacted, and finally, the eventual outcomes of the reform movement.
At
the school level, it traces how the larger reform influences
were trans-
lated eventually into an educational program. Together, through
the
analysis of citywide educational and individual school reform,
sufficient
data will be developed to accurately test the historical
paradigm created
by the radical scholars.
Definition of Terms
Educational Revisionists
Revisionism, as an approach to educational history
is relatively
recent in origin. It represents one intellectual
strand of a larger his-
torical reassessment of United States domestic
and foreign policy, which
focuses on the development of the corporate-liberal
state, the appearance
of new organization values, the maintenance
of elite class structures,
and the origins of American Imperialism.
1 Following the tendencies of
1 lames Weinstein, The Corporate Ideal in the i
Jto^l_State^90^-
5of such analysis, educational revisionism has attempted to re-examine the
development of administrative bureaucracies, meritocracti c sorting, and
the ideology of educational opportunity.
In the course of its evolution, educational revisionism has
developed two major currents: cultural and radical revisionism. Cul-
tural revisionism, of which Lawrence Cremin and Bernard Bailyn are lead-
ing advocates, stresses an expanded view of education encompassing
reli-
gion, community, and the family. In part, this emphasis comes from a
rejection of what they would consider parochial analysis developed by
earlier educational historians. Bernard Bailyn reflects this
influence
when he states:
The main emphasis and ultimately the main weakness of the
his-
tory written by the education missionaries of the_turn ot
the
century derived directly from their professional interests.
Seeking to demonstrate the immemorial importance of the
evolu-
tion of theories and procedures of the work in which they
were
engaged, they directed their attention almost exclusively
to
the part of the educational process carried on in the
formal
institution."*
Cultural revisionists maintain that public education from
its
earliest beginnings in colonial America has been the
bond uniting Amerv
can society in the face of changing social,
religious and familial
values. By integrating the diversified cultures
(immigrant and Indian)
through an exposure to secular values that
promoted democratic and
TUp Cparrh For Order, 1877-1920, (New York: Hill and Wang,
1367);
WlTjTam~ApTO i ams , The Tragedy of AmeHcanD^ Sr -ill
f '
De ta Books, 1962); Stephen Thernstrom,
Mobility in a Nineteenth Century Cit^, (Cambridge.
Harvard University
Press, 19647!
1 Bernard Bailyn, Education in the Fprmjnfl_o^^
(Hew York: Vantage BooksT I960), p.9.
6egalitarian virtues, public education according to these writers reduced
the potential for social conflict by instilling a common heritage.
With
its "genius 1^ in a commitment to popularization, public education
was
valorized as a vehicle for success, supposedly giving everyone an
equal
opportunity to find the American Dream. Viewing the social history
of
the 1890‘s from this perspective, for example, Lawrence Cremin
writes:
To look back on the nineties is to sense an awakening
of.social
conscience, a growing belief that this incredible suffering
was
neither the fault nor the inevitable lot of the sufferers,
that
it could certainly be alleviated, and that the road to
allevia-
tion was neither charity nor revolution, but in the last
analy-
sis, education.
^
This revisionist conception of history is at once
both idealistic
and materialistic. It views education as the model
by which the contra-
dictions caused by urbanization and industrialization
would oe alleviated.
Popular during the early 1960's, this position
reflected the confidence
of many individuals at that time that a renewed
commitment to education
could solve many of the current problems
associated with racism and socio-
economic disparities, and the challenge associated
with the “space race."
Although these historians are credited with
enlarging the perception of
what constitutes education, cultural revisionists
have come under serious
criticism.
To some more radical historians and
social critics, it seemed
that the cultural revisionists have merely
replaced the narrow inspira-
tional histories of an earlier era, with
an equally glorified view that
1 Lawrence Cremin, The Genius of A
ir^anjduca^, (New York:
V.ntage
cremin. The Trans fpnnaMglLO^ (New Y°
rk:
Vintage Books, 1961), p.59.
7was little more than a "morality tale linking the evolution of American
Democracy to the triumph of public education."^ These critics, referred
to as radical revisionists, pushed the analysis still further, contending
that cultural revisionists never seriously questioned whether schools
had
achieved their ideals or whether the American social framework was
altered by changes in education. For instance, Colin Greer, in his
rejection of the cultural revisionist position, suggests that "to inter-
pret rhetorical good intentions as actual priorities, is to
read and
judge a society quite sympathetically." Consequently, "it is not very
good history or sociology.
1,2
By failing to address the essentia! contra-
dictions between educational ideals and their eventual outcomes
within a
society, radical revisionists like Clarence Karier,
frequently conclude
that "liberal history (read cultural revisionism) does
not connect and
- 3
add meaning to our present world."
It is the radical revisionist concept of today's
society that
forms the foundation of their historical perspective.
In having seen the
failure of the liberal social and educational
reforms to ameliorate the
inequalities during the 1960's, the radical revisionists
conclude that
American society is fundamentally racist,
materialistic, and controlled
by vested-interests. Given this framework,
they see schools as having
acted to maintain class structure and racist
ideals. This has been
1
Col in Greer, The Great School Legend *
(New York: Viking Press
1972), p.45.
2
Ibid
.
,
pp.3b-36.
^Karier, et al . , Roots of Crisis , p.5.
8achieved through the development of educational bureaucracy, meritocratic
sorting, and a liberal educational philosophy and ideology that
tends to
then mask static power relations and that has been essentially
immune to
reform.
Unlike the idealists' conception of history promoted by the cul-
tural revisionists, these radical revisionists tend to
be voluntaristic;
that is, to view history as the natural outgrowth of
conscious decision
making on the part of the individuals or groups of
individuals working in
their common interest. According to this view, where
conflict exists be-
tween individuals or groups, it is the result of
differences in value
systems. These value systems come in conflict in
areas such as organiza-
tional development,
1
social philosophy,
2
and educational methodology.
However, as Michael Katz explains in his
discussion of the educational
bureaucracy, the value "clash is not described
by conventional categories
,4
of economic or class division."
Given this voluntaristic conception of history,
their use of tra-
ditional Marxist categories of class represents
that type of analysis
usually confined to bourgeois sociology
(i.e., elite or incone analysis).
Rather than looking at the social
relations and modes of production.
hpring,
2 karier et al . , Roots of Crisis; Halter
Feinberg, Reasmjmd
bhPtnrirf The ’n t.l 1 ectuITFomditi ons pfjwentiet h Century^
To*: John Wiley atuTlonsV Inc.,
19751.
\azerson, Origins of the Urban_Scho£ll
Tyack, Lhe One Best Sjrs-
4Katz, Class, Bureaucracy, and Sc
hools,, P-55.
9their use of income or class analysis serves only to
bring out the
h subtle interplay of factors" and the “patterns of interaction
formed
when major alterations in the conditions of life, mediated by the
ten-
sions and values of men, provoke innovations in
social philosophy.'
1
Host often, those patterns in interaction are
explained as the "consis-
tent triumph of the self-interest of those who
'have' over the aspira-
tions of those who 'have not'."
2
Now, it is at this level where these
revisionists differ from the radical economist.
Radical Economists
The theoretical orientation of American
radical economists such
as Samuel Bowles, Martin Carnoy, and
Herbert Gintis
3
is Marxist. Unlike
their European counterparts, their version
of historical materialism is
highly empirical and draws predominantly
on the research methodologies
developed within modem social science.
4 Consequently, their data and
]
Katz, The Irony of Early School
Reform, P-14.
2Greer, The School Legend , p.5.
3Bowles and Gintis, ScbooliD^^
Carn0y ’
Fducation as Cultural Imp_ejMa]TSin.
“The resurgence of intellectua'
20 years has favored a more
philosophi
Frankfurt School and the
two forms: the neo-Hegalian
philosophy
_ Sartre and Roger Garaudy.
existentialism and marxist humanism of Louis Althusser
However, more recently, the empha™s! For a detailed anal-
represents a movement to a more emp see Helmut Fleischer,
ysis of differing Marxist Jheones
o h
rorch’Books, 1959); Dick Howard
Marxism and His tory,* (New Flirnnean Marxism S ince Lenin ,
and~Kari KlTreT^heJnknowr^^^ Future, (New
(New York: R"oph7p63rTRo9er^ Vork;
Pantheonl'
,
'l970);
=
.
Beacon Press, 1975).
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research often resembles that of the radical revisionists'. Their con-
clusions, however, are significantly different.
To these radical scholars, the development of mass education in
the United States is the product of the dialectical conflict
involved in
the accumulation of capital and the transformations in the
social rela-
tions of production. As capital is accumulated and the
capitalist class
increases its control of the means of production, antagonistic
relations
develop between wage-laborers (includes marginally and unemployed
workers)
and the capitalists. As a result of the incipient
rebellion, the capi-
talist class must channel the discontent into "isolated
daily struggles
of workers" or suppress it "through ameliorative
social reforms, through
coercive force of the State, through racist, sexist,
ageist, credential-
ist, and other strategies used by employers to
divide and rule; and
through ideological perspectives which served
to hide rather than clarify
the sources of exploitation and alienation
of the capitalist order."
Hass education has played a central role
in this process. In
rhnnl i no in Capitalist Ameri ca, Samuel Bowles and
Herbert Gintis con-
clude that schooling functions in this
society to enhance labor power and
prepare individuals to accept authority
structures (employee-employer)
and other social relations necessary for
capital accumulation and
hegemony. Stated more precisely, the
social relations of production are
reflected in the social relations of
the schools (correspondence princi-
ple). 2 However, periodically, a
discontinuity develops between the two
1 Bowles and Gintis, Schoolj^ P>232
2
Ibid.
,
p. 5.
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sectors (production and educational) when the static (slower changing)
social relation in the educational sector cannot mirror the rapidly
changing social relations in the dynamic production sector. This results
in the need for educational reform. In most cases, this requires only
minor adjustments (pluralist accommodations) in educational values and
goals that correspond to the changing economic reality. However, during
certain crisis periods in American society--where there is a "serious
disjuncture between the school system and the economy" and where "schools
function as an arena for struggle among major social groups"
1
—education-
al reform becomes a social bromide for incipient rebellion and socio-
economic disparities. To illustrate their analysis, the radical econo-
mists historically show that educational reform has followed major
changes in the organization of production and labor force composition.
The ideological distinctions between the revisionist historians
and the radical economist is by no means static. In recent
months,
especially among the radical revisionists, there has been a
definite
movement towards a Marxian analysis. After several
years of intensive
research on the impact of public education on mid-nineteenth
Century
Hamilton, Ontario, Michael B. Katz has concluded that
rather than urbani-
zation and industrialization, changes in education
were more fundamen-
tally associated with changes in local capitalist
development. At the
same time, Joel Spring in his most recent book,
Ihe^ortin^Jiachine, has
concluded that the War on Poverty and other
compensatory programs
^
Ibid .
,
p.238.
Michael B. Katz, Presidential Address to the
History of Educa
tion Society, Boston, HA, October, 1976.
12
initiated during the 1960's with their strong emphasis on education
"served as a. means of conservatively dealing with the issues of social
class differences.
1 '
1
Meanwhile, liberalism and its intellectual
corollary (cultural revisionism) have continued to fall in disrepute
from
the intellectual right and left.
2
These trends seem to indicate a grow-
ing intellectual interest in a neo-Marxian reinterpretation
of American
educational history.
Research Design
As the intellectual differences between the
radical revisionists
and economists become more functional than real,
a synoptic analysis en-
compassing both groups is suggested. Such a
synthesis becomes possible
for two reasons. First, both the revisionists
and economists have dealt
with essentially the same question concerning
the nature of school reform
and, therefore, have drawn heavily on each
others' research. Secondly,
the themes suggested by revisionists such
as demographic change (urbani-
zation), technological change (industrialization),
and value clash have
economic antecedents. For exam,pie,
demographic change often is associ-
ated with labor mobility and socio-economic
inequalities; and value clash
can represent a form of conflict over
economic self-interest. Together,
the mutuality of concern and economic
antecedents provide the structural
basis for the synoptic analysis.
This dissertation attempts such an
analysis in tne study of
modern school reform. This requires
the identification of the major
^Spring, The Sorting Machine , p.228.
2 Fein berg , Reason and Rhetoric,,
pp.1-23
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themes suggested by the radical scholars (radical revisionists and econo-
mists) and their application to historical events surrounding school
reform in Rochester, New York. The first chapter will attempt to identi-
fy these themes by presenting a historical outline suggested
by the radi-
cal scholars. This interpretive framework will be presented
against a
general economic profile that shows the historical instability of
the
American economic system. This approach is used to underscore
the argu-
ments raised by the radical economists while providing a
linear structure
necessary to span the chronological distances encompassed
by the revision'
1st historians. From this general historical overview,
the five major
themes of the radical scholars emerge and provide the
rhuberic to study
modern school reform in Rochester. These themes are:
1. School reform is a response to major demographic changes
occuring in the United States.
2. School reform represents a liberal response
to a threatened
social order.
3 School reform has been the result of
a discontinuity between
the social relations in the workplace (production
sector) and the social
relations in the schools (reproductive sector).
4. The corporate sector plays a decisive
role in determining the
direction of school reform.
5 The most lasting school reforms
reflect a more e-ff i ei
.
mechanism of performing schooling's traditional
functions of educational
expansion (holding), sorting, and socializing
students.
The second chapter begins the study
of educational reform in
Rochester by presenting general demographic
data about the city. This
will include such items as population
changes, racial composition, and
age distribution. In addition, this
chapter provides extensive informa-
tion concerning the economic conditions
that existed in Rochester during
the 196Q's, including information about
the size and character isti
14
the labor force, the labor-management relations, working conditions,
economic base (industrial output and capital expenditures) and the busi-
ness and community relations.
The third chapter examines the major social issues that influ-
enced changes in the city's educational system. These issues center
around the riots of 1964 and the community's response to them. This
chapter takes account of the conditions (social and economic) that con-
tributed to the riots, a description of the characteristics of those in-
volved, the community’s response, the controversy surrounding the organi-
zation of community actions by Saul D. A1 insky, and finally a study of
the conflict between community organizations and the dominant industrial
power in Rochester, Eastman Kodak.
The fourth chapter examines the system-wide educational reform
initiated in Rochester in the last fifteen years. Basically, this repre-
sents an attempt to locate the driving influences behind the movement for
the reorganization and desegregation of the city’s public schools. In-
cluded in this chapter is an examination of pedagogical, socio-economic,
demographic and political undercurrents that contributed to the reform
process.
The fifth chapter studies the development of one specific reform—
the development of an alternative junior high school. This micro-
analysis of educational reform will be helpful in determining
nuances
that are sometimes obscured by a more general investigation
of reform at
the community level. Further, it provides insights as to
how systematic
reforms influenced specific school organization and methodology.
The sixth chapter critically discusses the
appropriateness of the
15
arguments raised by the radical scholars in relation to recent social and
historical outlines generated by the revisionists and radical economists
with the historical data engendered in the study. In addition to the
specific historical data, other recent community studies will be included
in this chapter when deemed appropriate to clarify the analysis.
In summarizing the insights gained by the dissertation, a special
effort will be made to make wider generalizations that seem to be implied
by the specific analysis of reform in Rochester. Finally, the disserta-
tion will conclude by proposing areas for future investigation that have
been suggested by the study.
The dissertation requires the use of the following methodological
and research procedures: The investigation of federal, state, and local
census data is necessary to determine general demographic characteristics
of Rochester. Similarly, economic data such as capital expenditures and
labor market characteristics are examined to determine the general econo-
mic climate. To gain a full understanding of the issues and events that
have contributed to educational reform within Rochester's public schools,
an examination of primary sources such as School Board minutes, school
records, newspaper accounts and minutes of committees is required.
CHAPTER I
HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK
Introduction
This chapter represents an attempted synthesis of the work of
various prominent revisionist historians of education with the often com-
plementary observations of radical economists. This reading of the edu-
cational history of the United States, which outlines the problematics of
both social and economic change, is especially revealing when focused on
periods of educational reform.
1
Most specifically, as the data and graph
will indicate, the educational reform movements as seen by the radical
scholars parallel prolonged periods of economic prosperity and education-
al conservatism is predominant during economic downturns and war-time
prosperity.
This outline of educational history has been placed against
an
economic backdrop that indicates the cyclical nature of the
American eco-
nomic system. This has been done to accentuate the economic
determinism
of the radical economists while providing a linear time
structure
necessary to bridge the chronological distance between
the studies made
by revisionist historians.
As Graph 1A indicates, economic instability
is indigenous to our
]
The three major periods of educational reform under
considera-
"ion (the antebellum, progressive, and current
reform movements/ are
those suqqested by Michael Katz as not only being
movements to ™P*^e
\rlll Schools but as exteotions of broader attempts
to solve problems of
industrial society.
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present system. The horizontal lines on the graph represent the relative
economic conditions that have existed at any time in the economy.
Plotted against chronological time, the variability in the economy is
pronounced. Although general economic categories have been used, the
fluctuations represented by the graph are indicative of the macroecono-
mic changes that have marked our economic history.
Economic and Social History
The early part of the Nineteenth Century was a time of vast eco-
nomic development and expansion in the United States. Despite economic
periodicity, each downturn was successfully followed by periods of
increased prosperity. From its beginnings as an agricultural, small
manufacturing and trade society, the economic life of the country grew
steadily with changes in technology and the work process.
1
Further, the
abundance of natural resources, security of the oceans, and
availability
of inexpensive labor, contributed to the fertile environment
for the
development of capitalism. Economic historian Douglas Dowd
summarized
his interpretation of the period:
’Both radical economist and revisionist f^toHais agree
that the
onset of the factory system had a profound
impact on the ives^« he
i,krsv.0y Mirhael Katz in The Irony of
™es a -ring passage that delFTbes the rede fin, ion o ma
h,s
labor that e.olved with the change in mode of
Production.
lahnr and oowerful machines were combined in manufacturing
processes
bLld on dfvirion of !abor. For many work no longer
remaine a t
an acquired skill, an important part of man s 1^, Tnstea ° 9
be alienated for their work, increasingly
re-defined as Jhe mepetiti
operation of a machine, the making of_a motion
that was only one sma n ,
part of the production of a shoe, a piece of
cloth, a rifle, or a watcn.
20
The nineteenth century was the American economy's reckless
youth, a period of rapid expansion in every which way, as our
geographic boundaries and structure of production were both
filled in and expanded. It was a period of extraordinary
buoyancy. Each panic or crisis was fol 1 owed by successively
higher peaks of economic activity. Optimism was the.rule;
for those at the top level of business it was justified.!
However, for those who were not at the top or for the physical
environment, this period was filled with hardship. The classic example
is the cotton industry, whose prosperity dominated the economic sphere to
the mid-Nineteenth Century. Its success and profitability was largely
2
based on inexpensive slave labor and unsound soil conservation.”
The dynamic changes in the technology associated with the intro-
duction of the factory system caused concurrent alterations in the domes-
tic, social, and demographic features of Nineteenth Century life.
Previously, In Colonial America, the family had been the basic productive
and educative unit.
3
But with the introduction of the factory system,
its role and influence began to wane. The traditional work
and training
functions were diminished as the dislocation between home and
workplace
increased, and as women and children were introduced into
factories.
Additionally, there developed a discontinuity of age, that
is, children
and adults became more obviously separate than in the
rural setting.
’Douglas Dowd, I
“
HnitPri States Since 1776TTciibrTBgern^throp Pub., 1974), p.84.
2
So tremendous was the depletion of the
soil environment that
without the westward migration, the economy may
well have collapsed.
3
For an enlightening analysis of
Bernard Bailyn, Education and theJjornmi£
Vintage Books, 1960), pp."15-21.
Colonial American life
of American Society,
,
see
(Hew York:
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resulting in a radically different concept of youth and adolescence.^
Subsequently, with emotional disengagement occuring between both
family members and community, social relationships became more individual-
2
istic, eventually causing a breakdown in the extended family system.
Both cities and the new factory towns changed demography cal ly as
the uprooted farm families and new immigrants sought work in urban areas.
The nature of the social and ethnic stratification within the city gener-
ated a secularization of values that mirrored' the commercialization of
goods and services. Caught in this dynamic, children were exposed to a
myriad of values and choices that often were in conflict with the values
of parents and the larger community."
5
The trauma caused by the disloca-
tions, the choices advanced with secularization of values, the
decline of
the traditional cultural institutions (family and Church); in
addition to
^Joseph Kett, "Adolescence and Youth in Nineteenth-Century
Ameri-
ca", Education in American History , edited by Michael
Katz, (New York.
Praeger Publ . , 19731, p.68.
^William E. Bridges, "Family Patterns in American,
1825-1875,"
Education in American History, edited by Michael Katz, p.64,
makes the
i^ThiT^JiitTSFiFle claim that the disintegration of family ties is
"better understood as training in detachment."
It.seems to me that this
interpretation is an attempt to find a "silver lining
to explain the
undermining of family life with the changes in modes
of production.
3
Ihe familiar criticisms of the declining
values among the Jouth_
f lect'thei r own's'eH-inte^ts! bairns of'unsuper^sed
children with
(iraJge values and customs were held before the P^*« “
pies of the deterioration of the social fabric,
tve
^ for
*
ed ^ CQm_
munity was involved m this type of acti _ y, - constituency,
pete for converts and to curtail the erosion
of their own r
ThL perceptions of social deficiencies in moral and spiritual
character
JSrtdTthfbiSrock for public fucation For a =
e detailed analysis,
see Michael Katz's, The Irony of
,Ea^y_Sci^,Kcf^-
22
the lack of status, security, and alienation associated with the new
modes of production, instigated antagonisms and social ferment at all
levels of society. The anxiety created by these events was to contri-
bute to the eventual rise of public education in America.
By the beginning of the Nineteenth Century, the philosophical
foundations of public education had been already advanced by such ardent
spokesmen as Benjamin Franklin, Benjamin Rush, and Noah Webster.
1
For
the first several decades, most of the support for public education came
from philanthropic sources. Organization such as the Free School Society
of the City of New York offered free instruction to the impoverished
children of the city. This type of support was the genesis of equating
2
public education with poverty and potential social mobility.
The support for public education gained strength in the 1820's as
3
the country continued to grow economically and demographically. The
exuberance of the growing nation was evidenced in the election of Andrew
Jackson in 1828. With the impetus of populism associated with
Jackson-
ian Democracy, the period 1828-1836 saw a dramatic rise in
secularism
and subsequent support for public education.
4
But it was a political
1 Adnl phe F. Meyer, An Eriucati onal f 1 tiltc
5
:
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965)7 p.386. These men were among
the first to
call for the creation of a national educational system.
2 lbid .
,
p.388.
3
In 1827, the public high school movement
started in Massachusetts
when the legislature passed a law permitting towns
to organize public
schools that would provide commercial and college
preparatory instruction.
4
The rise of secularism was important to the
expansion of support
for public education because it allowed education
to
by religious values. Schools were to provide a
set of nat lonal «tic
goals that were in harmony with the economic
sector. No y 9
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democracy that was not without serious contradictions. Historian Samuel
Eliot Morrison explains:
Jacksonian Democracy believed in equality for white men; it was
far less charitable toward the Indian and Negro than its aris-
tocratic 11 opponents. It was not "leveling" in the European
sense, having no desire to pull down men of wealth to. a common
level; but it wanted a fair chance for every man to rise..^.ne
common man gained active participation in. the government at
ail
but the highest levels, and public education was provided
tor
his children--if they were white and free.
1
It is clear that Jacksonian democracy presented a
danger to many in the
upper echelons of society. Its populism had eroded
their control of both
values and politics. Together with the gathering
labor unrest, many per-
ceived the potential for rebellion and social
reordering. Not surpri-
singly, in their advocacy and support of school
reform, the rising middle
and upper classes played heavily on these
fears.
2
To many, education was
the institutional mechanism that ordered the
potential of social and
economic control with the minimum of force
and coercion. Bowles and
G intis summarized this mentality.
A stable body po
require citizens
ii tic and smoothly functioning factory
alike
and workers who embraced and have
taken on
1 Samuel Eliot Morrison,
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1965),
p.45z.
2
I„ David B. lyackls,
evangelical tone of the reforms w e h y^ them was to ally with
the panacea for c
[
ime ’ P^fthat the tradition of cloaking the public
evil." Further, he contends that
a
^ ti|wGod Cubberly.
education in vi rtue was _cont , nued y
sto’
r of En Wood Patterson
(Also see Lawrence Creml"/’J^r -°"Japhy 0 f American Education, [New
Cubberly: An Essay on ^he Hi- - 9 P
^ Columbia University,
York: Bureau of Publications,
Teach ,
'
^he Great Schoo1 Legend ,
1965].) Radical revisionist Co in
Gr ’ 1
.j— t his tori ani^sucFas
rrL^ocritical „ritin 9 as tde,r
predecessors.
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as their own the values and objectives of those in authority.
Schools might do better than instill obedience; they might
promote social control. 1
Following the Jacksonian period came the rapid ascent of Horace
Mann in Massachusetts. Over a period of years starting in 1837,
Mann and
contemporaries like Henry Barnard developed and expounded the virtues
of
tax-supported, non-sectarian, and bureaucratically organized
public edu-
cational systems. Although appealing to the more affluent
in society,
their high-handed and moralistic proselytizing found
little support among
the poor and disenfranchised who were suffering
through a period of eco-
nomic hardship.
2
In fact, their ideas concerning taxation,
organization
and educational methodologies may never have
gained acceptance were it not
3
for a drastic reversal in the economic cycle.
As the country grew both economically and
demographically (west-
ward and urban), each crisis period in business
was followed by renewed
optimism and economic activity. As Graph 1A
(on Pages 17 and 18) indi-
cates, the year that Horace Mann became
Secretary of Education in Massa-
chusetts (1837), was the beginning of a
severe decline in the economic
vitality of the country. In part, this
was caused by over-speculation
and the over-extension of credit by
foreign and domestic banks in finan-
cing the new manufacturing processes,
the expansion of the transportation
sector, and the westward migration.
Coupled with, the inflation
1 Bowles and Gintis, Scho^ P J70
‘
cent
economic conditions were in such a
state of
3See Graph I A, pp. 17-18.
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basic commodities as flour, it led to the beginning of a serious depres-
sion that lasted six years.
1
It is little wonder why many of the harbin-
gers of educational reform were held in contempt by inmigrants and
the
disenfranchised populace. To expound the virtues of education with its
accompanying increases in cost per pupil expenditure, higher salaries
for
teachers, better school structures and teacher training
facilities, all
of which would be tax-supported amidst the economic
depression, indicates
2
how desperate and fearful many were of potential
conflict.
But as the economic improvement occurred and business
was once
again revitalized in the mtd-1840's, the economy
began a steady rise that
eventually led to a plateau of prolonged economic
prosperity, ihese
years of prosperity saw the greatest rise in the
general support of pub-
lic education. In conjunction with the sociological and
demographic
changes and the increasing wages and expectations
introduced by this
period of prosperity, the common school became
more viable to many Ameri-
cans. Michael Katz explains its sudden
popularity and support:
FHiirati on to its mid-century enthusiasts became
a wonder drug
o
C
oc?al Infection and a Lns of direction and rego at,ng
„ .. ] r h'nnp And the qlory of it all was that u invuiveu
no structural 'changes in society,
and the increase in taxes
would be more than saved by the safety of
property.^tne
behavi- and personaiity
1 Historian Samuel Eliot Morrison in
th^Oxf^Histor^of^he
American People, speaxs of ^
ferin9 ™
ernment assistance of any kind for
"...There was no social secun ty » r 9 nnorhouse. Cold and hungry
c?as sssrtxs rP ^ »- *»*
And a promising labor movement collapsed;...
and Gintis argue class conflict.
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was required; no alteration of existing social hierarchies, no
interference with private property, and vested interest would
scar the formation of the new model order.'
The tremendous gain in support of public education from 1848-1856
was manifested in increased school expenditures (per-pupil cost,
teacher
salaries, bureaucratic staffing), thereby increasing both the size
and
number of public schools.
2
Also legally, it was reflected in the
Roberts vs. Boston case (which recognized that Negroes should
be educated
if in separate schools) and the Compulsory Education Law
in Massachusetts
(1852).
As the common school became a familiar sight in
many northern
antebellum communities, there were concurrent changes
in the methodologi-
cal focus within the classrooms. Due to the heavy
criticism of authori-
tarian methods by Mann and others, the newly
created normal schools con-
centrated on a "softer" pedagogical approach.
These techniques included
the "look-say" method of teaching reading,
the use of drawing, and the
object teaching method.
3 Motivationally, these approaches stressed
affection over corporal punishment and
student-centered instruction over
The period was also marked by the
personal triumph of two of the
teacher-centered.
educational reformers leading advocates.
Secretary to the Board of Education in
M
Horace Mann, who was the first
assachusetts, was elected United
Vatz, The Irony of Early Sch_ooLtoform» P-
49 -
.alysis of social, economic and edu-
Appendix A in Katz's ]Tie__Ironx_Oj_
Early School Reform .
3
Ibi d.
,
pp. 115-161.
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States Representative. Henry Barnard, who had been ousted as Connecti-
cut's first Commissioner of Education in 1843, triumphantly returned to
his position in 1851. In both cases, each man would continue his advo-
cacy of public instruction and distinguished service.
In the midst of .the economic prosperity, the personal attainments,
as well as the fiscal, structural and methodological changes, drastically
altered both the nature and the content of public education. These
changes were concentrated in the more industrialized areas in the North-
east, but spread with industrialization to cities in the South and West.
The geographical perspective, education following industrialization,
.
buttresses the radical economist's view (correspondence principle) that
the expansion of capitalist production (accumulation) required
changes in
social reproduction. That is, the factory system undermined
the role cf
the family as the unit of childrearing (education) requiring
a new mech-
anism for training workers, quelling social unrest (common
school).
As quickly as its ascendency occurred, the support
and direction
of the reforms drastically changed with the economic
depression of 1857
and the eventual onset of the Civil War. As the
popular support was
withdrawn, the reforms took a more conservative
bend that reflected the
mentality of the recently created bureaucratic
structure. For more than
a quarter century, without public support or
concern, education in
1 Bowles ' and Gintis' book, Schooling in Caci
toHst_America, is
instructive in' relating educational reform to
organization and.industna
growth It offers a number of studies
comparing u-baoizat:°n in t e
industrialized nations.
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America deteriorated and in some areas was neglected altogether.
1
Progressive Reform
After the Civil War, the nation's industrial growth once again
moved forward with renewed confidence and vigor. From 1867 to 1897, a
period of thirty years, the economy showed great diversity and expansion.
Profits, however, remained at relatively depressed levels. This was the
result of four factors: Rapid technological changes, effects of
foreign
and domestic competition, lack of skilled workers in many
economic sec-
tors, and several panics initiated by overspeculation in the
financing of
railroads and the westward migration." The outcome of these
conditions
was the development of monopolistic business practice
through the elimina-
tion of competition by "gentlemen's agreement", and by
the centralization
1
Michael Katz, in The Irony of School Reform (p.13),
documents
that the increase in enrollments, the number of
schools, and tne numoer
of Lachels slowed considerably after 1857. While
in Class
,
°;reaucrga
and the Schools he reflects on what happened when lay
interest declined
TOW's Sosepn Cronin, in Th^^jrft^rb^c^,
amol i*1es Katz's remarks with data on fourteen
large cities. Hecon-
clSdesthat the gradual loss of power by parents and
voters led to the
c^frol of schools by a minority of owners and col
lege graduate >
wanted the schools to preserve Protect
their way L
^
Cremin. in The Transformatjon^hetc^ ” Horace
in emphasis in his analysis of the philo p
"Mann's common school
Kara, and William Torrey Harris. He explains
that H
was to contribute substantially
^
the fashionnaeof “ emerg^
^ ^ ^
Itafhid already come into existence."
„™t c
^^‘and^financial^managemenf after World War II. The
reforms
deposit insurance, regulation of security
craui, y, y
and the autonomy of the Federal Reserve
Boa .
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and concentration of economic power .
1
In essence, it marked the begin-
ning of the modern corporation.
During this period, immigration continued to include ever larger
9
numbers of Southern Europeans. Demographically, most settled and sought
employment in urban areas where overcrowding and slum conditions were
aggravated. In addition to their labor, the immigrants brought customs,
values, and new ideologies that were in conflict with the prevailing
socio-economic philosophy. The ethnic solidarity of these immigrants was
seen in the rise of unions as once again they asserted themselves through
their control of apprenticeship training and periodic strikes. Together,
the labor militancy and the social condition surrounding industrialization
and urbanization caused a threatened bourgeoisie to seek mediation of
the
potential conflict through the enlargement of the societal roles of gov-
3
eminent, social welfare and education.
In education, the last quarter of the Nineteenth Century had
seen
the beginnings of many educational reforms .
4 However, most lacked any
Ibid.
,
p.64.
^Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, in
MeT^ra
Pot (Boston • MIT Press, 1963), p.183, found that not all the
immigrants
Tound America to their liking, end men, returned to
their home country.
An example is that nearly one-sixth of the Italians
who arrived in the
late 1880's returned to Italy.
J
In his
Roots of Crisis ,
changing liberal
tition, private
espoused control
4Marvin
cise account of
the century. In
essay "Liberalism and the Quest for Orderly
Change", in
Clarence Karier sees these changes as a
reflection of
philosophy; from the old liberalism that embraced
cornpe-
property, laizze-faire government, to the new
liberalism tha
led economy, state planning and group thought.
Lazerson in the Origins of the Urban...S
chool., gives a pre-
the development of
_iduHtTohaTTFo^ before the turn of
tracing the development of kindergarten,
manual training,
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degree of public acceptance, except in isolated areas. ^ The overall edu-
cational structure remained relatively unchanged despite the onslaught of
immigration, the increase in compulsory education laws, and the existence
of methodological alternatives. Without public support of the proper
economic climate, the quality of teaching and teacher training, as well
as the total resources allocated to education remained quite low. In
essence, education in America was allowed to stagnate.
The 1890's, however, saw the beginning of a deluge of social and
educational criticism instigated by such journalistic muckrackers as
Joseph Mayer Rice and Jacob Riis, Although protests concerning educa-
tion had been heard intermittently during the previous quarter century,
these new attacks generated great controversy. Eventually, they initia-
ted a re-evaluation of the educational process. This could hardly be
seen as sudden insight by the American society into the problems
of pub-
lic education, but rather as had occurred before, a response
to a
3
recently evolved set of social and economic parameters.
vocational ism, and civics, he shows how each was diverted
from its origi-
nal goals and eventually diluted to reflect the
schools traditional man-
date of sorting, socializing, and holding.
1
Perhaps the most famous attempt at reform was
in Quincy, Massa-
([
rhusetts under the direction of Col. Francis Parker.
The Quincy System
abandoned a set curriculum and traditional methods
of teaching ™|aing
, nrj ari thmati c As Lawrence Cremin describes the system in
ine iransTur
mat.ion of the School , (p.130), the “emphasis was on
observing, describing,
and understanding."
2| ,„„Dnro fVpmin. in The Transformation of thejachools. PP-20-21,
describes^th^abhorent
1
condi t1oHs^Hat-eHTti3"mrThi^chooTs7 which were
the target of Rice and Riis.
3The nroblems associated with urbanization,
industrialization,
and labor^mili tancy^troubled many -tdzens
The conda ions « n urban
areas were abyssmal , and many cries of
dissent began to be
31
Educational reform, supported by the upper classes and endowed
with business and philanthropic support was a corollary to a wider pro-
gress ivism of the period.
3
Beneath its liberal rhetoric, it endeavored
to sustain order and discipline without ultimately changing society to
any significant degree/ To be sure, part of the early support for edu-
cational change and social reform, however limited, reflected a genuine
concern for individuals.
3
But within progressive pluralism, the focus of
the reform was again lost and eventually its noblest ideals were sub-
verted to reflect the views of the business sector.
4 Precisely as it had
occurred fifty years before, sociological and economic changes had juxta-
posed, creating a potential for violence and conflict within the American
society. Once again these conditions, combined with a period of
sus-
tained economic prosperity, provided the milieu for the consideration
of
educational reforms. These reforms were a substitute for the
deeper con-
sideration of other more drastic alternatives to a more
egalitarian
society.
The economic record shows that beginning in 1897,
there was a
1 Cremin, The Transformation of the School,
pp.viii-ix.
2Clarence Karier, in "Liberalism and the Quest for
Orderly
Change", Stains that the underlying meaning of the new liberal
philo-
sophy of the Progressives was control and
order.
3 lt is hard to imagine as some revisionists have
intimated, that
the motives of Jane Adams and others who
sought to ease the pain of urban
life were a front for other beliefs.
4
For a discussion of the problems of
pluralism within the pro-
^
Change", Edcentric Magazine , March-Apnl,
.9/b.
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sharp increase in and then a prolonged period of economic prosperity
lasting until 1907. During this period, education assumed a larger and
more functional role in society. With its roots in the past kindergarten,
manual training, civics instruction, among others, gained a degree of
support.' Soon the role of the schools in the lives of individuals
became more important, as increasingly they were promoted as isolated
enclaves amidst the urban squalor. Ultimately, this humanitarian concep-
tion of education, that included viewing school as an equalizer of
opportunity and a bastion of democratic ideals, would be lost to its more
traditional functions. This was reflected in both its philosophical and
organizational marriage to the business sector.
Like the economic community, the organization of schools became
more consolidated and centralized. Under the guise of efficiency in ad-
ministration and decision making, the role of the superintendent increased
while the participation of the School Board declined. This had a drastic
effect on the functioning and the control of schools, as Joseph Cronin
explains
:
These ingredients, a smaller board, a stronger executive,
decreased lay parti cipation--buf minimal teacher participa-
tion--were essentially elitist, conservative and a reaction
against immigrant ethnic groups and their interests in
'[lost of the revisionist writers consider this period the most
active in terms, of concern and support of reform in education. Although
many reforms were espoused and initiated during this time , ,
would be modified to reflect the more traditional functions of
the school.
Respite information to the contrary, schools continue to be
idealized and asked to perform tasks that should be done
in the w'^der
society. Present day busing is a prime example of Jow
education, i p
motion of democratic ideals, must discharge responsibilities
that are
more appropriately the domain of the socio-economic
system.
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getting control of the schools to maximize the economic' mobi-
lity of their people.!
The move toward administrative efficiency was part of a wider "Scientific
Management" movement initiated by the writings of Fredrick Winslow
Taylor. Although a systematic approach to industrial management through
an analysis of the factors of production, it produced many educational
corollaries due to the suggested parallels between schooling and the 'pro-
duction process. Reforms such as the junior and senior high schools,
vocational ism and the testing movement reflected this association and
provided training (skills) and ethics (respect for authority, punctual-
i ty
,
discipline, cleanliness) appropriate to the workplace. Through the
use of an elaborate testing mechanism, schools sorted students behavior-
ally and intellectually: then counseled students into varied occupa-
tional strata which reflected a minimum amount of social and fiscal mobi-
lity.^ The resilience of this type of reform to outlast the periods of
^Cronin, The Control of the Urban Schools , p.103.
^Raymond Callahan, in Education and the Cult of Efficiency,
(Chicago: University of ChicagFTr^rTTWTT^orilTaers .ffiTTarr^Ameri-^
can Tragedy" in education. His reasons are fourfold: First, educational
questions were subordinated to business considerations; second, adminis-
trators were produced that were not educators; third, a scientific label
was put on some very unscientific and dubious methods and practices;
1 astly, it contributed to an anti-intellectual climate in American
society. But Joseph Cronin defends the administrative acceptance of the
efficiency movement by indicating that it was not tied to economics so
much as a desire to gain more information about the effectiveness of pro-
grams, ( The Control of the Urban School , p. 109)
*
^Perhaps the best analysis of the testing movement is given in
Clarence Karier's Shaping the American Educational State , p.143. He con-
tends that "Repeatedly, throughout the twentieth century the tester
^
tested and measured the consequences of social conditioning and social
repression, and insisted they had accurately measured natural talent and
virtue. 1 '
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prosperity, is an example of what David Cohen and Marvin Lazerson des-
cribe as "issues of distributive social justice" being "translated into
matters of individual ability and efforts in the school and marketplace."'®
Modern Reform -
As prosperity ended and the United State's entrance into WWI
seemed imminent, those educational reforms such as kindergarten and manual
training advanced as having a humanitarian focus, had suffered a humilia-
ting metamorphosis. The kindergarten, whose advocates had hoped to
soften the impact of urban life on the young, had become by WWI the pre-
paration for the grade school. Manual training, once touted as a demo-
cratic ideal in which everyone should participate, became vocational
training that channeled the lower classes into economic and social niches.
What remained of the reforms Initiated in the years of prosperity were
those which valued discipline and order, and that emphasized the custo-
dial function of education.
2
The comprehensive high school, junior high
school, vocational guidance, and meritocracy, the legacy of
this reform
period, are the most obvious examples of the continuing
commitment of
these principles.
After the depression of 1907, the economy began to
recover with
the anticipation of WWI. It is the feeling of many
economists that the
1 Cohen and Lazerson, "Education and the
Corporate Order", in
Education in American History , edited by Michael
Katz, P-324,
2Sorinq and Gumbert, in Superstate and S
ugersdiool, feel that the
HSiJISHS
and economic role.
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nation's productivity had reached a plateau given the state of technologi-
cal advancementJ Underproducing and with unemployment on the rise’, the
war provided the external stimulus that motivated technological change,
decreased unemployment, and caused the conciliation between many conflic-
ting interests in the American society. The "outside threat" had effec-
tively released the economy and pulled the country together.
Following the wartime prosperity, the economy showed considerable
variability despite the necessity of replacing shortages in goods and ser-
vices caused by the war. Even as 1929 approached, economic enthusiasm re-
mained high, with many believing in a period of endless growth and pros-
perity. The extent of the Great Depression is hard to imagine. The psy-
chic and personal damage alone caused by unemployment and the loss of
personal assets is incalculable. Economically, the country was shattered.
Industrial production was cut in half causing private investment to be
curtailed as prices fell. Subsequently, the decline in prices and capi-
tal value had the drastic effect of undermining the solvency and faith in
the banking establishment.
Despite the emergence of government action in the form of public
works projects' and revised fiscal and monetary policy, the recovery was
slow and painful. In fact, the actual recovery was not assured, had it
not been for the economic stimulus provided by WWII . Again, war provided
a degree of prosperity,^ if at a tragic cost in human suffering.
^Dowd, The Twisted Dream , p.87.
^Robert Aaron Gordon, Economic Instability and Growth. The Ameri-
can Record, (New York: Harper and Row, 1974), P-64. In a revealing com-
ment about employment during the 1 930
1
s
,
Gordon intimates that at no time
was there a goal of full employment ever mentioned. Business only wanted
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From the end of the war to 1961
,
the economy grew with only mild
and temporary interruptions. Although the period was marked by sus-
tained and rapid technological development, to understand the reason for
the growth it is necessary to mention the structural changes in the
economic system. Those changes include the changing position of the
United States in the world economy; the growth of governmental and mili-
tary expenditures; the impact of social security, unemployment compensa-
tion, welfare payments and the use of monetary and. fiscal policies to
provide a floor for purchasing power; the relocation of the population
with its impact on the building industry; and the status of occupational
changes (from agriculture and industrial procedures toward services and
professions)."* These structural changes had as large a sociological and
demographic impact as they had in the past.
The demographic corollaries to the economic changes were reflec-
ted in three ways. First, the decline in agriculture caused many rural
inhabitants to seek employment in the urban areas. In demographic terms,
tliis meant a large influx of Negroes and poor whites from the southern
states to northern cities. Secondly, reacting to this migration
and to
the demands of urban life, many chose to resettle in the suburbs.
Thirdly, in response to changes in organizational philosophy
in the busi-
ness sector, city-to-city migrations came to be seen as
appropriate and
other ways, including (at lea:
for example, longer schooling
so on.
1
Dowd
,
The Twisted Dream , P-107.
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necessary for advancement."* This demographic response of course had its
sociological consequences.
The family structure, already weakened in the traditional sense
was to bear the brunt of much of the disorientation caused by economic
and demographic changes. The frequent movement caused by job displace-
ment or migration accentuated the isolation of the nuclear family, as
lasting friendships became more difficult to initiate and maintain. In
addition, the sense of community that was often associated with ethnic
enclaves did not transfer to the suburbs where relationships tended to be
superficial
.
The family further changed as women pressed increasingly for
equal rights and men were asked to share a larger role in domestic acti-
vity. As children became increasingly aware of the dynamics and contra-
dictions of modern life, there developed a "youth culture' that both
rebelled against schools and parents, while often seeking relief in the
form of drugs .
2
It seems clear that a satisfactory family life became
more difficult to maintain given the changing cultural relations.
So also did the workplace continue to decline as an outlet where
"*As many have indicated, the demographic changes contributed
sub-
stantially to aimlessness modern man is feeling. Uprooted and
alienated,
it is little wonder that so many seek a nostalgic and rural
solution to
the ennui of modern living.
Spring and Gumbert, in Superstate and^uperschooX, explain
the
reason for the rebellion in this way: "The combination
of extended
dependency, consumer exploitation and the sharing of a
common social life
helped to create the youth culture... As a social group
of
0fJ™i-
about working, it could define its social importance
in terms o humani
cote?n...Much of the turmoil in high schoo s and co!
age 1 the
industrial countries of the world during
s was the resu t or
conflict between youth's newly defined social function
and the oi
societal role of the school."
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one could engage in satisfactory social relations. The limitations and
routine of most jobs, in addition to the automation and bureaucratic
hierarchies, made it increasingly difficult to take pride in labor."*
Studs Terkel's book Working and the government study Work in America are
a testimony to the alienation and isolation that modern man is feeling.
Amidst these difficulties, American society once again turned to social
2
welfare and education for their salvation.
Despite the acute criticism of such men as John Dev/ay, George
Counts, and Upton Sinclair, schools had remained essentially the same in
terms of organization, methodology, and curriculum since WWI. In 1957,
the launching of Sputnik caused a re-examination of the current educa-
tional practice. In addition, the printing of Slums and the Suburbs by
the noted educator James Conant (1961), expanded the critique by arguing
that the disparity in resources between city and suburbs was creating
"social dynamite to accumulate in our large cities. Thus education,
serving as a scapegoat for falling behind in the space race, and as the
"*This is not only true for the business and industrial sector,
but also for the state sector which has grown the largest over the last
fifty years.
2
The Kennedy and Johnson presidential years were filled with a
plethora of new social welfare and educational programs. Host
attempted
to alter the environmental impact on urban children. The Head
S^art
Program is an example of this type of reform in education.
(See Spring,
The Sorting Machlng .
)
3
The relationship between the nature of this book and
the . focus
of the muckrackers (Riis and Rice) in the 1890's is by
no means circum-
stantial In his concluding chapter, Conant feels
compelled to .eview
the u/nrk nf r.remin's Transformation of the School , especially in regards
to Qu?ncyfMa«achusetiTl^^
nev r
former he calls for equality of educational opportunity,
while e
seeing’the contradiction between equality of educatTon
and equality of
opportunity in this society. (See Fienberg, Reason_^jna_Rh^ }
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cause of the continued failure of minorities in social and economic mobi-
lity, became the focus and the panacea for societal ills. That is,
school' as the most common and accessible of all modern institutions, was
once again to become a social ameliorative agency. Soon, a familiar
pattern began to unfold as the economy entered another period of pro-
2
longed prosperity.
For the next seven years (1962-1969), criticisms and reforms were
initiated from various sectors of society, but not surprisingly, many
came from the corporate sector. As had occurred before, foundations and
philanthropic agencies through their fiscal and media domination, con-
4
trolled both discussion and direction of educational reform. In
addition to the ideological bias, some firms sought in their support of
the educational reform movement to capitalize on the sizeable economic
5
market in educational hard and software.
The reforms offered during this period were most often either
Due to its commonality, education tends to be the first line of
defense against a sharper more hostile critique of the equity of
the
socio-economic order.
2
See Graph 1A, pp. 17-18.
3
For a methodological study of the relationship between
education
and corporate policy, see Joel Spring, ^ tdp ^ r
d
r!
l
Corporate State, (Boston: Beacon Pre Ss7T972T) IrTTriiFTho^^
why
P
education~fs the preparation for control by anonymous
authority and
how each institution compliments the other.
4
Many of the major works that offered alternatives to the
tradi-
tional educational structures were completed in Classram by
aid of philanthropic support. An example. is CnjLL|T^
Charles Silberman. This book became a primer for
educational reformers
with the support of the Carnegie Foundation.
5What further contributed to this avarice was
the substantial
amounts of governmental funds appropriated to e
uca ion.
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humanistic or rationalistic. The humanistic reforms, offered as an anti-
dote to the increasing ennui and violence of urban life, attempted to
alter the social relations within the classroom. Low structure learning
environments, individualized instruction, rural free schools, and value
clarification among others, similar to the highest ideals of the kinder-
garten movement, were highly individualistic and represented a largely
nostalgic and anti-urban solution to the serious social problems caused
by technology, urbanization, and cultural change
."1
Other more rational-
istic reforms urged changes in the educational process that favored beha-
vioristic and technocratic approaches. Individualized programs, learning
systems theory, and behaviorial objectives, although seemingly more sys-
tematic and efficient, did little to change or overcome educational out-
comes. More often than not, they merely reaffirmed the faith in the
tenets of competition and control .
2
Most remarkedly, they resembled both
in philosophy and content the scientific managers of the turn of the cen-
tury, seeking more efficient and effective methods of performing the tra-
ditional functions of education, that of sorting, holding, and sociali-
zing . 3
1
Thi s is not to say that these reforms are inherently
compromis-
ing, but rather that they are poor substitutes for more
substantial
changes in the total environment. They often act to divert
_
the focus of
the reform, causing the irrationality of the system to
be misconstrued
as individual problems.
2
Io be sure, many of the rationalistic reforms
ho id promise for
improving public education, but as long as competTtTve
achievement tests
and socialization that stresses external rewards
occurs within our
schools, their effect is marginal.
3Not all rationalistic reforms have been successful
in improving
instruction! For Ix^le, the reading program advance by Westinghouse
in Indianapolis seems to have failed to improve
reading skills.
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As prosperity declined in the late 1 960 ' s and early 1970's as a
result of the war and its raging inflation, so also did the educational
reforms. Educational conservatism, as evidenced by the rhetoric of the
!
'Back to Basics” movement, regained popularity amidst the declining test
scores and the results of Coleman and JenksJ Those reforms that have
lasted (individualized instruction, competency-based instruction, among
others), are those that are meritocratic and that do not seem to alter
2
the basic formula for educational success.
Thus, this most recent reform period reveals the unmistakeable
pattern of interesting ideas and cursory change in the service of the
status quo. Bowles and Gintis have seen the ideological implications of
these historical lessons in their summary of the progressive era:
The legacy of this urban reform movement bespeaks both of its
commitment to social control as the overriding objective of
schooling. Special amelioration, open education, equaliza-
tion of opportunity, democratic forms that could all be^pur-
sued only insofar as they contributed to, or at least did not
contradict, the role of the school in reproducing the class
system and extending the capitalist mode of production.
d
From this interpretive historical framework of the radical scho-
lars, the following assumptions can be generated concerning school reform
1. School reform has been a response to major demographic chan-
ges in the United States.
1 Although the declining scores in basic skills tests have all
been used as apparent evidence of the shallowness of the recent educa-
tional reform, it should be remembered that the results are
indicative of
even the most traditional learning environments.
2
In addition, they continue to legitimate the tracking
of indivi-
duals into unequal economic and sociological positions.
3
Bowles and Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist America,
Chapter 9,
P-9.
2. School reform represents a liberal response to a threatened
social order.
3. School reform has been the result of a discontinuity between
social relations in the workplace (production) and the social relations
in the school (social reproduction).
4. The corporate sector played a decisive role in determining
the direction of school reform.
5. The most lasting reforms reflect a more efficient mechanism
for performing the traditional school's functions of holding, sorting,
and socializing.
CHAPTER II
DEMOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS
OF ROCHESTER, NEW YORK 1950-1970
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the demographic and
economic conditions that existed in Rochester immediately preceding and
during the 1960’s. This will be performed in two sections: Demographics
and Economics. The demographic section will deal with general character-
istics of the population, including descriptions of size, age, ethnic
identification, and migratory patterns. The bulk of the information
cited in this section was obtained from United States Census data, as
well as information provided in local population studies completed by the
Rochester Bureau of Municipal Research. The economic section will survey
the general economic conditions by studying the characteristics of the
labor force, the relationship between management and labor, the types of
business and commercial concerns located in the area, and a review of the
economic climate of the 1960's. This demographic and economic orienta-
tion is vital because it provides an index to the character and general
soundness of city life. Further, it provides an objective framework for
comparative study in which wider generalizations can be obtained.
Demographics
By the beginning of the 1960's, certain demographic changes typi-
cal of those in other major northern cities began to manifest themselves
in Rochester. Between 1950 and 1960, Rochester's population
declined
44
from an all-time high of 332,488 to 318,611, a drop of 4.2% (see Table 2A
on Page 45) J However, despite the decrease in the city's population,
the remainder of Monroe County (where Rochester is situated) increased
2
from 155,144 to 267,776. This 72% increase in the population of Monroe
County represented a massive migration to the town and suburbs surround-
3
i ng Rochester. The character of which is seen in Table 2B on Page 46,
Although births had exceeded deaths by 35,866 between 1950 and
1960, the total population of the city of Rochester had declined by
13,887. This indicated a net migration of 48,743 from the city. Concur-
rently, this population shift had distinct racial implications.
As Table 2C shows,
4
the white population which in 1950 was
324,643 had decreased by 1960 to 294,388 or 9.3%. Meanwhile, the non-
white population had increased from 7,845 to 24,228— a remarkable 204% in
the same decade. In other words, the non-white population which in 1950
represented two percent of the population had increased to over seven
percent in just ten years.
The age distribution of the population shift adds another dimen-
sion to the demographic changes (see Table 2D). Between 1950 and 1960,
the percentage of the total population between 0-19 years of age had
in-
creased by 5.6%, while those between 20-65 had decreased by 8.9%.
'City of Rochester Population Study, Rochester Bureau of
Munici-
pal Research, Inc., June, 1963, Table 1.
^
I bid .
3
1 b i
d
. ,
Table 3.
4
Ibid . , Table 4.
"'Ibid.
,
Table 5.
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TABLE 2C
POPULATION BY RACE, 1930-1960
CITY OF ROCHESTER
1930 1940 1950 1960
!
Total Population 328,132 324,975 332,488 318,611
White Population 325,294 321,553 324,643 294,383
Non-white Population 2,838 3,421 7,845 24,228
POPULATION CHANGES BY RACE, 1930-1960
CITY OF ROCHESTER
j
Total White
• 1
Non-whi te
Population Population Population
;
1930-1940 -3,157
-3,740 583
1940-1950 7,513 3,089 4,424
1950-1960 -13,877 -30,260 16,383
1930-1960 -9,521 -30,911 21,390
Source: U. S. Censuses of Population
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TABLE 2D
AGE DISTRIBUTION BY RACE, 1930-1960
CITY OF ROCHESTER
1930 1940 1950 1960 !
Total Population
0 - 19 32,7% 27.1% 26.5% 32.1%
20 - 64 61 .2 64.7 62.6 53.9
65 and over 6,1 8.2 11.0 14.0 1
' Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100,0%
White Population !
“0-19 32.7% 27.1% 26.3% 31.0%
20 - 64 61.1 64.7 62.5 54.2
65 and over 6.1 8.2 11.0 14.9
Total 100.0% 100,0% 100.0% 100.0%
Non-white Population
0 - 19 27.8% 2.9,71 31.9% 46.8%
20 - 64 68.9 65.8 64.3 50.3
65 and over 3.3 4.5 3.9 2.9
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Note: Due to rounding.
Source: U. S. Censuses
items do not
of Population
necessarily add to totals.
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However, in terms of the white and non-white populations, the change was
even more pronounced. In the 1950's, the 0-19 age group in the non-white
population had increased by 14.6% and those between 20 and 65 years of
age decreased by 14%. More specifically, the reason for this shift was
the influx of young non-shite population that was between 0-39 years of
age (see Table 2E on Page 5'0)J
Meanwhile in the white population, there was a distinct change in
nearly all age brackets. Especially significant was the high degree of
migration of those between 20 and 40 years of age (see Table 2F on Page
bl)/ The net result of the population shift was the the city of Roch-
ester was at once becoming both very young (non-white) and very old
(white)
.
The beneficiaries of the population shifts were the suburban ;
areas that surrounded Rochester. In suburban areas like Henrietta,
Brighton, and Greece, the population rise was meteoric. So rapid was the
shift that some towns like Irondequoi t began to experience overcrowding
due to the factor that they had reached saturation levels. These subur-
ban areas had white populations. In fact, most had fewer than 25 non-
white residents. With urban planners suggesting that the white popula-
tion would continue to decline by almost 30,000 in the next decade while
projecting that the non-white population would again double,^ the exodus
^
]
lpid
. ,
Table 6A.
‘
Tlbid
, ,
Table 6B.
3
Population Study: Rochester-Monroe County Metropolitan Area,
1960-1980, Monroe County Planning Council, June, 1962, p.95.
4
Op. cit.. City of Rochester Population Study, Table 8.
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was assurred to continue. In fact, the migration continued at a rate un-
equaled by any other metropolitan district in the Northeast. 1
Economics
Rochester was fortunate to have a stable economic environment
relative to other metropolitan areas in the Northeast during the study
period. The major factors contributing to this equilibrium were favor-
able labor market characteristics and the general strength of the manu-
facturing sector.
Labor Force
Most major firms in Rochester were involved in technological,
electrical, or mechanical fields. They required a labor force that was
highly skilled with a research and technical orientation. Most of the
new employment generated between 1950-1960 reflected this trend (see
Table 2G on Page 53).^ Professional, technical, sales, service, and
clerical occupations increased numerically and as a total percentage of
the work force. By 1960, 75% of the labor force in Monroe County was
either skilled or semi-skilled. In such great demand were these employ-
ees that many business analysts believed that the major limiting factor
for further economic development in Rochester was an insufficient market
3
in skilled labor. This fact was to create a strange anomaly during the
1
Blake McKelvey, Rochester on the Genesse: The Growth of a City
,
(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1963), p . 241
.
2
Committee on Economic Research, Basic Economic Information on
Rochester, New York
,
Rochester Chamber of Commerce, Nov., 1954, p. 12.
3Genesse Finger Lakes Regional Planning Board, Regional Economic
and Demographic Analysis
,
Report One Basic Study Series, Oct., 9, 1969,
p .M-8.
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TABLE 2G
LABOR FORCE CHARACTERISTICS
MAJOR OCCUPATION OF EMPLOYED PERSONS IN 1960 AND 1950
MONROE COUNTY
Major Occupational Group
Percent Distrib.
Total Male Female Total M F
1960
Employed 231,201 1U9,L,20 81,781 100 100 100
Professional, technical.
and kindred workers 33,351 21, 973 11,378 111 15 111
Managers, officials, and
proprietors, inc. farm 17,658 15,581 2,077 8 10
. 3
Clerical, kindred wrkrs 38,703 11,686 27,01? 17 8 33
Sales workers 17,680 11,955 5,725 8 8 ?
Craftsmen, foremen, and
kindred workers 36,728 314,1,82 2,21,6 16 23 3
Operatives, kindred wrkrs 1:7,51:9 30,738 16,811 21 20 20
Private household wrkrs 3,023 123 2,900 1 3
Service workers, except
private household 17,198 8,521 8,677 7 6 11
Laborers 7,380 7,011 369 3 5
Occupation not reported 11,931 7,350 h, 581 5 5 6
1950
Employed 202,197 136,1,56 65,71,1 100 100 100
Professional, technical.
and kindred workers 22,361, Hi, 360 8,001, 11 10 12
Managers, officials, and
proprietors, inc. farm 19,51:0 17,1,87. 2,053 10 13 3
Clerical, kindred wrkrs 30,861 10,371: 20,1,8? 15 8 31
Sales workers 111, 982 9,961 5,021 8 7 8
Craftsmen, foremen, and
kindred workers 36,1,13 33,836 2,577 18 25 li
Operatives, kindred wrkrs 50,113 32,253 17,860 25 21: 27
Private .household wrkrs 2,358 Ihh 2,211, 1 • 3
Service workers, except
private household 11,, 628 8,539 6,089 7 6 9
Laborers 8,1,71 7,989 132 li 6 1
Occupation not reported 2,1,67 1,513 951: 1 1 2
Source: United States Bureau of Census
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mid-1960's where at once there existed a chronic need for highly trained
labor and vast reserve of unskilled and uneducated individuals demanding
to be trained.
Another remarkable feature of the labor force in Rochester was
its stability. As Table 2H indicates J Rochester was virtually free from
labor unrest and work stoppages for many years. Despite its status as
the third largest city in the New York State, Rochester's labor force
rarely exceeded 2.3% of the total man-days idle for the total State. In
part, this was due to the generally favorable working conditions and the
lack of unionization in the city’s largest businesses. In these busines-
ses (a key example being Eastman Kodak), management provided extensive
fringe benefits such as salary bonuses, free dental and medical assis-
tance, and recreational activities to their employees, in order to
counter any thrust toward unionization. So congenial were labor rela-
tions in Rochester that in 1960 the labor turnover (separation and quits}
fell far below that of the remainder of the country (see Graph 2A on Page
2
56). This meant that once an individual was trained and hired, they
would likely stay within the same organization.
The harmonious relationship between labor and management coupled
with the need to retain skilled and semi-skilled workers in the tighten-
ing labor market was reflected in terms of weekly earnings, hourly wages,
3
average hours worked, and unemployment in Rochester (see Table 21).
Committee on Economic Research, Basic Economic Information on
Rochester, New York
, p . 1 8.
^
I bi d
.
, p . 1 5 .
3
Ibid
.
,
p. 19.
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Historically, the weekly earnings of production workers in Rochester had
been significantly higher than their New York State counterparts. During
the late 1950's and early 1960's that trend (differential in weekly and
hourly earnings) continued to grow at a higher rate. As a result, in
1963, the "effective buying power per household" in Rochester amounted to
$9,015, while comparative figures showed New York State to be $8,279 and
nationally $7,130. In addition to the high wages, the unemployment rate
in Rochester was remarkably low, usually between two and three percent.
In fact, in 1966
,
it fell to an incredible 1 . 1 % of the labor force. ^ Few
communities in the nation regardless of size could even approach these
figures in unemployment and income.
A final characteristic of the labor force that often is neglected
concerns the degree of participation by the business sector in community
affairs. Perhaps more than any major city in the nation, Rochester has
been known for its community involvement, especially by its managerial
class. Corporation and businesses have encouraged (in a sense mandated
it for professional advancement) that their middle and upper level employ-
ees become involved in the city's recreational, civic, religious, and
social organizations. So intense has been this commitment that often
business and corporate -leaders have been "loaned" to the public sector at
the business's expense. Tin's was especially important during periods of
intense crisis within the community.
!
Sales Management Inc., "Survey of Buying Power", June 10, 1964.
2
McKelvy, Rochester on the Genesse
,
p.243.
59
Business Sector
The stimulating force behind the upsurge in employment and income
tnat occurred in the late 1950's and early 1960's was the expansion and
growth in Rochester's manufacturing sector. This growth was the result
of major technological advancements and market expansions. In turn,
these innovations provided substantial capital expenditures for new con-
structions and subsequently spurred the development of Rochester's retail
and financial sectors.
The corporation making the greatest contribution to the economic
expansion in Rochester was Eastman Kodak. Employing over 40,000 people,
it saw unparalleled growth. Based on many technological advancements
(i.e., development of the Instamatic camera), it found an ever-growing
market for its goods and services during the affluent years of the 1960's,
investing heavily in research and capital construction, Kodak continued
to expand its markets and further contribute to Rochester's economic well-
being J
Another firm which experienced remarkable growth during this
period was the Xerox Corporation. Second only to Kodak in employment.
Xerox continued to make large gains in the relatively new photo-copy
field. Similar to Kodak, it reinvested heavily in research. In fact, in
1964, 10% of its gross return was reinvested. Furthermore, Xerox chose
to expand its productions facilities, tripling both the size of its local
plant facilities and its total employment between 1961 -1964. 2
^McKelvy, Rochester on the Genesse
,
p.224.
2
Ibid
., p.246.
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Behind these two major industrial giants, other firms made more
modest improvements. General Dynamics, whose two divisions Electronics
and Stromberg-Carlson employed over 10,000 individuals, expanded their
electronic, telephone, and control system markets. Another leader in its
field (optical instruments), Bausch and Lomb continued to make substan-
tial gains with its development of hard and soft contact lenses. Mean-
while, smaller economic development occurred within the Sybron Corpora-
tion (hospital, medical, dental, and control data equipment) and the
General Motors Products Division (carburetors and electrical motors).
1
Subsequently, the surge in the manufacturing sector affected .the
retail trade in Rochester. Although the central business district had
declined, many new retail outlets located in the suburbs and towns enjoyed
remarkable success as both retail sales and employment rose sharply in
the late 1950's through the mi d-1 960
‘ s . Eventually, this stimulated the
construction industry as many new retailing firms sought to establish
stores in new shopping centers located in the affluent suburban areas.
The construction industry, already burgeoning from capital con-
struction occurring in the manufacturing and business sectors, experi-
enced further growth through a tremendous increase in housing starts.
This housing boom was centered primarily in the suburban areas where in-
creasing number of former city residents had decided to resettle. The
actual number of new housing permits requested between 1961 and 1965 in-
2
creased from 3,187 to 5,451 per year. Meanwhile, construction in the
1
Ibid .
2
Ibid.
,
p.247.
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central city continued to decline. The imbalance between the demolition
caused by urban renewal and highway construction and the shortage of new
housing starts in the central city created overcrowding in houses that
were forced to serve as multiple dwellings in the city's low income
areas.
Rocnester s financial institutions also benefited from the gains
in the manufacturing and retail sectors. During the 1960's, they mounted
a massive construction campaign which resulted in the rebuilding and
expansions of office and banking facilities in the dowtowrs area. Further,
they found the need to construct smaller branch offices in Rochester's
expanding suburban areas. In addition to the banks already established
in the area, this period saw the influx of many new financial institu-
tions. So affluent and seemingly stable was the financial and social
climate that even several of the conservative New York banking institu-
tions opened branch offices in Rochester.
Another firm that enjoyed relative economic prosperity during
this period and that played a substantial role in community life was the
Gannett Press. Known as. one of the nation's most conservative newspaper
chains and headquartered in Rochester, it expanded through the acquisi-
tion of several smaller newspapers located in the Eastern United States.
In Rochester itself, it maintained a virtual monopoly by controlling both
the major morning and evening papers. With a wide circulation, its con-
servative outlook became a powerful communications force in molding com-
munity opinion.
‘
1
Ibid.
62
In summary, the favorable labor market characteristics and
strength of the manufacturing sector caused Rochester to enjoy remarkable
prosperity. The nine county region that surrounds the city in the early
1960 s displayed the highest income levels, the highest proportion of the
labor force in manufacturing (38.4%), the most skilled workers, and the
highest agricultural income in the upper New York State area.
' With an
unemployment rate that was among the lowest in the nation and with per-
sonal income far above the state and local averages, 2 it seemingly offered
an individual unlimited potential for stability and socio-economic advance-
ment. As the local newspaper told a shocked city on July 25, 1964, it
seemed "hardly a place for a riot".
^Genesee/Finger Lakes Regional Planning Board, Regional, Economic,
and Demographic Analysis
,
p.M-12.
2
New York State Department of Commerce News, Albany, New York,
May 12, 1964.
CHAPTER III
SOCIAL UNREST IN ROCHESTER:
JULY, 1964—THE RIOTS AND THEIR AFTERMATH
Introduction
From Sits early beginnings as a small mill town along the route of
the Erie Canal, Rochester has shown a propensity to adapt to the changing
character of its social and economic conditions. Whether it was the
large influx of immigrants at the turn of the century or the transference
from a small mill town to an industrial city, each transformation has
been completed with relatively little difficulty and discontent. 1 Yet,
despite its past, Rochester was unprepared for the conflict that plagued
it -and other American cities during the 1960's. In Rochester, demogra-
phic changes and years of inequality in the distribution of goods and
services culminated in inner-city riots and mass action. These events
severely tested the city's basic social and educational institutions as
never before. At stake was the control of those very institutions them-
selves.
Precondi tions
Despite the apparent affluence within the region (Chapter II),
I am indebted to former Rochester historian Blake McKelvey in
Rochester on the Genesee and Gannett reporter Dan Lovely in his three-
part series, "Decade of Decision", (July, 1974), whose works were invalu-
able in constructing an historical outline on events during the study
period. Although I do not necessarily agree with their interpretive
framework, their efforts made it possible to quickly gain access to many
historical documents.
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many contradictions existed in Rochester in both material conditions and
the treatment of its citizens. In order to gain an understanding of
these contradictions, it is necessary to examine the social and economic
conditions preceding the riots of 1964. These preconditions can best be
studied using census data from the areas where most rioting occurred (see
Map 3A, Page 65; Table 3A, Page 66; and Map 38, Page 67. Also see
Appendix A..)"®
,
The bulk of the disturbances of July, 1964 occurred in census
tracts 1, 2, 3, 4, 11, 12, 13, 64, 65, and 90. All but two (13 and 90)
had decreased in total population since 1950. In some instances the
decline was over 50%. However, despite. this overall migration, most of
these tracts had seen phenomenal growth in the non-white population.
There are two basic reasons for this increase. First, these areas
offered a source of inexpensive housing for many new immigrants from the
Southern states looking for job opportunities in the area. Second,
these areas received many migrants from other sectors of the city. This
occurred when families were displaced by urban renewal and highway con-
struction in the centra! city and, subsequently, where additional housing
had not been forthcoming.
Housing in these census tracts were all below average in the per-
centage of deterioration and delapidation. The two tracts where rioting
was most severe (tracts 11 and 12) ranked first and second with 91% and
^Map 3A, Table 3A, and Map 3B have been taken from a Population
Study of Rochester completed by the Rochester Bureau of Municipal Re-
search in 1963. Additional information from this three-volume work have
been placed in Appendix III and related to demographic information con-
cern the census tracts in which rioting occurred in July, 1964.
2
Ibid.
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70% respectively considered del api dated.
1
‘ To further exacerbate the
living conditions, most of these tracts showed a high degree of over-
crowding: Census tracts 2, 3, 11, 12, 13, 64, and 65 ranking the highest
in the number of persons per multi
-person household (see Table 3A on
Page 66).^
In terms of age, the residents in the riot tracts were both very
young and very old. Tracts 2, 11, 12, 13, 64 and 65 ranked within the
top fifteen of all city census tracts in terms of the percentage of indi-
viduals under 18 years of age, while the other riot tracts, such as 1,
3, 4, and 90 ranked among the highest in percentage of individuals between
19 and 85 years of age (see Appendix A ).
3
Educational attainment in the riot areas was somewhat ambiguous.
Some tracts were among the highest in the number of individuals with less
than an eighth grade education. However, tracts 4, 64, 65, and 90 were
located in the middle third of those with less than eight years of educa-
4
ti°n • Perhaps a better indication of the educational situation comes
from the fact that although the city had median school age of 11.2 years,
non-whites in Rochester had a median school age of 8.8 years. 5
^ Desmond Stone, "Rochester Riots--Scar? or Spur?", (four-part
series), Rochester Times
-Uni on
, Part Two, August 20, 1964, p.l,
2
For further demographic data on housing in Rochester, see
Appendix III.
3
For additional demographic data on age distribution in Rochester,
see Appendix III.
4
For additional demographic information on educational levels in
Rochester, see Appendix III.
5
Stone, "Rochester Riots", Part III, August 21, 1964.
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In economic terms, the census data indicates that the riot areas
were among the very lowest in terms of median family incomes. 1 In 1960,
the median family income for the city was $6,361, yet the median family
income in the riot tracts was far below this figure (in some instances
more than $2,000 less). 2 Taken separately {white/non
-white)
, the despar-
ateness of the situation for non-white can be seen more clearly. The
median income for a non-white individual in 1960 was $2,364, while his
white counterpart averaged $3,647, a difference of almost $1,300. This
figure represented an increase of 49.8% among the white community since
1950, but only a 43% increase for non-whites (see Table 3B below). 3 Put
TABLE 3B
For additional demographic information on income levels in Roches-
ter, see Appendix A.
2
1 bid.
3
Stone, "Rochester Riots", Part III, August 21, 1964.
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another way, not only were the economic conditions for the non-white pop-
ulation bad, unlike the popular notion, they were becoming worse.
Despite the claims of affluence and mobility by community leaders, the
fact remains that Rochester was one of two major cities in New York State
in which the non-white population had not made economice gains in compart
son with the white population income. More specifically, Rochester had
the lowest non-white median income in the State .
^
In the area of unemployment, the situation was equally bleak for
tne non-white community. While in New York State unemployment had de-
creased between 1950 and I960 from 10.2% to 7.4% among non-whites, in
Rochester it had climbed from 13.8% to 14.1% during the same period. 2
This was reflected in the riot census tracts where unemployment was among
<3
the highest in the city. To make conditions even worse was the fact
that when work was available, it was primarily in marginal occupations
such as domestics or as unskilled labor. 4
Despite these deteriorating conditions (in housing, education,
income and unemployment), few citizens were seemingly aware of the plight
of the non-white community in the city. Even as the civil rights move-
ment was calling attention to the problems encountered by non-whites
during the late 196Q's and early 1960's, only limited action was taken by
community leaders to investigate the seriousness of local conditions.
^
Ibid .
2
Ibid .
3
For additional demographic data on the levels of unemployment in
the census tracts, see Appendix A.
4
For additional demographic information on the employment charac-
teristics of those in the riot areas, see Appendix A.
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Usually this amounted to the appointment of several commissions (the most
notable were the Commission on Race and Religion and the Human Relations
Commission) which had little power and functioned primarily as community
sounding boards. When the acknowledgement of a problem did occur, it re-
sulted in a small handout from agencies like the Community Chest.
Overall, in the early 1960's the Rochester community remained con-
fident that the city was somehow spared the problems that plagued other
major urban areas. As Laplois Ashford, the first director of Rochester's
Human Relations Commission would later say, there existed in Rochester a
certain "smugness that says that vie are so much better than others, so
why raise hell here."'1 Not only did this smug attitude exist latently,
but it was actively encouraged by members of the white community. For
example, two members of the NAACP (the only formal non-white organization
that seriously questioned conditions in Rochester) resigned due to
alleged pressure from the white community on those active in the civil
2
rights movement.
The non-white community in Rochester was forced to endure other
indignities in the early 1 960 ' s . Several prominent incidents that in-
creased racial tensions serve to make the point: In August of 1962, the
police arrested a black gas station attendant as he closed the station'.
The police alleged that the attendant had refused to identify himself.
During the arrest and subsequent trip to the police headquarters, the
attendant received numerous injuries including two fractured vertebrae.
^Dan Lovely, "Decade of Decision," Rochester Democrat and Chroni-
cle
,
Part I of a three-part series, July 7, 1974, p.lA.
2
Ibid
.
,
p. 14A.
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Since this had not been the first incident of alleged police brutality,
some 350 individuals launched a protest. Under the name the United
Action Committee, and with the support of the NAACP and the Human Rela-
tions Commission, this group organized a legal defense fund and sought a
full-scale investigation, of this and other incidents of suspected police
brutality. Under intense pressure, City Hall capitulated to their demands
for an investigation and called for increased training for the police in
the areas of community relations and civil rights. 1
While this case of the gas station attendant was still under ju-
dicial review, two similar incidents occurred to further increase ten-
sions. The first involved the Black Muslim leader Mai com X. The police,
reflecting the values of the business and community leaders, as in the
case of the NAACP resignations, had become increasingly suspicious of any
organized activity within the non-white community. At that time, the
Muslim community in Rochester had invited Mai com X to speak at a religious
gathering. Acting on a report that a man with firearms had been seen in
the general vicinity of the church headquarters, the police launched a
full-scale raid on the services. The Muslims resolutely refused to per-
mit the police entry, and in the struggle that insued, 15 Muslims were
2
arrested, although no firearms were found.
The second incident of police brutality that occurred during this
period involved a black who was arrested for drunken driving. After
being stopped by the police, the intoxicated man was taken to police head-
quarters for questioning. A short time after his arrival, he was suddenly
1
Ibid .
?
McKelvey, Rochester on the Genesee
,
p.249.
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rushed to a local hospital with assorted injuries that included a broken
arm and hand.
As a result of the two incidents, the United Action Committee
gamed new followers. Immediately, a protest vigil was organized at City
Hall. Subsequently, the United Action Committee insisted that the
Rochester City Council appoint a civilian review board to hear complaints
concerning police brutality. Amidst the uproar, the police chief sus-
pended the arresting officers. Then, almost immediately, he reinstated
the officers under pressure from the Patrolman’s Association and City
Hall. This series of incidents served to enrage the non-white community.
In March of 1963, as a result of continued community pressure, the City
Council created a Police Advisory Board
J
This seemingly small concession was the catalyst for the inspec-
tion of other basic institutions in Rochester. Soon schools, social
agencies, labor and business organizations came under close scrutiny of
community leaders from non-white and lower-class white areas. Sensitized
by thi s pressure, these organizations began to re-examine their policies
toward the poor and non-white elements in the community. For example,
school officials attempted to desegregate a predominantly non-white
school by busing non-white children to an all-white school. 2 Social agen-
cies established informal counseling services and training facilities in
non-white areas of the city. City planners called for the demolition of
]
Lovely, "Decade of Decision," p.!4A.
"
Ibid
.
3
MeKe Ivey, Rochester or, the Genesee
,
p.25Q.
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one of Rochester's worst slum areas and sought to replace it with a new
school and playground.^ 1 he local media (Gannett Press) began to give
more attention to affairs in the non-white community, providing more news
concerning activities in the non-white community and featuring articles
about successful non-white business leaders. 2 However, despite the gen-
eral review and nominal alterations, serious policy modifications did not
occur, and those small changes that did occur functioned as only minor
adjustments to the city's overall neglect of its disenfranchised. By the
summer of 1964, the conditions in Rochester's non-white and lower class
areas had only become worse.
The Riot
On the evening of Friday, July 24, 1965, the Northeastern Mothers
Improvement Committee planned a barbecue and dance for inner-city resi-
dents in order to raise money to buy a merry-go-round for a neighborhood
playground. Since the dance was to be held in a vacant lot, an authori-
zation had been secured from the local police. In addition, the Police
Department assigned two patrolmen to the dance area to supervise the pro-
ceedings. The evening progressed satisfactorily without a hint of
3
trouble and with more than two hundred residents in attendance. At
about eleven-thirty, a party sponsor asked the patrolmen to remove a
1 Stone, "Rochester Riots", Part II.
2
3efore the riots, the Rochester press had neglected to_write
about events in the non-white community. Still following the riots, the
articles appearing in the paper rarely addressed the desparate conditions
in the non-white sectors.
\ovely, "Decade of Decision", p.!4A.
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youth who had arrived intoxicated. During the arrest, a small group
gathered and began heckling the officers. Reinforcements were requested
and suddenly 35 officers with dogs arrived to assist in the arrest. The
crowd enraged by this obvious show of force grew quickly in size and
became restless. Suddenly, years of frustration and resentment were re-
leased as rocks and bottles were thrown and local businesses looted. The
rioting continued to grow throughout the early morning hours despite con-
1dilatory gestures by the local police chief. A state of emergency was
called and soon State and County police units arrived to help quell the
disturbance. However, despite the massive police entourage, the fires
and pillage continued until the pre-dawn. hours.
When morning came, the extent of the devastation was apparent.
The morning paper published the banner headline, "Negro Mob Riots Here".
Further, the paper went on to suggest possible communist involvement and
its editorials demanded that the authorities "do whatever necessary to
2
restore order.
"
The mayor, city manager, local and county law enforcement offi-
cials began to plan a strategy for the remainder of the weekend. Road-
blocks were established to prevent sightseers and vigilantes from coming
into the riot areas. A- curfew was imposed prohibiting traffic and group
activities as well as liquor and gasoline sales in the riot area for the
remainder of the weekend.^ However, these preparations were of little
^ Lovely, "Decade of Decision", p.!4A; McKelvey, Rochester on the
Genesee
,
p.253.
^ Rochester Democrat and Chronicle , July 25, 1964.
^McKelvey, Rochester on the Genesee , p.253.
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avails as _periodic incidents continued Saturday.
The second evening of rioting was even more devastating than the
first, i he fires and looting spread across the town to include other
lower socio-economic and racially mixed areas. That night, four people
died and over 350 people were injured. The property damage soared into
the millions. As the evening progressed, it became obvious to city offi-
cials that Governor Nelson Rockefeller had to be informed and urged to
send the National Guard, despite the large contingent of local, county,
and State law enforcement officers
J
By early morning, the first company of Guardsmen appeared on the
streets of Rochester. Soon, over 1,500 of their colleagues arrived and
prepared camps throughout the city. For the remainder of the weekend and
into the early part of the following week, the National Guard troops
patrolled the riot areas. After several days of calm, Governor Rocke-
feller flew to Rochester to survey the damage and to declare the "situa-
O
tion here is well in hand."
The results of the rioting were extensive; more than 975 indivi-
duals arrested: 792 blacks, 153 whites, and 35 Puerto Ricans. Most of
these individuals were employed and between the ages of 25-29. Only 166
teenagers were incarcerated and they composed the bulk of the 243 arrested
who were unemployed. Most of those arrested had lived in Rochester for
3
over 10 years with only 18% newly arrived (within two years). These
^McKelvey, Rochester on the Genesee
, pp. 254-255; Lovely, "Decade
of Decision," p,14A.
2
Lovely, "Decade of Decision", p.14A.
3
McKelvey, Rochester on the Genesee
,
p.255.
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figures quickly dispelled the impression within the community and fur-
thered by the local newspaper accounts that the rioters were a "Negro
Mob" composed of unsupervised teenagers and unemployed hooligans. In
addition to the human losses, the property damage was equally extensive.
Property claims ran into the millions with more than 200 stores looted,
damaged, or destroyed.^
There was another type of casualty over and above the human and
property losses. The self-serving myth of Rochester as the "most
unlikely place" for a riot was shattered with shocking suddeness.
Despite newspaper attempts to buoy its tarnished image with calls of non-
2
white betrayals, the psychic damage and guilt on the part of many
Rochestarians was immeasurable. It would remain for years and would be a
contributing force in the attempts at local educational and social reform.
Aftermath
Immediately, public officials attempted to absolve the community
and fix the blame for the riots within the non-white community. City
Hall issued a progress report attesting to its many achievements and
programs serving the lower class areas. Government leaders claimed that,
in fact, no other city had "done as much for race relations." The local
newspaper denied that the city had been delinquent in its treatment of
the non-white community. Their editorial stated, "A great libel is being
Lovely, "Decade of Decision", p.MA.
^
Rochester Democrat and Chronicle
,
July 25 and 26, 1964; Roches-
ter Times Union
,
July 25 and 26, 1964.
3
Lovely, "Decade of Decision", p.MA.
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applicated to this city by some of its own citizens and by visitors
brought here by the riot. It is that this has been a complacent city,
refusing to recognize that if has been sitting on a powder kog.
Further, they affixed the cause of the riots to "Hoodlumism" within the
non-white community. Mrs. Harper Sibley, Chairman of the Committee on
Race ana Religion and one of the wealthiest individuals in the area, said
that despite the injustices the rioting was "absolutely intolerable and
2
i n.excusible. Final sy, the city manager blamed the rioting on the
failure of the Negro Leadership
1,
to inform him of the impending disaster,
claiming in a paternalistic tone that "it will be necessary for us, with
other responsible people in the community to help develop a competent
3
Negro Leadership.'
Within weeks of the riot, a myriad of committees, organizations
and commissions, attempted to analyze the conditions in Rochester leading
to the riots. Some, like the Human Relations Commission, tripled
requests for funding for inner-city projects. Others, like the Voter
Registration Commi ttee
,
launched an effort to register non-white voters.
Still others, like ABC (Action for a Better Community), started a variety
of job training programs headed by Operation Outreach that recruited
young adults for jobs as machinists, welders, typists, and sales workers.
4Some less ambitious committees merely issues reports.
^
Ibid .
2
1 bid .
2
1 bid .
4
McKelvey, Rochester on the Genesee
,
p.256.
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But the most important action came from within Rochester's reli-
gious community. The Board of Urban Ministries (structured and financed
by local Protestant denominations) and the Rochester Area Council of
Churches (member congregations) had become concerned with the lack of
leadersnip and organization within the non-white community. At first
they tried to enlist the aid of the Southern Christian Leadership
Council (SCLC) headed by Martin Luther King, to help organize the non-
white community. Although the SCLC did send several members to Rochester
immediately following the riots, Dr. King declined further involvement on
the grounds of priorities in the South. At that time, the Board of Urban
Ministries began consideration of requesting Saul Alinsky and his Indus-
trial Areas Foundation (IAF) to organize the non-white community.”®
Saul Alinsky was the most controversial and prominent community
organizer in the United States. His work in organizing Chicago's Wood-
lawn Association and the Mexican-American communities in California had
drawn praise from many sectors. Yet, his abrasive style caused him to
nave many detractors especially from within the traditional power struc-
tures of government and business. This was particularly evident when the
Council of Churches and the Board of Urban Ministries asked. A1 insky to
come to Rochester.
I advised the church council of the cost and said that my organi-
zation v/as available. The council agreed to the cost and "invi-
ted" us to come in and organize. I replied, then, that the
churches had a right to invite us in to organize tiiei
r
people in
their neighborhoods, but that they had no right to speak . for, let
alone invite anyone into, the black community. I emphasized that
we were not a colonial power like churches who sent their
1
Roches ter limes Union, February 5, 1965.
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missionaries everywhere whether they were invited or not. The
black community had been silent--but at that point panic
gripped the white establishment. The Rochester Press, in
front page stories and editorials, raised the cry that if I
came to Rochester it would mean the end of good fellowship, of
Brotherhood Week, or Christian understanding between black and
white! It meant that I would say to the blacks, "The only way
you can get your legitimate rights is to organize, get the
power and tell the white establishment ' either come around or
else! The blacks read and heard and agreed
J
Despite the unreasonable reaction from the professional, govern-
mental, and media leaders, nearly every church and organization in the
ghetto area (together with thousands of signed petitions by inner-city
residents) enthusiastically supported inviting Alinsky to organize
Rochester's non-white community. A short time later in the Spring of
1965, Saul Alinsky and his Industrial Areas Foundation accepted the invi-
tation.
The reaction was swift on the part of the media and corporate
leaders of Rochester. Radio station WHAM indicated that the Council of
Churches would no longer receive free air time for church service broad-
casts. "I would not like to feel that WHAM is contributing in any way to
the support of Mr. Alinsky," said station manager William F. Rust, Jr.
"I feel the church should not descend to this type of indirect political
of mass agitation.” Newspaper and televised editorials flooded the
communications media with condemnations of Alinsky and urged the Council
to reconsider its action. Although many of these amounted to personal
attacks on Alinsky and his IAF, most carried a more paternalistic tone.
^Saul D. Alinsky, Rules for Radicals , (New York:
1971), p. 102.
^Lovely, "Decade of Decision", p.!4A.
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This is exemplified by William S. Vaughan, former Board Chairman of
Eastman Kodak, who upon reminiscing about the Alinsky invitation said:
Why didn’t [they] bring some of the rest of us in. Whenever a
community undertaking of this kind is planned it's sort of a
tradition in Rochester to get everyone involved. We'd like to
have been involved...! was a little irritated, frankly, at the
fact that they'd done it without consulting us when obviously
from their description of the way Alinsky operated it was
going to affect all of us...
1
Part of the "state of hysteria and fear" that became apparent at
the mention of Alinsky's name in Rochester, was due to his community or-
ganizing tactics of which conflict was the most basic. By conflict,
(used in traditional trade union sense, a skill gained from his mentor
and close friend, John L. Lewis), he meant that community organizations
should band together and develop enough political power to force conces-
O
sicns from the controlling power structure. His strategy is well arti-
culated by Charles Silberman in his book. Crisis in Black and White :
The essential difference between Alinsky and his enemies is
that Alinsky really believes in democracy: he really believes
that the helpless, the poor, the badly educated can solve
their own problems if given the chance and the means; he
really believes that the poor and uneducated no less than the
rich and the educated have the right to decide how their
lives should be run and what services should be offered to
them, instead of being ministered to like children.
3
If conflict is what Alinsky thrived upon, he could not have found a more
advantageous battleground than Rochester. Having little experience with
labor tactics and with a penchant for paternalism, local leaders easily
^
Ibid .
2
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played into his organizing strategy. No sooner had he arrived than the
conflict began.
Met by a cadre of eager reporters on one of his early visits to
Rochester, he was asked what he thought of Rochester and he replied:
"Rochester more than any Northern city reeks of antiquated paternalism.
It is like a southern plantation transplanted North. He was then asked
why he was meddling in the black ghetto after "everything" that Eastman
Kodak had done for blacks; Alinsky responded caustically, "as far as I
know the only thing Eastman Kodak has done about the race issue in
America has been to introduce color film."
2
Finally, he was asked about
a personal denunciation of him by W. Allen Wallis, the President of the
University of Rochester who had also been an antagonist in the Wood! awn
controversy in Chicago; he said, "Wallis? Which one are you talking
about? Wallace of Alabama or Wallis of Rochester--but I guess it
doesn't make any difference." In the space of ten minutes, he had sent
shockwaves throughout the entire community. In challenging the city's
basic institutions and image of itself and by raising irrational anger
and fear, he hoped to show the non-white community the vulnerability of
the power structure. John L. Lewis, his former teacher in reference to
his own organizing efforts in Rochester "affectionately" said that "I
A
resent the fact that you are more hated in Rochester than I was."
1
Lovely, "Decade of Decision", p. 14A.
2
Alinsky, Rules for Radicals
,
p.137.
3
Ibid.
Ibid
.
,
p. 1 36
.
83
Since the non-white community had never "seen the power structure
quake as it had since A1 insky's arrival, the community redoubled its
commitment to him and his tactics and began a strenuous organizing cam-
paign. There wasn't an organization in the inner-city that was not con-
tacted by A1 insky's organizers. But the organizational battle was made
difficult by the community power structure. It was not uncommon for a
community organization or program to support Alinsky, then to have its
local funding removed. An example was the Baden Street Settlement House.
Located in part of Rochester's worst ghetto area, it was supported with
the aid of the local Community Chest Agency. After it announced its
_de~
cision to join Alinsky's FIGHT 1 organization, the Community Chest decided
that it would no longer fund an organization that sided with Alinsky.
With its economic survival at stake, the settlement was forced to recon-
sider and ultimately renounce its intention to join FIGHT. 2 However,
despite threats as this and other protestations by local leaders and the
media, the organization drive was a success and culminated in the FIGHT
organization's first convention in Rochester with 1,500 delegates repre-
senting a widely diverse group of community organizations and programs
located in the central city. Its goal was to "unify the Negro people of
Rochester in order that they may assume their rightful role in solving
the problems and determining the courses of action that affect their
lives in this city." To those in the community who had attempted to
1
FIGHT was the name chosen by Alinsky and his followers for their
organization. It stood for Freedom, Integration
,
God
,
Hionesty and Trust.
2
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prevent the development of the FIGHT organization and its convention, the
first FIGHT President Rev. Franklin Florence sounded an ominous warning
in his acceptance speech before the convention delegates. He said, "For
those who fear the people, the convention is rightly a cause of fear and
trembling. Because for those who fear the people prefer paternalism to
democracy. pP
Within the next year, the FIGHT organization secured positions
and representation on many local boards and community agencies that re-
viewed the housing conditions, education, employment, and urban renewal
in the inner city. Placed under close review was the Rochester Board of
Education who had a long history of condoning the defacto segregation
that existed in the city. In addition to securing representation in
community government and organization, FIGHT actively used its pressure
tactics to seek change. This included the picketing of suburban homes of
inner-city slumlords and .the pressuring for better services within the
ghetto (houseing code enforcement, garbage pick-ups, police involvement.
2
Further, it fought to have FIGHT representation on all urban renewal
projects. This was done to assure that the control of construction,
labor, and financing would remain within the inner-city.^ By the time the
second convention convened in June of 1966, the FIGHT organization had
achieved an enviable record in community affairs and success was marked
by the inclusion of 105 member organizations. Still, its biggest battles
lay ahead.
^Lovely, "Decade of Decision", p.!4A
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The Kodak- FIGHT Controversy
Basic to the FIGHT organizations was a concerted effort to have
more Inner-city residents hired into both skilled and semi-skilled posi-
tions in the manufacturing sector. A1 insky and FIGHT felt the key to
this process was to have Rochester's largest employer, Eastman Kodak,
accept FIGHT organization "as the bargaining agent for the black ghetto
of Rochester." If this goal was achieved, FIGHT felt that other local
firms would begin to follow suit;
It should be remembered that during the 1960‘s, many firms in
Rochester had experienced tight labor markets in which job vacancies
-far
exceeded the labor supply. In 1966, the total unemployment in Rochester
was 1.5/4, though within non-white areas it was considerably higher. It
would seem that given the labor market conditions and the prosperity 'in
Rochester that most firms would have been willing to train the untapped
potential of inner-city residents. In fact, this did occur as some firms
like Xerox, Pfaudler (Sybron Corporation) began training programs.
In September of 1966, the FIGHT organization made an initial
-pro-
posal that Kodak train and hire 500 blacks into skilled jobs. FIGHT
would help in this matter by taking the responsibility to recruit and
counsel the trainees. However, Kodak balked at such a plan because it
smacked of unionism; that is, the plan would require that FIGHT be recog-
nized as a bargaining agent. Instead, Kodak offered to review its train-
ing policies and "to discuss how FIGHT might cooperate in the implementa-
tion of plans that the corporation might develop.*" Given its staunchly
]
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anti-union practices, this position was not unexpected by FIGHT and their
supporters. After further discussions had not appreciably changed the
position of either party, the FIGHT organization temporarily withdrew
from further negotiations. During its absence, the public rhetoric
became fierce and quite vitriolic with both sides making claims and
counter claims concerning the bad faith of the other. On October 22,
1966, Kodak, in an obvious public relations move announced that it was
beginning a training program for 100 new trainees, in hopes of preparing
them for new jobs. Unfortunately for Kodak, however, it soon became
apparent that most of these positions were already filled by present
employees or those hired especially for the program. FIGHT's President
Rev. Franklin Florence denounced the offer as being a "fraud" that Kodak
was attempting to perpetrate on the non-white community.'3
Embarrassed by the community's recognition of this half-truth,
Kodak accepted an offer by its Vice President John Mulder to seek a re-
opening of negotiations with the FIGHT organization. In order to do
this, Kodak President William Vaughn was forced to recall Kodak's Office
of Industrial Relations staff and to appoint Mr. Mulder as chief negotia-
tor of a new bargaining team. Within a week, the new negotiating team
had reached an agreement with FIGHT and signed what has been called the
2
"most controversial piece of paper in Rochester's history."
In addition to the furor within the industrial giant caused by
the formation of the new negotiating team, Kodak was undergoing routine
3
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change in its upper echelons of management. William Vaughn, who had
served as the corporations president and who had appointed Hr. Mulder,
>was replacing Dr. Albert Chapman as Chairman of the Board of Directors of
Eastman Kodak. Subsequently, Dr. Louis Ellers was to assume Mr. Vaughn's
role as President. As President Elect, Dr. Ellers had already assumed
most of the responsibility for his office, and there remained only a pro
forma transition. Yet, the FIGHT controversy had created some ambiguity
over control within the ranks of management. Several days before he was
to formally assume the position of President, Dr. Eilers learned of the
Mulder agreement with FIGHT. The agreement indicated that FIGHT and
Kodak had agreed to join in the recruitment and counseling of 600 unem-
ployed people over a 24 month period and that Kodak was to absorb the
training cost. Dr. Eilers was enraged and immediately repudiated the
i
agreement.
On the day that Dr. Eilers officially was to assume office, the
Board of Directors of Eastman Kodak, bowing to the arguments of
Dr. Eilers and tnose of Board member W. Allan Wallis, concurred in the
repudiation. A simple public statement was issued that read that
Mr. Mulder had no authority to sign such an agreement and that "the com-
pany regrets any misunderstanding which may have been created with the
7
c omnium' ty.
"
The following day, the FIGHT leaders met with Dr. Eilers in an
attempt to avoid further embarrassment for both parties. FIGHT asked the
^
Ibid .
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Kodak President to reconsider his actions or merely to state that he
would work together with FIGHT to get more jobs for non-whites. Taking a
hard line. Dr. Ellers refused and told Rev. Florence that it would be in
the best interest of the community if they were to accept Kodak's origi-
nal job training proposal. 1 Seeing that all attempts had failed and that
its conciliatory gesture had been rebuffed in a paternalistic manner, the
FIGHJ organization began the preparation for a battle that would even-
tually humble this industrial giant both locally and nationally.
Keep Your Sermons, Give Us Your Proxies
With the battle lines drawn, both FIGHT and Kodak began an all-
out attempt at discrediting each other. Kodak officials claimed that
FIGHT was not truly interested in employment but rather was more, con-
cerned With the polarizing of the community. Supported by the business
community and especially the Gannett Press whose articles were consis-
tently slanted in Kodak's favor, Kodak sought to undermine FIGHT 1 s commu-
nity and liberal support. On the other hand, FIGHT, with the help of the
Council of Churches, began to place full -page advertisements that were
reprints of the signed compact between Kodak and FIGHT. Of course, this
was made readily available to other media sources as well as national
news services. This type of publicity put Kodak's management on the
defense and tarnished its carefully nurtured public relations image.
Soon the situation became more ugly, with both sides claiming the other
had participated in so-called "dirty tricks" (phone calls, sugar in gas
tanks, etc.). Finally, in February of 1967, Kodak halted any further
Ibid.
89
communications with the FIGHT organization.
1
The battle had been costly to the FIGHT organization in terms of
time, energy and money. Lacking the staying power of Kodak and with the
community growing weary of the divisiveness, the struggle had reached a
crisis state for FIGHT. Alinsky explained:
Now necessity moved in. As the lines were drawn for battle it
became clear that the usual strategy of demonstrations and con-
frontation would be unavailing. While Kodak 1 ;; buildings and
administration were in Rochester, its real life was throughout
its American and overseas markets. Demonstrations might be em-
barrassing and inconvenient, but they would not be the tactic
to force an agreement. It wasn't Rochester that Eastman Kodak
was concerned about. Their image in that community could
always be sustained by sheer financial power. ?Their vulnera-bility was throughout the nation and overseas/
Since the use of traditional tactics would have little overall
impact on Kodak (economic boycott--"asking people to stop taking pic-
tures"), the search for new tactics came under consideration. What
evolved from tactical discussion among FIGHT members was the "Proxy for
the People”. Simply stated, the FIGHT organization, in order to gain
entrance and speaking privileges at Kodak's annual stockholders meeting,
would ask current stockholders to sign their stock proxies over to FIGHT.
The organization itself Immediately bought several shares of Kodak stock.
Within, weeks, Alinsky and FIGHT leaders had crossed the country speaking
at churches, conventions, and universities seeking stock proxies.
Many politicians observed organizations releasing proxies and
foresaw that the same process could be used to achieve votes. "Proxies
were now seen as proof of political intent if they came from large
1
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membership organizations." 1 Subsequently, political intent meant votes,
and votes attracted politicians. The implications were clear. "Sympa-
thetic politicians might request a senate sub-committee hearing in which
a number of practices could be considered as violation of the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act. Another implication would be a full-scale investigation
by the Attorney General's office. (A1 insky contends that Robert Kennedy
was outraged himself by the conditions in Rochester and was ready to move
whenever A1 insky was ready.) 2 Further, the possibilities of applying
pressure were enormous as the "Proxies for the People" movement sent
"shockwaves throughout the corporate world." Clearly, the prospect of
using proxies for social and political purposes "seriously threatened the
existing power structure," for it meant the development of organizational
methodology that could- include representation of the poor and middle
class. As A1 insky clearly understood, "People power is the real objec-
tive; and proxies are simply a means to that end." 3
On April 25, 1967, FIGHT President Rev. Franklin Florence, armed
with his proxies, entered the annual Kodak convention in Flemington, New
Jersey. Once inside, Florence and others sympathetic to FIGHT'S cause
began to question management about Kodak's hiring practices. In the end,
the stockholder's meeting was reduced to a shouting match between manage-
ment and its supporters and those who supported FIGHT. After the conven-
tion, the final blow was delivered to the industrial giant. Before a
1 1bid
.
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myriad of national reporters. Rev. Florence announced that a candlelight
pilgrimage to Kodak headquarters was being organized. It would be held
on July 24, 1967 and would mark the third anniversary of the riots in
]
Rochester. With the memory of the chaos of 1964 still fresh, the anti-
cipation of a hot summer filled with racial disturbances was too much to
handle. After a series of face-saving denunciations in the midst of
local and national scorn, Kodak management hastily sought the reopening
of negotiations with FIGHT.
At the same time that the Kodak-FIGHT controversy was raging, a
series of discussions had been organized at Col gate-Rochester Divinity
School between community and business leaders. From these discussions, a
program called Rochester Jobs Incorporated had been established. Its
goal was to coordinate a community program which would be beneficial in
the training and hiring of the hard-core unemployed. A plan had been
developed so that 40 local businesses would hire 1,500 unemployed indivi-
duals over an 18 month period. These unemployed would be recruited by
p
FIGHT and other social agencies. Most jobs available were either
unskilled or semi-skilled in nature.
The initiation of Rochester Jobs Incorporated coincided with the
FIGHT ultimatum for a candlelight protest march to Kodak. At this point,
another nationally known figure entered the contest: Daniel Patrick
Moynihan, then coordinator of the War on Poverty. His entrance was sup-
posedly at the request of his close personal friend Leonard Zartman who
^
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served as Kodak's corporation counsel. However, it was rumored that
President Lyndon Johnson had originally suggested the Moynihand mediate
the dispute and that the President wanted the candlelight march halted at
any cost. In June, Moyniban organized a secret meeting in which an
agreement was worked out in which Kodak was forced to formally recognize
the FIGHT organization. In a telegram to Rev. Florence, Kodak President
Eilers stated that Kodak recognized that FIGHT was a broad-based commu-
nity organization speaking on behalf of the basic needs and aspirations
of the Negro poor in Rochester. Further, the telegram pledged that Kodak
would send employment interviewers into the inner-city in cooperation- with
FIGHT and Rochester Jobs Incorporated. However, no quotas were set.
^
The FIGHT organization saw the agreement as a total victory.
Afterall, it had gained the recognition, recruitment, and counseling
privileges that it had demanded. Only the quotas had been denied them
in the formal agreement, but this was mitigated by the fact that Roches-
ter Jobs Incorporated would provide additional jobs to the number reques-
ted and from a variety of local firms. It had been a tremendous victory
and now FIGHT began to concentrate on other areas in need of reform. The
first stop in this struggle would be the City School District of Roches-
ter.
1
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CHAPTER .IV
DESEGREGATION AND EDUCATIONAL REFORM IN
ROCHESTER 1961-1972
Introduction
Any historical accounting of the recent movement for school re-
form in Rochester is necessarily linked to the story of racial struggle
in that city. The dynamic changes in Rochester's demographic and econo-
mic conditions had created a large, highly segregated educational system
which provided civil rights leaders with evidence of social and economic
discrimination, as well as a focus for their politics of reform. The pre-
vious chapter has described the social conditions which facilitated and
followed upon the riots of 1964. This chapter attempts, rather, to de-
lineate the progress of the various proposals for school reform and deseg-
regation against a background of power struggle in the city from 1 960-
1972. 1
Although most major plans for desegregation and reorganization of
schools occurred later in the decade, the civil rights movement recog-
nized the need to organize for educational change by at least 1961 when
the local chapter of the NAACP met with the Superintendent of Schools,
Robert L. Springer, to discuss desegregation. These preliminary meetings
produced no change in school policy but record the fact that school
Most of the information contained in this chapter has been com-
piled from newspaper accounts in Rochester's daily papers, the Democrat
and Chronicle, and the Times-Union
.
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officials were formally alerted to the developing problem. More signifi-
cantly, on May 28, 1962, the NAACP initiated the nation's first multi-
racial law suit against desegregation. The defendants, twenty-two
children from ten families (white and non-white), charged the Board of
Education with having violated their constitutional right to due process
and equal protection by enacting “rules and regulations establishing and
operating certain racially segregated schools..." 1 The suit petitioned
the court to grant a temporary injunction to close the segregated schools
and, further, asked that the Board of Education be required to initiate a
plan for the desegregation of Rochester schools. Perhaps the most impor-
tant question being put before the legal system was whether School Boards
could be held responsible for the practices resulting from de_ facto segre-
gation in their districts. The School Board, in this instance, argued
that it was the responsibility of parents in racially homogeneous neigh-
borhoods rather than School Boards to effect such changes. The injunc-
tion was denied, although the case remained active in the courts, thereby
drawing attention to the conditions in the schools.
Dr. James E. Allen, known as a progressive Commissioner of Educa-
tion in Hew York State, brought the pressure of authority to bear on
school officials in 1963 when he publicly reported that sociological and
psychological research had proved that segregated schools can seriously
damage motivation and other aspects of personality development. He in-
structed school officials to submit a statement to the State Board of
Regents: {]) on the status of the problem in their districts, (2) on the
democrat and Chronicle
,
May 28, 1962.
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policy of the district concerning racial balance, and (3) in districts
where segregation existed, on plans to eliminate it. To emphasize his
own commitment, he instructed' his staff to review the State's laws and
regulations to discover their possible application to the State effort to
eliminate segregation in schools.
Reorganization Plan One
Responding to the Commissioner's directive, the Board of Educa-
tion developed Rochester's first School Reorganization Plan. At that
time, ten out of the forty-four elementary schools exceeded Dr. Allen's
quota of no more than 50% non-white enrollment. The plan to correct the
racial imbalance contained four proposals: First, an open enrollment
policy so that students in racially imbalanced schools might be trans-
f ei red for balance. Second, a proposal referred to as the "Princeton
Plan" which merged elementary schools in adjacent schools to create a
racially balanced enrollment in newly created zones. The primary grades
(1-3) would be assigned to one school while the intermediate grades (4-6)
would attend another. Third, a proposal which anticipated the modifica-
tion of the school structure by 1965 (to separate junior and senior high
schools) and considered gerrymandering elementary school feeder patterns
to produce racially balanced secondary schools. Fourth, the proposal to
change curriculum to include more Negro history and culture and to pro-
vide in-service training of teachers so that they might be more sensitive
to the problems of human relations which these changes involved.^
There were objections to this plan from both those who actively
^
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supported desegregation and fro. more conservative elements who opposed
it. Those who supported rapid desegregation felt that it mistakenly
favored the concept of neighborhood schools by avoiding any involuntary
bussing of white children. Also, where racial imbalance was most severe
school boundaries remained relatively fixed (except for mergers under
Proposal Two which concerned only selected schools). These critics also
pointed out that loopholes were available in the open enrollment propo-
sal .
1
Those who opposed the reorganization formed school associations to
voice their disapproval. For the most part, these organizations repre-
sented poor or middle-income whites whose children attended schools who
were to receive non-white students under open enrollment. It should be
emphasized that this opposition was weak, partly because white children
were rarely bussed at that time.
Not even the school officials who drafted the proposals found
this plan entirely satisfactory. Open enrollment, by bussing only non-
white students, corrected racial imbalance only in the receiving school.
Also, as whites continued to leave the city and blacks came in, the prob-
lem was exacerbated. Under increasing social and legal pressure, the
Board of Education expanded their own voluntary transfer program merging
three continuous school zones into an extended "home" zone. Referred to
as the Triad Plan", parents in the three areas c-ould choose one of
three schools for their children. The intent of this option was to honor
Open enrollment would be determined by space available, and
school, officials had the perogative to veto transfers if they determinedthat it would be detrimental to the child (if for instance, a disadvan-taged student would not be able to keep up with his classmates).
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the concept of neighborhood schools while promoting integration. The
three extended home zones that were actually created were located in
economically marginal areas.
^
ihe NAACP and the Monroe Country branch of the New York State
Liberal Party were not satisfied. In 1965, they pushed for stronger
actTon and the NAACP, in particular, dropped their law suit and peti-
tioned Commissioner Allen directly to redress their grievances. Dr.
Allen had recently ordered the Long Island School District {Mai verne
Case) to desegregate, and there was reason for optimism. The Liberal
Party lobbied for a compulsory bussing program by petitioning and picket-
ing the Board of Education. The Board responded by again expanding the
open enrollment policy and initiating a suburban transfer program.
School officials saw this as a demonstration of good intention in elimi-
nating even suburban segregation, although an integrated metropolitan
scnool district was not suggested as a solution since it was not desired
by the suburban population.
In 1966, a voluntary transfer program was initiated in the secon-
dary schools with Madison High (predominantly non-white) as the focus of
attention. Like the transfer program at the elementary school level,
non-whites were encouraged to transfer while whites were counseled to
remain in their schools. This program was quite unsuccessful as very few
students chose to participate.
On balance, the voluntary enrollment policy was not successful.
In_June of 1966, the total program effected less than two percent of the
1
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scjjopl ^ largely non-whi tes who were bussed
lTM_yie_cent^ For those who advocated desegregation in the pub-
lic schools, a new offensive seemed appropriate. This time, a new poli-
tical element was added to their efforts in the presence of the FIGHT
organization.
^
In May 1966, the NAACP, the Liberal Party, FIGHT, and its auxi-
liary in the white community- Friends of FIGHT-demanded an end to racial
imbalance in schools before school opened the following September. John
McCrory, an attorney who had helped the Board of Education organize the
open-enrollment program, publicly declared that the program had fallen
behind tiie mandates issued by Commissioner Allen. His comments were
particularly notable because he was the Chairman of the Board of Urban
Ministries and had joined the Friends of FIGHT organization. His remarks
echoed, in fact, the resolution made at the spring convention of that
organization.
i he coalition petitioned Dr. Allen with the signatures of parents
in the city s elementary school, asking him to significantly reduce
racial imbalance through any means he deemed appropriate. In presenting
the petition to the Board of Education, FIGHT spokesman Rev. Herbert
Shankle, registered the group's outrage:
Nothing has been done, only more public relations gimmicks, more
double talk and everything but positive action... The facts are
tbae segregation grows and our inner city schools get worse as
you sit idly by and do nothing to improve condi tions . . .Your
utter lack of action to date must bring us to the conclusion
At that time, FIGHT was still predominantly concerned with econo-
mic issues. But with its success in that area it had begun to investi-
gate other institutions.
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that you have neither the desire nor the will to end racial
imbal ance.
<
His remarks elicited an immediate reaction from the establishment
sources (such as the Chamber of Commerce) in the community. Local news-
paper editorials labeled the claims "insultingly ridiculous" and its
proponents "publicity seeking". 2 The differences between the two sides
were further publicized in public hearings before the U. S. Civil Rights
Commission.
From this crisis, several important developments emerged: First,
the ineffectiveness of the previous attempt to achieve desegregation
became obvious to State and local authorities. This realization was
quite embarrassing given the inflated statements that had been issued
concerning Rochester's involvement in the integration effort. 3 Second,
with the non-white- community no longer willing to assume the major re-
sponsibility for integration, it was up to school officials (under close
watch by State and judicial authorities) to reinitiate the effort to re-
form the school system. Under these pressures, the Superintendent of
Schools presented the Board of Education with the long-awaited plans for
desegregation of the elementary schools in Rochester.
]
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Booster! sm in Rochester was by no means confined to the economic
sector. Superintendent Goldberg and Commissioner Allen, as well as the
local press, were often guilty of making inflated comments about how well
educational reform was progressing.
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fjj^LLMajor Attempts at Reform
On February 1, 1967, Superintendent Herman Goldberg outlined four
possible alternatives which could be used to end racial imbalance and
effect general educational reform:
The first plan was called the# 1 Rochester Natural Park Plan". It
divided the elementary schools into seven areas. In each area there was
to be an educational complex (park) that would hold a primary, an inter-
mediate, and a special facilities center. The plan would have made
existing schools obsolete and have required extensive bussing. The approx
imate cost of the plan was $47,000,000.
The second plan, called the "Rochester Plan", would have had ele-
mentary schools divided into ten areas, each containing three to six
schools. The existing schools located in the outer perimeter of the city
would be the primary schools, while the inner-city schools would serve as
intermediate schools. This plan required 37% of the school children to
be bussed and would have required seven new schools. The total cost was
estimated at $13,000,000.
The third alternative, called the "Combination Plan", merged
aspects of the first and second plans. New intermediate schools were to
be built in educational parks with primary grades housed in existing
mner-city schools. The inner-city program would feature a maximum class
size of 15 and several "enriched" programs. While construction on the
new schools was being completed, the intermediate grades were to be held
in outer-city schools with inner-city children attending on a space-
available basis.
The fourth alternative plan, called the "Home Base Plan", would
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have divided the elementary schools into seven areas with each area divi-
ded into the inner and outer area city schools. Each school would have
subject matter specialists and act as a "home base" for students.
Students attending these schools would be bussed to specialized areas and
integrated settings at different times during the day, returning to their
home school at the end of the day. 1
The presentation of these alternative plans met with great con-
troversy in the community. Conservative elements (particularly the
Citizens Tax League and the Taxpayer Education Committee) organized a
very effective campaign in opposition to all four plans. It was reported
that most of the mail received by the Board members was against the plans
and much of it was insulting or defamatory in nature. The local papers,
however, urged the adoption of the Combination Plan which it labeled a
progressive yet moderate" alternative since it was relatively low in
cost and concentrated on bussing non-white inner-city children out of
town to the outer-city schools on a space available basis. 2
After six weeks of discussion, the Board of Education rejected
all four alternative plans, and on March 16, 1967, it announced a new
fifteen point proposal that featured a limited two-way open enrollment
program. The proposal included the following points:
1. Use selected features of the Combination Plan.
]
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March 10, 1967. The Times Union article in fact saw potential harm in
'reverse bussing" of white children to inner-city schools.
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2. Reduce class size in No. 3 School
aide assigned to each classroom.
(non-white) with a school
3. Assign a Reading Specialist to each inner-city school.
4. Voluntarily transfer children
to periphery receiving schools.
in Grades 4-6 in School No. 3
5. Transfer advanced placement programs to School No. 2.
6. Implement a voluntary reverse open enrollment program toinner-city Schools No. 2 and 6.
7. Implement a reverse enrollment program to be
similar program in Catholic schools.
accompanied by
.
.,
IfpP
1
ement or the World of Inquiry School (alternative school
similar to British primary school).
9. Continue expansions of urban-suburban transfer program.
c • i l „^
ont1
'
nue integrated pre-kindergarten demonstration program atSchool No. 26.
si. Encourage the .development of a yluntary cooperative federa-
tion of school districts in region to plan ways of reducing racial isola-
tion in Monroe County.
4 n£
n
£
1
'
nue t0 encoura 9 e additional participation in open enroll-
ment and TRIAD Program.
13. Cooperate with community agencies whose programs seek to
remove the basic causes of racial isolation.
14. Work with Model Cities program to upgrade city schools
through new educational facilities.
15. Request the Board of Regents and Commissioner of Education to
send a report on the progress made toward elimination of legal and finan-
cial barriers to reducing isolation in the schools."!
With the exception of limited two-way bussing, most of the fif-
teen points did little in achieving racial balance. In an effort to have
the plan withdrawn, civil rights groups petitioned Commissioner Allen to
direct the Board to implement a total desegregation plan in its place.
Democrat and Chronicle
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The Board, in turn, sought to defend their action by hiring recruiters to
gather non-white support in order to administer the plan. In an affida-
v,t presentee to Commissioner Allen, the Board projected 3,000 full-time
transfers though the number involved never actually approached such an
estimate.
^
By Fall of 1967, it was clear enough that the plan had failed in
both the white and non-white communities. Black parents in School No. 2
Association, whose children were to be bussed to other parts of the city,
had originally opposed the plan fearing that their children would be
leaving an enriched educational program for an inferior experience at the
receiving school. In fact, only 271 of the projected 600 non-whites
actually volunteered to leave School No. 2 and its special programs
designed to attract white transfer students.
During the 1967-68 school year, the effects of the structural and
academic reforms were studied in an atmosphere of relative calm. Outside
dignatanes such as the U. S. Commisioner of Education, Harold Howe, II,
praised the city for its desegregation efforts, as did State Commissioner
2
Allen. At the end of the school year, in August of 1968, the school
district released the results of a study comparing pupils at School No. 2
(integrated) with students in School No. 3 (predominantly non-white):
Non-white students in the integrated program had achieved more than those
in segregated schools. White children did as well as they did in
'In attempts to draw support to the plan, Superintendent Goldberg
was continuously over-optimistic when gaging potential support. However,
when the figures were actually counted, his over-zealousness was always
apparent.
2
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predominantly white schools. (Undoubtedly this was due in part to the
fact that the superior program at School No. 2 had attracted many of the
best students,, white and non-white, in the city.)
The school district report was followed immediately by the re-
lease of a study of parental participation by the Committee for Expanded
School Integration. This report found that white in the professions
(doctors, lawyers, and engineers) had responded most positively to the
move towards integration in School No. 2. In 'contrast, whites in the
outer-city with a marginal economic base showed more reluctance to volun-
teer their children for the inner-city schools. However, this identifi-
cation of professionalism with integration did not increase participation
in the transfer program. In the Fall, a report was Issued that suggested
strongly that non-whites had been poorly received by principals and
teachers when they transferred to new schools. Reecey Davis, the Presi-
dent of the United Federation of inner-city Parents, (a non-white group
supporting integration), demanded an investigation of the staff. With
denials from school officials and the Teachers Association, antagonism
grew mirroring the conflict in the Ocean Hi 1 1
-Brownsvi 1 le area of New
York City occurring one month earlier.
By this time, the non-white community was nearly united against
the integration efforts. The FIGHT organization, which had been only
marginally involved in the reorganization plan in the schools, began to
actively work against it. Soon, even the moderate element in the non-
white community began to withdraw its support of integrated educational
programs in Rochester. Richard D. Harrison, the black Vice-President of
the Rochester PTA Council, resigned and joined the Federation of
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Inner-City Parents charging that the PTA had neglected the pressing needs
of inner-city children, particularly in their failure to protest over-
crowded schools and bad principals.
It was not only the non-white community that had second thoughts
about the effect of the reforms. Legal pressures from Albany were
exerted. In February, 1968, the Board of Regents had issued guidelines
for the racial composition of schools, stipulating quotas for white and
non-white students which corresponded to the composition of the school
district as a whole with the additional charge to eliminate boundaries
which created segregation. Nearly a year had passed since this directive
had been formulated, and Rochester had clearly failed to comply with
State policy. Once again, with the threat of the collapse of its trans-
fer program' and subsequent legal action by the State, the Board of Educa-
tion was forced to propose another plan for reorganization and desegrega-
tion of its public schools.
Second Attempt at Educational Reform In Rochester
In what was termed a “sweeping proposal to integrate and reorgan-
ize high schools on the city's westside", the central office administra-
tion proposed that two secondary junior-senior high schools
-
be turned
into junior high schools. .The remaining junior-senior high schools on the
city's westside would become exclusively senior high schools. In addi-
tion, the administration suggested several major changes in the feeder
pattern of these schools to insure proper racial balance.^ Hearings were
held throughout the city to explain the proposed reorganization plan to
^
Times Union
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the general public. In these meetings, the discussions centered on the
plan's potential for increased integration, the possible effects of bus-
sing, and the advisability of having separate junior and senior high
schools. Overall, the plan received a cool reception by the white
parents on the city's westside (predominantly middle and lower economic
classes). They objected both to the plan's cost and to having their
children bussed to the inner city.
While the plan was under discussion, the Elementary Principals
Association proposed an alternative plan that would have included the
total integration of the city's elementary schools, and not merely those
secondary schools located on the westside. The introduction of this new
Plan by the principals received little support from School Board members
who kept both proposals under review for the remainder of the school
year and into the summer.
In a sense, the Board's indecision was not unpredictable given
that three members had decided to run for City Counsel offices in the up-
coming Fall election. Obviously, they saw a potential danger in taking
a position on such a volatile issue. In late July, however, Laplois
Ashford, Board member and former Urban League President, disassociated
himself from his colleagues on the Board. Recognizing their political
motivation, he presented a motion before the Board urging again total in-
tegration of the public schools. This proposal was deemed too costly by
other Board members and was immediately voted down. In turn, this
triggered action among several inner-city parents organizations to begin
plans for a boycott of the September school openings in Rochester. In an
attempt to increase pressure on school officials, Reecy Davis, President
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of the Inner-City Parents Federation, urged that all members of the
school community (parents, teachers, and children) join the boycott.
Meanwhile, other inner-city groups sent letters to federal agencies re-
questing them to end payments of the Title I and Title II funds ear-
marked for integration purposes in Rochester.
Soon many parents and teachers began to respond to the organiza-
tional efforts of the inner-city parents. The two major professional
organizations, the Rochester Teachers Association and the Elementary
Principals Association, pledged their support of the plan for total inte-
gration, and to show their sincerity, the organizations took an active
role in publicizing the boycott by distributing leaflets urging school
integration. Finally, immersed in conflict of their own making, the
Board of Education attempted to defuse the impending boycott and directed
the Superintendent to make:
been
Jtai led
=
description of desegregation measures that haveput into effect since 1963.
2. Plans to reduce racial imbalance (partial integration).
3. Plans for a complete reorganization and desegregation if
ordered by the courts J y
When this directive was announced at the Board meeting, it drew
jeers and laughter from the audience. Board member Ashford commented
that the motion sidestepped the issues, and that most Board members
already knew most of the information requested. The newly elected FIGHT
President Bernard Giffort interjected a more ominous tone to the proceed-
ings when he stated:
1
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This board has never been responsive to the needs of blackcommunity. Community control which would allow parents andneighborhood residents to set on Boards of EdScat?on fortnei. particular school would be an excellent idea to
t
r
o
em° V
? Schools from politicians. Parents are not going
rhl
back another year. We
-are prepared to lock out
9
eachers and administrators who are not responsive to theneeds of black children in ghetto schools.!
As the school opening neared, elaborate preparations were made by
inner-city parents for the establishment of "freedom schools" for child-
ren who needed daytime care while their parents worked. Staffed by stu-
dents from local universities, these schools were located in various com-
munity centers, churches, and libraries. Despite warnings from the
Superintendent and local editorials decrying such "intolerable interfer-
ence", and last-minute resolutions reaffirming the existing Board's inte-
gration policy, a strick began on September 3, 1969. 2
ihe strike lasted three days and included about one-third of the
students going to the city's elementary schools. Then, after lengthy
discussions, Superintendent Goldberg, Reecy Davis, and Richard Harrison
of the United Federation of Inner-City Parents reached an agreement to
end the boycott. This agreement resulted in the Board of Education organ-
izing a city-wide Advisory Council for Quality Integrated Education.
This Council, composed of various community interests, was directed to
plan an integrated educational program that included bussing to achieve
integration. Further, the agreement provided for an upgrading of the
reading program, the extension of the hot lunch program, and the expansion
1
1bid .
2
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of library facilities in all inner-city schools.
1
Although falling short
of gaining a total commitment to integration by school officials, the
agreement did achieve most of the educational and participatory aims of
the inner-city parents.
The reaction on .the part of the conservative community was predic-
table. Witnessing the emerging power of non-whites in the inner-city,
many parents feared that the Board of Education might be forced to adopt
a compulsory bussing program. The Rochester Neighborhood School Associa-
tion (RNSAC) immediately began efforts to organize this opposition among
members of the white community. During September of 1969, this organiza-
tion filled the Board meetings with speakers and presented petitions with
almost 6,000 signatures. At these meetings, James R. Sims, RNSAC Presi-
dent, threatened that the recent boycott would be a "Sunday School picnic
compared with what you'll [Board of Education] get if you approve a com-
pulsory bussing program."
It was during this reactionary phase that a division developed
within the non-white community. The focal point of the conflict was the
agreement between the United Federation of Inner-City Parents and the
Board of Education. After studying the agreement, FIGHT President
Bernard Gifford charged that the Federation’s agreement with the Board
had amounted to a "sellout" of the black community. To the FIGHT organi-
zation, the non-white community had made attempts at integrated education
before, and each time it resulted in their carrying the burdens of
1
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integration. What FIGHT wanted was community control.
For a while during the Fall of 1969, it appeared as if the moder-
ate conciliatory approval taken by the United Federation of Inner-City
Parents was successful. The Advisory Council mandated in the agreement
was organized and began deliberations, strengthened by President Nixon's
vow to enforce desegregation measures as well as the School Board's
defeat of a motion to ban compulsory bussing, the Advisory Council con-
sisting of members from various community organizations v/orked to evalu-
ate existing programs and to develop a plan to integrate the schools of
Rochester.
All had seemed to be moving smoothly until December when, without
prior notice, the Board of Education passed a resolution banning compul-
sory bussing for the purpose of integration. It was the final political
act of four of the five Board members who had decided to resign or run
for other offices. It marked the beginning of a new phase in the struggle
for desegregation and school reform.
The resolution was a serious blow to the United Federation of
Inner-City Parents and to the liberal community in Rochester who had
supported the concept of integrated education. Richard Harrison, in
registering his disbelief over the duplicity shown by the Board in approv-
ing the anti-bussing resolution, conceded that. "the federation has made
an honest and sincere effort but we’re not in limbo anymore. We know
that integration won’t work here so we're concentrating our efforts in
the black community."^
1
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In an impassioned statement before the Board of Education, he re-
iterated this reformulation of his organization's policy: "After a move
like this I have no alternative but to give up the fight for integration.
But I'm not going to say we worked in vain. We've helped show black
people like myself that no matter how hard we work, white people don't
want integration."^
In spite of the Board's action, five days later the Advisory
Council for Quality Integrated Education convened to make its results
known. It reported that the voluntary desegregation measures and compen-
satory programs initiated by the Board of Education in the last ten years
were a "failure". Furthermore, racial and ethnic isolation had actually
increased. The statement concluded the despite the Board's resolution,
the Council was fully prepared to present its reorganization and desegre-
?
gabion plan.
On December 29
,
1969
, Superintendent Goldberg released the dese-
gregation and reorganization plan for the Rochester Public Schools.
Known as the Goldberg Plan, the aim of the lengthy document was to
achieve racial balance and improved instruction in the city's public
schools. This would have required a quota system of 25% to 40% non-white
enrollment in each school. In addition, it recommended a total reorgani-
zation of Rochester schools into five senior high schools, four junior
high schools, 11 intermediate elementary schools, and 33 primary elemen-
tary schools. (At that time, most secondary schools were Grades 7-12,
^
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while the elementary schools were Kindergarten through sixth.) The cost
of the implementation of such a plan was estimated between 2.5 and 4.3
million dollars.
in a show of support, the Rochester liberal community embarked in
a massive effort within the community to publicize the merits of the
Goldberg Plan. Groups supporting the plan included the Rochester
Teachers Association, the Central Office Administration {school manage-
ment), Metro Act {a liberal white auxiliary formerly known as the Friends
of FIGHT), the Monroe County and Jewish Human Relations Committees, the
Liberal Party of Monroe County, the Voters for Peace, the Board of Urban
Ministries, as well as various social agencies, school committees, and
church and women's groups. 2 These groups crossed the city speaking to
business and community groups (such as the City Council, Chamber of
Commerce, and neighborhood associations) in an effort to apply pressure
on the newly elected School Board. Their efforts were doubled in January
of 1970, when Senator John Stennis of Mississippi announced that Roches-
ter was a shining example of the "neglected and uncorrected school segre-
gation in the North." These remarks embarrassed and outraged the commu-
nity which was highly aware of its national image. A major effort was
made to gain the support of the non-white community for the integration
plan.
Herman Goldberg, Grade Reorgani zation and Desegregation Plan of
Ihe__Ro Chester Public Schools! A Report to the Board of' Education!
December 29, 1969.
'
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Knowing that the newly elected School Board would be unable to
enact the plan without the help of the non-white community, the FIGHT
organization (now with full support of the Inner-City Federation of
Parents), escalated its demands. FIGHT President Bernard Gifford stated
that before his organization would even consider the desegregation plan
workable, certain "non-negotiable" demands had to be met. These included
staffing the nine elementary schools that would remain predominantly non-
white under the Goldberg Plan with experienced and successful teachers.
Also, these schools were to have smal 1 er-than-average class sizes.
Finally, a ‘'mobilization year in reading" would be called in all schools
where more than half of the children were reading below grade level.
^
Although major blocks of the city supported the plan, opposition
remained strong, especially in the predominantly lower and middle class
white areas. Working through RNSAC organization, opposition to the plan
centered around declining property values and the resulting threat of
white exodus from the city. More importantly, those opposing the plan
objected to the cost and the self-righteous attempts by the liberal and
non-white community to influence the Board's decision. Dr. Louis Cerulli
,
a former Board member, summarized this position:
This bussing progra he [Superintendent Goldberg] advocates will
cost you people $2.5 million to $4 million dollars. But who
does he [Goldberg] try to sell it to? He sel-ls it to the
Chamber of Commerce, the City Council and various other groups.
But he does not try to sell it to the normal people who furnish
the children for the schools.
2
To add emphasis, the opposition gathered many getitions and threatened a
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boycott of the schools if the plan was enacted.
At the same time, the Board of Education began discussions with
the FIGHT organization over their objections to the reorganization and
desegregation plan. The Board of Education agreed to EIGHT'S demands for
reading mobilization year, reduced class size, and the upgrading of the
professional staffs in those inner-city elementary schools that were to
remain predominantly non-white. Given these concessions, the FIGHT organ-
ization dropped their criticism to the plan, though no formal written
commitment was made by either party.
In February of 1970, the plan became a political football involv-
ing both city and county legislatures, with intense political pressure
being placed on the local community leaders. Eventually, this pressure
led to claims of political tampering and opportunism, especially from
Republican County Chairman Richard Rosenbl oom. Late in February, the
Board met as a group in order to come to a final decision. In that meet-
ing, the Board seemingly resolved their differences and internal conflict
and decided to approve the plan. However, when it came time for the
public vote, the plan was rejected along party lines (3 Republicans and
2 Democrats). The Democratic Board members immediately called foul, in-
sisting that Republican County Chairman Rosenbloom had overridden the
Republican Board members' acceptance of the plan. Given the local GOP 1 s
fall election platform rejecting compulsory bussing, as well as the
pressure placed on Republic County legislators, the charges made by the
Democrats seem credible. 1 in place of the Goldberg Plan, the Republican
1
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Board members voted for a modified proposal in which the school dis-
trict's open-enrollment plan would again be expanded. It also projected
two new junior and senior high schools to be built in the next few years.
Having expected a more progressive plan, the liberal white commu-
nity was taken by surprise when the Board made its decision. But while
the white community registered moral indignation, the poor and non-white
community began to organize another protest. This time with FIGHT in the
lead, such groups as the United Federation of Inner-City Parents, Ibero-
American League, and local welfare rights groups, vowed their support in
an all-out drive for community control. Speaking for the group, FIGHT
President Bernard Gifford stated that "What the Board of Education did
Wednesday was something we could never do before. They unified us. They
unified all the oppressed. Federation President Reecy Davis was more
blunt when he said that "Community Control and better city schools have
been a long time coming. We've been praying for it, and wishing for it
2
and hoping for if--and now we're going to take it.
This was not the first time that these groups had reacted with
fervor after having their hopes for reform destroyed. But in this case,
with the incorporation of FIGHT, they had gained a tactical expertise.
Together, this new coalition of socially and economically disadvantaged
citizens organized a boycott by students and teachers of all inner-city
schools. One school, the World of Inquiry School, became the special
focus of the boycott. This alternative school, which had been hailed as
^
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the model of integrated education, came to symbolize the end of the non-
white community's support for desegregation. All parents and teachers in
this mode! school were contacted and urged to join the boycott.
Symbolic as the boycott was, FIGHT organizers knew that real
power for reform was located elsewhere. In keeping with the A1 insky tra-
dition that the only power the disadvantaged have is themselves, FIGHT
began to organize what it called "Black Easter". "Black Easter" referred
to an economic boycott of the commercial and business sectors. What this
entailed was not only the boycotting of the downtown business districts,
but also informational picketing of commercial establishments throughout
the usually profitable Easter season.
Soon additional groups began to join FIGHT in calling for this
educational and economic boycott. Such traditional 1y pro-integration
forces as the Urban League headed this group. Even the teaching profes-
sionals, represented by the Rochester Teachers Association, pledged their
support. Association President Wilber Gerst asked the Superintendent of
Schools to close all schools in order to assure school safety. When the
Superintendent acceded to this request, the Association used the school
closing to hold a mass rally and begin plans for the boycotts and picket-
ing. As a result of the meeting, all teachers were requested (whether or
not they supported the boycott) to refrain from crossing the picket line
encountered at the city's public schools. The following day, despite the
threat of the New York State Taylor Law being invoked, one-third of the
Rochester's teachers, mostly from the inner-city schools, refused to cross
the picket lines and joined the march to City Hall. The following day,
the Reverend Daniel Brent, Superintendent of the city's parochial schools.
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joined the public school teachers by closing the schools under his juris-
diction in sympathy with the "frustration of minority groups seeking'
quality integrated education."
1
Further pressure was added when a lawsuit was introduced into
Federal District Court charging the Board of Education with maintaining
racially imbalanced schools. Once again, this attracted State and
national attention to the racial strife in Rochester and in conjunction
with the economic and political pressure caused school officials and pol-
iticians to reappraise their action.
This reappraisal began with the City Manager attempting to help
the Board of Education to save face by stating he was unsure of the in-
tentions meant by their actions. He called for them to deliver a "firm
and final decision" on the reorganization and desegregation plan. More
direct criticism of the Board's action came from the ranks of the Repub-
lican leadership who were overwhelmed by the community pressure. City
Councilman Robert Wood vigorously attacked the Board's decision saying
that it had "polarized this community and increased the bitterness be-
tween black and white, rich and poor, and Puerto Rican and whites." 1
Following Councilman Wood's lead, Mayor Stephen May bluntly told the
Board to put together another reorganization and desegregation plan.
With few choices or allies remaining, the Board of Education
hastily called another meeting to reconsider its decision. Within several
days, a partial plan for desegregation and reorganization of the Rochester
1
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schools was approved. The plan called for the reorganization of elemen-
tary grades in two areas of the city into primary and intermediate
schools. Although this would have reduced the racial isolation in sever-
al schools, an imbalance remained in the city's elementary schools. In
fact, in some cases, this plan required the return of non-whites that had
been formerly voluntarily bussed under the open-enrollment policy to
segregated neighborhood schools.
Most significant to the inner-city organization was the develop-
ment by the Board of Education of parental advisory committees or "commu-
nity councils" in the largely non-whits areas of the city. In its reso-
lution, the Board stated that "the President of this Board will in con-
sultation with community (specifically this meant FIGHT ! s Coalition of
Concern) immediately establish community advisory councils for Schools 2,
3, 4, and 19 on ‘the city's wests ide and Schools 8, 9, 14 and 20 on the
eastside. This meant that FIGHT
' s organization could choose the com-
mittee that would eventually determine the two community councils. The
Coalition of Concern interpreted the establishment of the councils as a
clear mandate for community control. EIGHT'S President Bernard Gifford,
in commenting on the Board's President's statement that "the committee
will define areas of authority and responsibility", added "that was
exactly what FIGHT intended to do. 1,2 As a result of apparently winning a
degree of community control, the Coalition of Concern decided to accept
the revised plan and called off the remainder of the economic and school
^
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boycott.
The conservative community reacted immediately to the decision to
implement a desegregation plan in two of the city's eleven elementary
zones and especially to authorizing FIGHT to develop community councils.
Following the Board's decision, RNSAC organized another school boycott of
their own, in which an estimated 17,000 of the city's 46,600 children
stayed home. (This number is somewhat deceiving because it included
open-enrol Iment and other students who were asked to return to their
inner-city schools.) However, no schools were closed. In consultation.
Board members and RNSAC leaders agreed to hold meetings in the areas of
reorganization to give parents an opportunity to express their views.
The RNSAC leadership decided that if parents in those areas were still
not convinced of the worthiness of the reorganization and desegregation,
it would continue the boycott at a later date.
In the intervening months, while the membership and guidelines
for the community councils were being developed, and as informational
meetings were held in the reorganized zones, the major contestants con-
tinued to pressure school officials. However, RNSAC began to have diffi-
culty generating interest with only several minor boycotts occurring in
the reorganized zones. Meanwhile, the advocates for desegregation
altered their lawsuit in United States District Court converting it into
a class action suit for all students attnding racially segregated schools.
It is interesting to note the media's response during this
period. To journalists outside the area, the reaction to the desegrega-
tion plan represented an example of the double standard that existed be-
tween southern and northern cities. Even the international press and
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media were especially hard on Rochester. ' The BBC did an hour program on
Rochester and its schools, concluding that indeed "there is a great deal
of hypocricy." Yet, more striking was the tone of the local press.
Acknowledging that the proposal for reorganization and desegregation was
a "modest one", (it basically effected lower class whites and non-whites
and provided for community guidance rather than control), editorials
called for a moratorium on any form of mass action be it social or econo-
mic.
2
In June, 1970, the Community Council's guidelines were presented
to the community and the Board of Education: Each council consisted of
at least four members from community agencies (FIGHT, Ibero-American
League, Puerto Rican Parents Association, and United Federation of Inner-
City Parents); one parent member from each school; one teacher represen-
tative; an ex-officio member from the Rochester Teachers Association; and
finally, a member of the Elementary School Principals Association. The
guidelines stated that the Community Council would provide a meaningful
voice in curriculum and textbook selection, the development and operation
of Federal Title I funds, the planning of new and remodeling of old
schools in the Council areas, and recommendation of items to be included
in the school budget. The plans were accepted with surprisingly little
resistance from the conservative forces. The reason for this was tacti-
cal, that is, the battleground was now the political arena in the form of
the School Board elections in the Fall.
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The period preceding the Fall election was marked by relative
calm, especially in the conservative community. In part, this was the
result of RNSAC President's James Sims' candidacy for the School Board.
Sims made an obvious attempt to appear more reasonable and less strident
during this period. However, this was interpreted as playing politics by
more ideological pure RNSAC members, and this eventually caused faction-
alism. Seven RNSAC school presidents resigned in protest of Mr. Sims'
action. With the addition of RNSAC members, and other conservative ele-
ments, these presidents formed an ultra-conservative faction led by former
School Board member Dr. Louis Cerulli. This schism was enough to split
the usually solid conservative community and permit the election of a
liberal school board.
Two seats on the Board of Education were to be filled in the Fall
election. Of the candidates, the Democrats had nominated two pro-
integrationists (David Branch and Wyoma Best), while the Republicans had
nominated two conservative and anti-bussing candidates, one of which was
James Sims. Meanwhile, Dr. Cerulli ran as an independent conservative.
In the Fall election, the normally conservative vote was divided among
the conservative candidates, which caused the liberals to achieve a nar-
row victory. Together, with liberal Board member Thomas Frey, who had
not been up for re-election, they constituted a new majority (3 liberal
Democrats and 2 conservative Republicans), whose aim was to totally reor-
ganize and desegregate Rochester's public schools. Stating that the
election victory represented a "clear cut mandate for progressive action,"
liberal leaders along with the newly elected Board members immediately
began to initiate plans for yet another reorganization and desegreation
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1
of the city's junior and senior high schools.
Reorganization and Desegregation Plan of 1971
In January, 1971, the newly elected School Board put forward its
plan for the reorganization and desegregation of the Rochester schools.
The plan called for the modification of the city's eight secondary
schools (junior-senior) into four separate junior and four senior high
schools. In addition, the Board called for a gerrymandering of the
feeder patterns which composed these secondary schools and for the estab-
lishment of two new alternative schools within the district. Although it
was hoped that these changes would have educational benefits, the major
purpose was to desegregate the public schools through the elimination of
the neighborhood secondary school and the alteration of feeder-patterns
.
The plan received much criticism from the conservative community.
Having been divided in the unsuccessful Fall election, RNSAC and the
United Parents Association once again joined together in deploring the
Board's action. There was another source of criticism, however, and that
came from the inner city. Both the newly formed eastside and the west-
side community councils objected to the school plans on the grounds that
it would erode the small foothold they had gained as far as community
control was concerned. FIGHT President Bernarad Gifford said:
We're not looking to build a separate black world for our child-
ren. All we're saying is that we're sick and tired of black
children being used as pawns. Some people in this room [School
Board meeting] have pushed for integration well over 10 years.
In this period a whole generation of black children have gone
^
through schools miseducated, misinformed and crippled for life/
]
Democrat and Chronicle
,
January 23, 1971.
2
Democrat and Chronicle
,
February 5, 1971.
123
Reecy Davis, President of the United Federation of Inner-City Parents and
former advocate of integration, said in speaking about the potential loss
of community school councils that...
...right now you [non-white community] have a good possibility
of having control of your children's education. I'll vote
against any elementary school reorganization for integration
because I don't think we need it now. . .Something good is hap-
pening in our schools (under auspices of community councils)
and we're not going along uprooting it
J
Despite objections, the Board moved forward once again. Not only
did it pass its proposal to reorganize the city's secondary schools, but
in addition, the Board presented a timetable for the reorganization of
the city's elementary schools. Implicit in its decision was the bussing
of elementary school children. Further, it called for methodological and
curricular changes that included non-graded classes, individualized in-
struction, and ethnic studies.
As on other occasions, an enormous reaction followed the new
directives. But conservative forces neither had the votes on the present
Board nor upcoming Board elections to prevent the inauguration of the
reorganization and desegregation plan. Clearly, another avenue had to be
explored. Eventually, RNSAC and ethers began to concentrate their
efforts on local and county legislatures. The conservative factions knew
that the initiation of the plan would involve substantial funding (though
much of the bussing cost would be reimbursed by the State) and that the
school budget had to pass the City Council. The City Council itself
could not override the Board policy, but neither could it lower the
aunts appropriated, hence, making it nearly impossible to implement the
^
Times Union
,
February 4, 1971.
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reorganization plan. This effort proved effective.
In late March, 1970, in a move that can only be described as
politically expedient, the Republican City Council enacted a bill which
called for new School Board elect! ons--non-partisan elections with a
seven-member slate to be elected. Given the change in political climate
and the consolidation of the conservative vote, this move most certainly
compromised the liberal School Board and seriously obstructed their plans
for reorganization and desegregation since they now faced a very strong
chance of defeat in the new elections.
This was not the only setback for the Board and its program. In
the following months, State and Federal funds for ending racial segrega-
tion were unexpectedly withdrawn. The City Council balked at any capital
construction or renovation needed to implement the reorganization plan.
In the face of adversity, the Board of Education became more determined
to complete the implementation phase before the Fall election. Finally,
in the face of strong disputation by the Board members, the City Council
did approve a school budget, though drastically reduced. For the time
being, the plans for reorganization continued at a reduced fiscal level.
In September, 1971, Rochester became one of the first cities in
the nation to move on its own to voluntarily end the racial imbalance in
its schools. The school opening, though, marred by minor clashes, pro-
ceeded smoothly with the aid of school officials and the religious commu-
nity. The Genesee Ecumenical Ministries stationed teams of clergymen at
the schools involved in the reorganization. Despite the initiation of
"block schools" (neighborhood schools temporarily set up to avoid bussing),
school attendance was high.
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While the school reorganization and desegregation took place with
relatively few disruptions, the political battles over the School Board
election grew fierce. Running for the first time without party labels, a
conservative faction consisting of five candidates campaigned against re-
organization and desegregation. Their platform included planks that
called for fiscal conservatism, against sex education, and severe disci-
plinary procedures for the schools. Their political battlecry was indica-
tive of their sophistication: "Vote Right This Time". The community did
just that, and they vie re overwhelmingly elected despite the release of
information by school administrators giving preliminary evidence that
students viere progressing faster in their new setting. The day after the
election, Gordon Debbond, the new president elect of the School Board,
visited acting Superintendent Dr. John Franco's office and directed him
to ‘develop plans for the dismantling of reorganization and desegreation
in Rochester.
By January, 1972, those plans were completed and the new Board of
Education rescinded the reorganization plan. The decision to roll back
the plan included the return of junior-senior secondary schools and the
return of the elementary school feeder patterns to their pre-reorganiza-
tion status. Once again, non-whites were asked to shoulder the burden of
integration under voluntary open-enrollment programs. Since under the
new plan schools in non-white areas swelled in population, it virtually
assured that only non-whites would be bussed and that there would be only
limited space available for reverse bussing (whites to non-white areas).
Possibly more devastating for the non-white community was the fact that
the Board backed off on its commitment to the easts i de and westside
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community councils. Despite campaign claims to the contrary, the Board
immediately reasserted its power by emphasizing the council's advisory
capacity. Clearly, the community control was dead. The only reforms
that survived were the two alternative schools, though they were eventu-
ally modified.
An article titled "Giving up on Integration" appeared in the New
Repujpli
c
and announced the fate of school reorganization and desegrega-
tion in Rochester to the nation's liberal community. Reading like an
obituary, the article complained that the School Board was now "controlled
by mean-spirited 'anti's' determined to return to the old days when
Rochester's 'happy blacks' kept their problems and their children to
themselves."”® By now, disheartened and with its passion and its leaders
exhausted, Rochester's non-white and liberal community turned inward.
Accurately described in the New Republic article, "a mood of acceptance...
2
settle on the city, as if an era had passed."
® Jerome Zukusky, "Giving up on Integration", New Republic, Octo-
ber 14, 1972, pp. 19-21.
2
ibid.
CHAPTER V
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN ALTERNATIVE SCHOOL IN ROCHESTER
Introduction
In studying educational reform, many historians largely consider
the struggle for school change at the national or city-wide level. Most
often, much of their historical data concerning educational reform is of
a general nature and is complicated by the political and social confron-
tations that surround educational institution. When historians have gone
beyond this general analysis and studied reform at the individual school
level, disparities have frequently been found between the rhetoric of re-
form (city-wide or nation) and its implementation at a specific school;
that is, it becomes difficult to ascertain what is reform and what is,
for instance, propaganda or political opportunism by reform leaders.
Moreover, while studying individual school structures, historians often
have identified or clarified reform influences that are only vaguely
apparent in their larger perspective.
This chapter will study the development and structure of an alter
native school in Rochester: the Interim Junior High School. ^ This
school was started in 1971 as part of Rochester's Reorganization and
1
In constructing the history of the Interim Junior High School,
the author has relied on four basic sources: minutes, video tapes, inter
views, and personal recollection. The author realizes that the latter
can often be detrimental in attempting an objective analysis. However,
throughout this chapter, every attempt has been made to provide primary
source documentation when available for those areas where subjective
judgements are required.
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Desegregation Plan and has continued in operation despite the repeal of
the Plan itself. Of particular interest to the dissertation are the
school changes in support, population, methodologies, social relations,
and organization that have enabled it to survive. In a later chapter,
these changes will be analyzed to determine how they are compatible with
corporate liberal philosophy and the changes in the social relations of
the workplace.
Planning and Organization
The impetus for the development of an alternative junior high
school in Rochester came from the liberal educational establishment, the
liberal community, and the corporate sector. Within the establishment,
many teachers and administrators had encouraged the separation of
Rochester's junior-senior high schools. In 1969, a committee consisting
of supervisory personnel reported to the Superintendent of Schools that
the 7th through 12th grade secondary schools were outdated and should be
divided into separate junior and senior high schools. In providing ra-
tionale for such a separation, the committee cited recent evidence that
junior highs: (1) developed self-worth and understanding of others; (2)
developed self-discipline in work, study, and the use of leisure time;
(3) contributed to the understanding of physical and sexual development in
their lives; (4) strengthened the ability to think intuitively and analy-
tically; (5) promoted emotional and economic independence; (6) developed
a set of moral and ethical values; and (7) advanced intellectual skills
and concepts necessary for civic and socially responsible behavior.
'The Junior High School Committee Report to the Superintendent of
Schools, The Junior High School , Rochester, New York, March, 1970.
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As a result of the committee's report and the continuing communi-
ty pressure for school reorganization, several of the secondary schools
within the district began to change their instructional program. These
secondary schools organized "cluster" programs (integrated curriculum) in
which students in the 7th and 8th grades were given limited freedom in
choosing areas of concentration as well as resources both internal and
external to the schools. This type of instruction took place in a re-
laxed and informal environment where teachers began to use individualized
instructional methods. Although falling short of the physical separation
called for by the committee and thus destroying the neighborhood school
concept, these program provided the methodological basis for later
reforms. Both in rationale and in practice they mirrored the ideology of
the advocates of alternative schools in Rochester.
At the same time, within the community, a group of prominent
women from Rochester's fashionable liberal southeast sector, joined in
the support of separate junior and senior high schools.
1 Calling them-
selves the Planning Committee for an Innovative Junior High School
(PCIJH)
,
they organized discussion groups at several schools in the Fall
of 1970. They wanted a junior high school which was needed on the city's
eastside in order to provide a more stable environment for their child-
ren. These parents were concerned that the junior-senior high school
which their children were scheduled to attend had become vastly over-
crowded. If such a school was forthcoming, it was the consensus that it
^The group was composed of the wives of professional .men ; that. is,
doctors, university personnel, and businessmen. Of the original founding
parents, most eventually sent their children to the city s private
schools.
130
should be structured in a flexible and open manner and incorporate the
methodological reforms that had become popular in the 1960's (i .e . open
education)
J
Additionally, another group that was interested in educational
reform in Rochester was the Eastman Kodak Learning Systems Laboratory
(EKLSL). During the late 1960’s, EKLSL had concerned itself with the
development of educational systems that could be used in industry. How-
ever, after the uproar with FIGHT, EKLSL sent several prominent scien-
tists into the community to study how its materials and staff might bet-
ter be utilized through the city. In a sense, while trying to polish a
somewhat tarnished community image, they, di scovered a potential market in
educational softwares that was closely tied to the needs for educational
reform. EKLSL hired several individuals with educational backgrounds to
form a consulting department that provided assistance in developing of
alternative educational programs. Despite their limited overall experi-
ence in the area, the EKLSL staff began consulting in school districts
2
throught the nation.
In the Fall of 1970, the issue of reorganization had figured pro-
minently in the School Board election. Many of the parents involved in
the PCI JH were helpful in the organization and election of a liberal
'This information was gained from video taped conversation with
P Cl JH President Janice Dowd and School Board member Thomas Frey. These
video tapes were part of an unpublished Master's thesis at the State
University of New York at Brockport by Dan Dramich.
^This information was gained in conversations with Dr. David
Youst, who was the first program administrator of the Interim Junior High
School (May-June, 1976). Prior to his directorship. Dr. Youst was on the
staff of EKLSL.
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Board of Education."* Immediately following their election victory, these
parents began to lobby in earnest for a new alternative school. From
their discussion with the newly elected Board and school administration,
it became apparent that if an alternative school was to become a reality,
wider community support was necessary, especially from members of the
non-white and business sectors. After several weeks, the parents organi-
zation had solicited the aid of a local black minister and EKLSL. Quite
understandably, the inclusion of these two parties gave the planning
groups additional educational and political legitimacy. With this new
credibility, the rather formidable group turned its lobbying efforts on
the State Education officials and the School District bureaucracy; organ-
izing meetings and discussing possible organizational models that would
be acceptable to all parties.
By January of 1971, the PCI JH was formally recognized by the
School District and began holding weekly meetings. From these meetings
developed objectives for an alternative junior high school that would be
"innovative" rather than experimental and would feature a "learner-
centered" program in which community resources and experiences would be
integrated with a variety of methodological and curricular approaches.
The organizing principles of the school would include maximum flexibility
in scheduling the use of a variety of resource materials, frequent evalu-
2
ations, and an emphasis on individual student-teacher conferences.
^One of the reasons the PC I JH was to have such an immediate im-
pact on the planning of the alternative school stems from the close asso-
ciation this group had with three of the Board of Education members,
Thomas Frey, David Branch, and Dorothy Phillips.
^Minutes of the PCI JH Meeting, January 18, 1971.
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During this same period, the Board of Education publicly
announced that it intended to totally reorganize and desegregate the
city's secondary schools and that two new alternative schools would be
developed: one a junior high school and the other a senior high school.
While the city was in an uproar over the intended implementation of the
Reorganization and Desegregation Plan, the PCI JH continued to work in its
planning efforts. For examples, decisions were made concerning inter-
viewing procedures for director and the staff. Figuring prominently in
this process was EKLSL whose representatives bore the major responsibili-
ty for the determination of the school's objectives and who served on the
interviewing committee for the program director and staff J At the same
time, PCI JH was invited to inspect the latest in educational software and
2program instruction at Kodak's Marketing Resource Center.
By March of 1971, the PCIJH began to make other important deci-
sions about the new school. It was determined that although the school
would be ungraded, it would have an approximate 50:50 sex and grade (7th
and 8th) ratio. In approving a maximum enrollment of 500, PCIJH stated
that the school population should reflect the city's racial composition
(60-40) and that preference would be given to family units. In addition,
since the initial plan was made by parents from a five-school area
(Schools #1, #14, #23, #24, #31) on the eastside, PCIJH decided that
those schools would be given a disproportionate membership in the student
body relative to other elementary schools in the district. Finally, it
''Minutes of the PCIJH Meeting, January 19 and February 16, 1971.
^Minutes of the PCIJH Meeting, March 2, 1971.
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was determined that the school population would be decided through a
lottery using quotas from each school area.
1
Table sa
DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION OF FOUNDING SCHOOLS
5
School
1
Average
Median
Income
2
Median
Val ue
Owner
Occupied
3
Number of
School-Age
Children
on AFDC
4
Percentage
Non-White
in 1964
5
Percentage
Non-White
in 1970
Mean •• 9,146 14,312 32.0 40.0
1 13,897 26,300 3.7 5.4 17.8
14 6,481 8,300 38.7 89.0 96.8
23 10,249 20,300 7.7 3.9 11 .4
24 10,622 14,400 10.5 3.8 14.6
31 8,131 13,500 32.1 30.7 50.0
i
All the "founding" schools were located on the city's eastside.
As Table 5A above and Map 5A on the following page indicate, four of the
schools were located in the Monroe JHS district and were either in or
directly adjacent transitional areas of the city; that is, areas of the
city that were extremely desirable (Columns 1, 2, 3) yet where non-white
migration had begun to encroach (Columns 4, 5). These areas were gener-
ally inhabited by university and professional (upper middle class)
1
1bid .
2
Table 5A has been developed from two sources. Columns 1, 2, 3
are taken from statistical information produced by the Department of
Planning and Research of the City School District of Rochester. This
data was created by taking 1970 Census data and applying it to two indi-
vidual schools zones. A summary of this data is provided for in Appendix
C. Columns 4, 5 are taken from information provided in the Annual
Statistical Report to the Superintendent of Schools in the School Years
1964-65 and 1970-71.
JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOLS (GRADES 7, 8)
SCHOOL DISTRICT MAP I
UNDER REORGANIZATION PLAN
ftQATvD Of EDUCATION
'ROCHESTER. NEVJ YORK.
j
8 Hitt
0 = founding
SCALE ,JOOOSr»lin. school
O* llenUficAEy
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families that were generally liberal in their philosophical outlook. In
addition, under the plan for the city reorganization, many of the child-
ren from these areas would be asked to attend Monroe High School for the
first time. In recent years, this school had seen a change in the non-
white population from 8.6% in 1964 to 32.0% in 1970. In addition, the
school had become overcrowded and was physically declining.
In March, the interviewing committee of the PCI JH advertized for
1
a program director. The interviewing committee consisting of two
City School District of Rochester, New York. Job Description
for Program Administrator of Learner-Centered School at the Junior High
Level
,
March, 1971
:
- Provide leadership in the development and the continuous evalu-
ation of the total program of the school and all its personnel, students,
staff, teachers, and resource personnel.
- Coordinate the development of policies by staff, students, and
community that are consistent with overall policies and desires of the
community and the Board of Education.
- Operate the school as a shared responsibility involving stu-
dents, parents, community, and staff.
- Develop open lines of communication and wholesome working rela-
tionships with all those who can help in the education, guidance, and
welfare of each child.
- Confer with the Central Office regarding staffing, material,
and equipment needs.
- Be responsible for all operations involved in the business
management of the school.
- Supervise the preparation of required reports and the mainte-
nance of complete and accurate records of the entire program at the school.
- Develop a staff representing the broad spectrum of backgrounds
and interests, recognizing individuality within the staff and the need to
nurture that individuality.
- Strive to become highly knowledgeable about: Students (their
needs, interests, and goals); Curriculum materials (their variety and
effectiveness); Instructional activities (their relationship to student
interest and to instructional goals).
- Be responsible for coordinating an on-going program of work-
shops, in-service meetings, visitations, and other forms of on-the-job
training for all staff.
- Coordinate the development and dissemination of new ideas,
techniques, materials, and models developed at the school.
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parents, two Central Office personnel, and a representative of EKLSL, in-
terviewed many candidates, most of whom were already employed by the
School District. In hiring a director, however, the committee decided
against the School District personnel and hired Dr. David Youst. Recog-
nized as an intelligent and energetic individual. Dr. Youst had limited
experience in the administration of either traditional or “open" educa-
tional settings. His expertise lay largely in the area of vocational ed-
ucation. The interviewing committee was impressed by his educational
philosophy which was remarkably similar to their own. Central to his
philosophy was the belief that education had been delinquent in preparing
individuals to function within other work-related institutions: "Schools
haven't changed to meet the changing needs of people in this society;
we're still teaching the same way. This doesn't make any sense given the
way other institutions had changed."'* In addition to his most agreeable
philosophical outlook, Dr. Youst did have another major drawing card: At
that time, he was a staff member of EKLSL.
The task before Dr. Youst was enormous. When hired, the school
had no teachers or students, or even a budget, building, or supplies.
Yet, with little support from a Central Office staff who were primarily
concerned with the larger aspects of the Reorganization and Desegregation
Plan, he was expected to have the school operational in five months.
Further, just as Dr. Youst was hired, the City Council had moved to hold
new non-partisan School Board elections, which most community observers
‘This information was gained from interviews with Dr. Youst in
May, 1976. Dr. Youst is currently on the staff of Empire State College
in Rochester, New York.
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knew would result in the rescinding of the Reorganization and Desegrega-
tion Plan. Consequently, many School District personnel did not make a
philosophical commitment to the type of educational reform the school had
hoped to provide. In retrospect, as Dr. Youst has explained, the
development of the school was at best a peripheral response by the liber-
al community who was more concerned with the desegregation program. Con-
sequently, the school developed not so much out of rational planning but
rather out of the political climate of the period.''
1
Dr. Youst and a committee of parents shared the task of faculty
recruitment with mutual veto power. The first round of interview candi-
dates came from a list provided by the Rochester Teachers Association.^
The interviewing process moved quite smoothly except for one problem. In
the initial round of interviews
,
the committee encountered many experi-
enced teachers who wanted no part of the Reorganization and Desegregation
Plan. These teachers hoped that the alternative program would attract a
different type of student (intellectually superior) or would at least
avoid some of the difficulties (racial conflict) expected by the detrac-
tors of the reorganization plan. In some cases, these teachers were so
desperate that they asked for additional (second and third), interviews
1
Ibid .
2
Since the teacher roles would be markedly different at the alter-
native schools, the Rochester Teachers Association closely followed the
school's development and program. In the first several years, they per-
mitted the teachers co change working conditions and evaluation mechan-
isms without suggesting contract violation. However, after this initial
grace period, and with several teacher abuses by the school administra-
tion, the RTA began to take a hardline and made the administration adhere
to the language of the contract.
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with the committee.
1
However, to their credit, the interviewing commit-
tee moved judiciously looking for individuals who genuinely manifested
an interest in school reform.
The search ended with the hiring of a racially and sexually
balanced staff, most of .whom had two or more years of teaching experience.
Reflecting the frustration of many teachers in traditional urban educa-
tional settings, the new staff was interested in providing a humanistic
yet substantial educational program within an open environment. However,
most had not fully articulated the dissatisfaction into a clearly defined
educational philosophy or methodology. Consequently, this would resu-lt
in a disparity between staff members concerning the expectations for
children, parents, and other faculty members in an open educational
2
setting.
Simultaneous with the personnel decisions, the PCI JH and Dr.
Youst began the drive for student enrollment. They spoke before PTA's
and educational staff (guidance counsellors). In these meetings, they
discussed the general objectives and structures of the new school.
Further, to emphasize the commitment to community input, they asked for
suggestions that could be embodied in the school's planning and opera-
tion. However, the recruitment drive had rather ambiguous results.
According to PCI JH guidelines, the city had been divided into
four zones that resembled the zones in the reorganization plan (see
^ Interview with Dr. Youst, May, 1976.
2
1 bid .
3
Minutes of the PC I JH Meeting, March 30, 1971.
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Map 5A on Page 134). The names of students whose parents had signed
letters of intent were organized according to their home school. The
students' names whose elementary schools constituted a zone then formed
the foundation for a student lottery. Each zone, except the Monroe Dis-
trict, was to contribute roughly the same number of individuals to the
new school. The Monroe District which contained the "founding schools"
was allotted a disproportionate number of student enrollment positions.
Flexibility was built-in to the process to adjust for any racial, sexual
or grade anomolies that might develop in the sample pool.
By the time the first drawing occurred, two clear patterns ha.d
emerged. Students from the Monroe District had volunteered for the
school in disproportionate numbers to those in other school zones. The
result was a lengthy and predominantly white upper middle class waiting
list from the Monroe District. Considering that at that time there was
neither a school structure nor fully articulated educational philosophy
for the program, this fact seems to indicate that parents from this area
(by no means exclusive of other areas) had enrolled their children in
this school as much out of fear of the Reorganization and Desegregation
Plan as from genuine interest in alternative education.^
Secondly, enrollment from the non-white sector fell far behind
that of the white community. With non-white clearly underrepresented,
the PCI JH and Dr. Youst mounted a massive enrollment campaign within the
non-white community. But even these efforts were ineffectual, and they
were forced to recruit non-white children with very serious disciplinary
^Interview with Dr. Youst, May, 1976.
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histories. In most cases, the guidance staffs at their schools were only
too happy to help this effort. They actively counselled students with a
history of disfunction within the traditional school setting into atten-
ding the new "alternative school P J
By mi d- summer , the enrollment difficulties had been alleviated.
Each of the quotas, racial, sexual, and grade were near the required
levels, and there remained a substantial waiting list to draw upon.
Remarkably, the school had developed a certain heterogeni ty . Composed of
students who were genuinely interested in alternative education, students
with severe discipline problems, and those who were merely attempting to
circumvent the intent of the Reorganization and Desegregation Plan, the
alternative school had achieved one of its primary objecti ves--a school
population that mirrored the city itself.
If the enrollment issues had been perplexing, the logistical
problems must have seemed insurmountable. The selection of a building
site had been delayed due to disagreements over location and the limita-
tions on renovation costs. Not until June, less than 90 days oefore the
2
school opening was the determination of a school site made. The site
was located on the city's eastside, across from the local art museum,
within walking distance from bus routes, libraries, a planetarium, and
the museum of Science and History. Formerly the administrative office of
^This process of using the alternative school as a "dumping
ground" was continued in the initial years of the school's operation.
Although often having a difficult time in adjusting to the new environ-
ment, most of these students overcame their problems, and it is to the
credit of the school staff that they succeeded with these difficult
children where the traditional schools had failed.
^Minutes of the PCI JH Meeting, June 1, 1971.
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a local industrial firm, it required extensive modification to meet all
state safety and health standards. Given the time constraints and the
demands made by the larger reorganization and desegregation plan, it was
impossible for the School District's support staff to complete the
needed changes. As a result, the school year would begin without such
rudimentary structural items as lockers or fire alarms."*
The problem of finding education resources (books, lab equipment,
etc.) was equally serious. The City Council in June, in an effort to
strangle the desegregation plan, drastically reduced the School Board
budget. This resulted in budget cuts in all educational areas but were
particularly severe for the alternative school. The school required
start-up expenditures that were over and above the relative sums required
to maintain a program. In order to overcome these financial difficulties.
Dr/ Youst requested resources from the other schools in the city. But
given their own financial difficulties, they were of little assistance.
The PCI JH quickly issued an appeal to the school community for any books,
supplies, test tubes, or any other resources that might be used within
the school . Teachers and students began to rummage through the street
garbage looking for motors, old radios, or whatever that might be
repaired or helpful in the instructional program. In several cases, in-
dustrial concerns and local hospitals were especially helpful in provid-
ing old equipment for the school, but despite these efforts, the school
began the year with a scarcity of educational resources.
1
Interview with Dr. Youst, May, 1976.
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The First Year
With the problems of hiring faculty and enrolling students under
control, the planning group and Dr. Youst turned their attention to the
training of teachers for their new instructional roles. It was at this
point that a serious dichotomy in educational philosophy was to develop
between the PCIJH and Dr. Youst. The planning committee held that a
summer workshop for teacher development should be organized and taught by
the staff of EKLSL. Although having worked for EKLSL, Dr. Youst was very
much opposed to the idea. Because of his association with EKLSL,
Dr. Youst was well aware of its limited methodological focus and overall
inexperience in public education. Dr. Youst opted for a more organic
process. He believed that through a more democratic and participatory
program, teachers and parents could work collectively to fully design the
school program. Despite vigorous opposition from some parents,
Ur. Youst prevailed and a participatory workshop was held.
The workshop began in August with sensitivity training conducted
by a psychologist from the University of Rochester. Ur. Youst had hoped
that the technique involved in sensitivity sessions would promote better
communications and reduce the interpersonal anxieties caused by the new
setting. In essence, he wanted to build an atmosphere of trust and soli-
darity between staff, parents, and himself. However, this did not occur.
Cliques soon developed around tiiose who wanted to "get to know
1
each
other better and those who were anxious to begin the programmatic
1
Ibid .
2
Ibid.
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development. As a result, there was a great deal of ambiguity and cyni-
cism about the value and time spent in such sessions.
After several days, the initial sensitivity training was com-
pleted, the workshop broke into large discussion groups (parents, staff,
and some students) in order to generate a general educational philosophy
and methodology that would govern the school's operation. It was at this
point that the deep rifts in educational philosophy became apparent.
Some staff members and parents opted for systems and behavioral approach
suggested by EKLSL. This emphasized specific task, Learning Activity
Programs (LAP pakcs), and behaviorial objectives. Other staff members
promoted a more humanistic and effective orientation that emphasized indi-
vidual autonomy, values clarification, and interpersonal relationships.
Still others had no clearly defined philosophy. These discussions were
often volatile. The names of Maslow, Skinner, Piaget, among others, were
used with varying degrees of sophistication and uncertainty to defend or
discredit the general positions. In retrospect, to some of the teachers
involved, the emotional tone of the discussions was as much the venting
of years of frustration with the traditional school structure as it was
value clash of differing educational philosophy.^
After several days, it was apparent that a philosophical consen-
sus was not forthcoming from the discussions. Instead, it was decided in
the spirit of compromise that a general philosophy could be adopted that
would be marginally acceptable to all parties. Conforming roughly to the
British Primary School approach, the instructional program would be based
^This information was gained in interviews with several staff
members of the school who attended the summer workshop.
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on the interests of the individual students. The faculty role would con-
cern itself more with promoting individual learning than teaching, and
therefore would concern itself more with process rather than the product
of instruction. It was believed that this philosophy would promote stu-
dent independence. Specifically, it meant that teachers would function
as planning and resource persons rather than lecturers. For instance, if
a student was interested in precious stones, the student and teacher
would develop a project that would include library research, experiments
in geology, and a visit to a local jeweler or gemologist. Every effort
was to be made by the planning teachers to expose the student to many
different methods of gaining information while integrating basic reading
and mathematical skills into the total project.
The teacher's role in the school was not limited to instruction.
In the morning, each teacher helped plan a daily and weekly schedule for
25 permanently assigned students. The teachers reported both
academic
progress and disciplinary problems directly to the parents of these stu-
dents. This often meant home visits or telephone contact. This approach
freed the school counsellors from their traditional disciplinary roles
and permitted them to devote their time to sensitivity training,
group
counselling, and courses on racism and sexism. Further, this role
for
teachers assured parental involvement by providing a direct
contact.
Once the school's philosophy and teacher roles were defined,
attention centered on the physical arrangement of the school.
The build-
ing contained four large open floors and two smaller floors
that were
sub-divided into individual rooms. It was decided that the
smaller areas
would act as the school administrative center and as the
location of
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"special" activities (music, art, industrial arts, and health). However,
there was controversy over how the other areas would be organized. Part
of the parents and staff wanted each of the floors to be organized as a
resource area, that is, each floor would contain resources for a speci-
fic discipline (science, math, language arts, social science). Others
opted for a structural arrangement that would have teachers from each of
the major disciplines on every floor. According to the advocates of de-
centralization, this would promote the interdisciplinary nature of most
curriculum, while facilitating the initial planning of projects by provi-
ding easy access to various disciplines. This latter group prevailed in
the discussions but at the tremendous cost of fragmenting the already
limited supply of school resources.
As the school year grew near, the faculty and parents began to
provide substance to the school structure it had developed. Community
resources (business, service, and educational) were contacted for later
referrals. Teachers made initial home visits to all of the
students in
their planning group, discussing with the parents the school's
goals and
operation. As the school year drew near, the hostilities seemed
to sub-
side in favor of guarded confidence and excitement that is
associated
with solidarity of purpose. It was this solidarity that would
hold the
school together during the- first year in the midst of
tremendous internal
and externa] forces.
The First Year
In the Fall of 1971, the Interim Junior High School
opened over a
three-day period to gradually orient groups of students to
the school.
In a model of the cooperative social relations which
were to be promoted
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within the school, each group of students helped with the orientation of
the succeeding group. Although this process was successful in avoiding
some problems, others emerged.
The first problem centered around the length of the planning pro-
cess. In the development of the planning process, the staff had more or
less assumed that students would come with individual interests and the
basic skills. But this often was not the case. There were great dispar-
ities in both the articulation of interests and the most rudimentary of
basic and research skills among the students. As a result, the planning
of projects with students took far longer than expected; and with faculty
members pre-occupied with planning, other instructional roles were not
fulfilled.
The second difficulty concerned the lack of instructional mater-
ial and resources. Although aware of the defi ciences before the school
year began, the PCI JH and the staff underestimated the gravity of the
situation. Projects were started only to be hampered by the lack of par-
ticular resources. Although searching for additional mechanisms to com-
plete the projects did have some instructional value, most students
became frustrated and confused by the total program.
The lengthy project planning and lack of resources led to disci-
plinary problems. Many students with little experience or motivation
began to cause disturbances that often distracted from those who were
working independently. Since disciplinary problems were mainly handled
by planning teachers after regular school hours with parents (by tele-
phone or visit), the emotional and physical demands on teachers were par-
ticularly harsh.
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After several weeks, the faculty and staff met with parents and
students to find solutions to the disciplinary and resource problems and
to stabilize the program. By consensus of the school community, it was
decided to accept a plan suggested by EKLSL where each planning teacher
would begin to offer several courses. These courses would emphasize the
development of basic skills and research methods that would be necessary
for the students to develop their own individual projects.^ The school
community felt confident that this approach would help students with mo-
tivational difficulties while not undermining the school's "open" educa-
tional philosophy.
The logistical problems were solved by organizing a campaign ask-
ing for individual assistance or resources that could be related to
school activities. Soon, many professionals (doctors, lawyers, univer-
sity faculty) and non-professionals (welfare mothers and businessmen),
volunteered to serve as work-study coordinators, references for projects,
career counsellors, or even as volunteer faculty members. While the cam-
paign attracted many individual contributions (books, radios, chemistry
sets, etc.), industrial and institutional concerns (such as Kodak and the
University of Rochester) donated new and used equipment to the school.
Slide tape viewers, cameras, books, oscilloscopes and other equipment
that could be spared were given outright to the school. In addition,
these organizations also provided time to certain individuals to work
with faculty and students to develop other resources.
After six weeks, the school had gained a relative degree of
^Minutes of the PCIJH Meeting, September 24, 1971, and October 5,
1971.
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stability. The change in structure had helped to diminish some of the
ambiguity in roles for teachers and students while increasing the
school ! s accountability. Slowly, the amount of instructional materials
and resources began to grow and contributed to the school's efficient
operation. Further, despite the complaints of some faculty members, it
had not seriously altered the flexibility of the program. Teachers and
students began to adjust to their new roles as both became more adept at
planning projects.
However, as the instructional problems began to be solved, divi-
siveness developed at the administrative level. The demands on Dr.
Youst's time during the initial weeks were enormous. In addition to the
usual amount of administrative business, he was asked to perform instruc-
tional, business, and disciplinary roles. This included an almost conti-
nuous series of meetings with faculty and parents. In mid October of
1971, Dr. Yousf decided to hire an operations manager in order to de-
crease his administrative burdens. This action angered many parents who
saw his unilateral action as a violation of the school's commitment to
community involvement in decision making."* To prevent any future misun-
derstandings about the lines of authority, the PCIJH quickly finished a
constitution for the school’s governing body which was named the Policy-
Advisory Council (PAC).
In planning the PAC, the parents had demanded a larger role in
the administration of the school; particularly in policy areas. These
policy areas included school philosophy, curriculum, staff utilization.
^Transcription of the PCIJH Meeting, October 19, 1971.
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evaluation, and the school budget, among others. On the other hand, as
Dr. Youst has said in retrospect, while desiring parental involvement, he
wanted the school's professional staff to retain the final decision-mak-
ing responsibility. Further, Dr. Youst feared that as a group, the
parents involved in the PCIJH were acting for themselves and represented
only members of the liberal community who had the time and money to par-
ticipate in school activities. However, the parents overcame Dr. Youst'
s
objections by organizing an effective lobbying effort with the Superinten-
dent and "lame duck" existing liberal Board of Education.^
2
The final PAC constitution (see Appendix D ) made the PAC and
Dr. Youst jointly accountable to the Board of Education and the Superin-
tendent of Schools. Although Dr. Youst was accountable for all educa-
tional practice (by State law), the PAC was granted permission to recom-
mend policy to the Superintendent and Board and to review all the educa-
tional and governance policy of the school. Included as areas of policy
recommendations were: School Philosophy, Student Goals, Curriculum,
School (climate), Community and Parental Involvement, Staff Utilization
and Improvement, Staffing Procedures, Evaluation, Budget Development, and
Cost Effectiveness. If allowed to function properly, this gave parents
the most influence in school affairs that was legally possible and was an
enviable model for community participation and control.
By February of 1972, the PAC elections had been held and the
1 1nterview with Dr. Youst, May, 1976.
2
Ihe final draft of the constitution of the Policy-Advisory Coun-
cil was enacted in December of 1971.
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council began to meet regularly. The first issues encountered by the PAC
concerned school resources and declining enrollment. With more students
remaining within the school itself during the winter months, the defi-
ciencies in resources that had afflicted the school since its inception
were again accentuated. Those who had earlier advocated that centraliza-
tion of subject matter once again urged reorganization within the school
to minimize the scarcity. Those who opposed centralization felt that the
interdisciplinary nature of many projects would be lost if the reorgani-
zation was to occur. In order to resolve the issue, the PAC consulted
with EKLSL and recommended that the school be reorganized into subject
matter areas to be called "learning centers". In retrospect to many
former staff members, this reorganization was a major step away from the
school's original curricular goals.
The issue of declining enrollment was also resolved by the PAC.
Although the average daily attendance was 92% (second highest in the
city), a number of parents had decided to remove their children from the
school. These departures may be explained by the parental decisions of
two distinct groups. First, some liberal parents who had seen alterna-
tive education as fashionable found the school's freedom excessive.
Often these parents had difficulty relating to the students' educational
experience. Many could not understand how students could operate under
such apparently chaotic conditions. Second, another group of parents who
had sent their children to the school to circumvent the intent of the
Reorganization and Desegregation Plan, returned their children to the
neighborhood schools. They anticipated correctly that the Reorganization
and Desegregation Plan would be rescinded by the new Board of Education.
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Despite these defections (about 10%), a substantial waiting list re-
mained. The PAG decided to request twenty names from that list and even-
tually thirteen students, largely from the Monroe district, decided to
change schools at mid-semester. The total enrollment remained near 475
for the remainder of the year.
'
By the beginning of the second semester, most parents and stu-
dents had become acclimated to the new setting. Most parents were satis-
fied by their child's progress and were particularly impressed with the
evaluation mechanism that provided discussions with staff members about
their children's academic and emotional development. At the same time,
most students had learned to develop projects using a variety of
resources and then to work more or less independently.
However, some students, many of them non-whites, did not adjust
as well to the school. They planned projects but were without the moti-
vation or the basic skills necessary to complete them. Furthermore, in
many cases, these students did not receive the individual attention the
school had promised. By March, the situation had become serious enough
that a group of black parents and teachers called a meeting with Dr.
Youst to voice their concerns. Subsequently, they sent a letter to the
PAC asking to have a meeting with the entire faculty. In that letter
they stated that many non-white students spent a disproportionate amount
of time on non-academic pursuits and requested that teachers provide a
better learning atmosphere and monthly evaluations for the students in
^Minutes of the PAC, February 15, 1972 and February 29, 1972.
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each subject matter area
.
1
Furthermore, while urging several additional
changes, they made it clear that the major concern was not the school
philosophy but, rather. Dr. Youst' s "poor performance" as an instruction-
al leader. They contended that the school's organization represented a
"beautiful plan for extending one's capabilities and opportunities," but
t hat Dr. Youst had performed poorly and displayed an "I don't give a
damn attitude toward parents and his responsibilities."
The black parents found' a strong alliance for their demands among
the founding parents, since many were still harboring resentment over Dr.
Youst's failure to consult them on most administrative matters. In fair-
ness to Dr. Youst, many staff and parents believed that he was a kind of
scapegoat for the school's ambiguous instructional consideration to those
students with skill and motivational deficiencies.
By March of 1972, the Concerned Black Parents, as they called
themselves, met with the entire faculty. In a highly charged atmosphere,
parents and faculty discussed the school's instructional program for four
hours, both in theory and practice. The parents demanded more evalua-
tions, individual attention, and personal contact with staff concerning
their children. The faculty asked for more support from parents in aca-
demic and disciplinary terms.
The discussion had two outcomes. First, Dr. Youst was asked to
develop a list of "agreements" that specified the responsibilities of
Letter from Clarence Perkins, Chairman of the Concerned Black
Parents to Mrs. Janice Dowd, President of PAC, March 22, 1972. This
letter is included in the minutes of the PAC, March 28, 1972.
2
Ibid.
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students, parents and staff members in relation to the school J Second,
the faculty and black parents found that in spite of the intensity of the
debate, both groups aired their concerns adequately and that working
together any difficulties might be overcome. Both parents and teachers
were aware of the uniqueness of the discussions themselves and seemed to
realize that they had no need to fear one another. This was important
when. in late April, the Superintendent of Schools announced that he was
recommending to the new conservative Board of Education that the city's
alternative programs be eliminated.
During this crisis period, the staff, parents and students showed
a remarkable resilience and solidarity. -Despite the school's difficul-
ties, the school community was proud of the program’s uniqueness and
participatory nature. This resulted in a sense of community that, in
turn, generated tremendous pressure on the Board of Education to keep the
program in operation. For six weeks, the school community blitzed the.
Board of Education meetings with highly organized petitions, media cam-
paigns, and speakers all supporting alternative schools in Rochester.
Further, they solicited the assistance of the city's professional and
university community as well as State Education officials by recommending
that they send letters or speak directly to the Board about the school.
The intense pressure created an interesting dilemma for the Board of Edu-
cation. In the previous Fall election, the Board of Education had run a
conservative campaign to rescind the Reorganization and Desegregation
Plan as well as to reduce the. city's educational expenditures. The
1 Memo to staff, parents, and others interested in the Interim
Junior High School from Dr. David Youst, May 18, 1972.
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election of all five candidates running on the conservative platform
amounted to a mandate for their proposals. However, the pressure from
the non-white and liberal sections of the city remained intense for the
retention of certain aspects of the reorganization plan. Since its major
concern was essentially desegregation, the Board of Education saw a use-
ful mechanism to forestall community discontent and criticism while
carrying out its mandate. In May, in what appeared an effort to appease
the liberal community, it funded the alternative school at somewhat
reduced levels. The day following the Board's decision, Dr. Youst, who
had led the fight to save the alternative school, resigned as program
administrator for personal reasons.
Upon receiving Dr. Youst's resignation, the PAC began the search
for a new program administrator. The PAC recommended that a committee
consisting of two Central Office personnel, two staff, two parents, a
student and a consultant from EKLSl, interview candidates and through a
unanimous vote make a recommendation to the Board of Education. In actu-
ality, this approach was tantamount to granting community control over
the hiring of the program director. However, this method of selection
was rejected by the Board of Education who proposed a committee of three
Centra] Office personnel, three individuals from the school community,
and a consultant from EKLSL, who would interview and rank candidates with
the Superintendent making the final recommendation. Although the PAC
strenuously objected to the Board's proposal because it sidestepped the
initiatives provided in the PAC constitution, it was forced to accede to
^Memo from Dr. John Franco, Superintendent of Schools to Mrs.
Janice Dowd, President of the PAC, May 26, 1972.
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the Board's wishes.
The committee developed a job description and interviewed and
rated eight candidates. In late June, the Board of Education recommended
that the committee's first choice be selected as the new program adminis-
trator--!^. Rachael Lawson. At the time of her hiring, Ms. Lawson was
working as an open educational consultant in Broward County, Florida.
There she had been trained and worked closely with Dr. Edward Eaton, who
was Chief Educational Coordinator for Eastman Kodak's Learning Systems
Laboratory.
Summary of First Year
One must exercise some caution in attempting an evaluation of the
school's first year of operation due to its unconventional methodology.
This methodology does not lend itself to traditional evaluation mechan-
sims; and there were none attempted. However, Dr. Barbara Braverman, in
studying one objective of the school, student resourcefulness, found some
rather ambiguous results.
1
Dr. Braverman found that students at the
school had made only minor advancements in the use of school resources,
community resources, and types of expression (largely written) in the
completion of projects. Conversely, she also found substantial improve-
ments in such areas as the use of the communications center (audio-visual,
and graphic arts), the development of questioning skills, and extra-
curricular involvement with other students. This contradictory evidence
as to improvement in student resourcefulness, together with the
1 Barbara Braverman, "The Applicability of Item Sampling to the
Monitoring of Resourcefulness", and unpublished doctoral thesis, the
University of Rochester, Rochester, New York, 1 9 7 3
.
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unavailability of basic skill information, however, preclude any judge-
ment as to overall student progress.
Another indicator of success or failure might be school atten-
dance. In this area, the results are much less ambiguous. In the 1972-
1973 school year, the school's attendance figures were the highest in the
city, with an average daily attendance of 92%J
Parental involvement also was clearly exceptional. Despite the
sometimes bitter conflict between staff, parents, and the program admin-
istrator, the participation level remained high. Furthermore , the school
community showed the propensity to evaluate and change the school. This
in itself may be construed as a sign of healthy growth and development;
afteral 1 , few schools attempt to make such rapid adjustments.
In considering the many obstacles, it seems quite remarkable that
the school opened and survived the first year. The social atmosphere sur-
rounding the Reorganization and Desegreation Plan, the motives of those
involved with the school, the logistical enrollment problems, among many
other factors, all had a tremendous impact on the school's functioning.
Perhaps the school's first year is best summarized in retrospect by
Dr. Youst, who has said that "If it didn't open then, it never would have.
2
It was a product of the- times."
Hhe Annual Statistical Report to the Superintendent of Schools ,
City School District of Rochester , Rochester, New York, Division of Plan-
ning and Research.
^Interview with Dr. Youst, May, 1976.
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The Second Year
The new program administrator began work in July of 1972 and was
faced with the problem of reorganizing the school. There was strong
pressure from the Central Office personnel to make the school pedgogi-
cally closer to the city's other educational institutions. Ms. Lawson
herself had shared this view since her visit in the Spring prior to being
selected as program administrator.
The first change that seemed to her to be necessary was in the
style of leadership. Although she supported faculty participation in de-
cision making, she felt that the faculty was spending excessive time in
2
committee work at the expense of their instructional role. Additionally,
Ms. Lawson believed that the program needed stabilization. She viewed
the changes in the instructional role during the school's initial year of
operation as counterproductive to the school's overall functioning and
wanted to define specific roles and responsibilities for students and
staff. This meant the formalization of requirements, expectations, and
standards of conduct. Further, it was her observation that the school s
instructional program needed to be more directed, with teachers exer-
cizing more control over structure and content of student projects. Spe-
cifically, this meant more school -oriented or pre-constructed projects
Memorandum to Staff, Student Government, and Advisory Council
from Rachael B. Lawson, Broward County, Florida, regarding Report of
Visitation of Interim Junior High, pp.1-6.
"
Ibid
.
,
p . 3
.
3
Ib_i_d.
,
pp.4-5.
158
and the introduction of behaviorial objectives."1
Ms. Lawson's first administrative lead upon her arrival was in
the area of staff development. With the aid of two faculty members and
an EKLSL representative, she began preparation for a summer workshop for
teachers that would reflect the school's change in instructional empha-
sis. The workshop was held in August and consisted of teachers' learning
techniques for making overhead transparencies, slides, photographs,
movies and video and audio-tape presentations. Further, the workshop
aimed at developing a familiarity with such community resources as
2
A. B. Dick, Eastman Kodak, Xerox, and Junior Achievement.
The school year began with the new program administrator bringing
the administration of the school under her direct control. The committee
apparatus was collapsed into a single steering committee. Decision mak-
ing became arbitrary and unilateral with faculty or parents having little
input. A new leadership model was put forward by Ms. Lawson in which she
q>
was the administrative center, as seen on the following page. What was
explicit in her model was that any decisions coming from the PAG, Student
Government, or Steering Committee, would have to meet with the program
administrator’s approval before being inacted.
The administrative changes were met with little resistance. The
faculty itself was split with some members disappointed and openly
^
Ibid
.
,
p.5.
^Memorandum Workshop News, John Nicholson and Edith Trybalski
,
August, 1972.
^Rachael Lawson, Administrative Bulletin #1 , Interim Junior High
School, September 5, 1972.
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charging a betrayal of the school's democratic ideals. Others were
grateful to be relieved of their non-instructional roles and protected
from dealing directly with the community and Central Office Administra-
tion. To the Central Office staff who had been tired of often dealing
directly or indirectly with the PAC, her new administrative style repre-
sented a strong leadership.^
Although successful at initiating administrative reforms,
Ms. Lawson had difficulty in developing her instructional reforms. Like
her predecessor, she found very little time to become involved in instruc-
tional matters. This permitted the instructional program to develop more
or less at the discretion of the faculty. Building on the previous
year's resources and experiences, the learning centers organized a varied
instructional program. Within each subject matter area, students had the
option of developing individual projects or choosing a more structured
Dramieh, video-taped conversation with Dr. Eberbard Theme.
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approach. This allowed students who were individually motivated to bene-
fit from the freedom and openness, still providing more structure and
time for those with basic skill or motivational difficulties.
Students themselves contributed greatly to the school's opera-
tion. Many with a year's experience had found it easy to develop indivi-
dual projects and were less likely to be distracted by the open environ-
ment; In addition, the faculty made a concerted effort to have these
students help others familiarize themselves with the school. Together
the coordination of the instructional program and the experience of stu-
dents and faculty, improved the overall school functioning. However, the
initial success in the second year was offset by changes in the school's
overall population.
The school population showed two major demographic changes. The
rescinding of the Reorganization and Desegregation Plan had caused many
white students from middle and lower class white areas to return to their
predominantly white neighborhood schools. Likewise, many non-whites who
were infuriated by the Board's decision decided that they were finished
with attempts at integrated education and enrolled their children in
their predominantly non-white neighborhood schools. The result was a
drastic change in both the racial and social composition of the alterna-
tive school. The school population in the second year had an abundance
of children from upper and middle class areas where the waiting lists for
entrance into the school had remained full. However, lower-middle class
and non-white students were clearly underrepresented. The school's
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racial composition dropped from 40% non-whife to 25%. 1 With the decline
in representation, even the most liberal parents lost hope that this
school would ever become a showplace for integrated education.
The PAC also began to change in membership, becoming decidedly
upper-middle class. With this change in representation, the program
administrator whose predisposition toward PAC involvement on the adminis-
trative level was not entirely enthusiastic, became even less receptive
of their demands for participation. In part, from her perspective, this
group had little sensitivity for the concerns of the non-whites who
wanted a more structured alternative with a basic skills emphasis. As a
result, the relationship between the program administrator and the PAC
became strained throughout the school year. In fact, only the "outside
threat" of elimination prevented open conflict.
An example of the decline in the relationship between the PAC and
the program administrator was seen in the debate over several teacher
terminations. According to the PAC constitution, the Council was to play
a substantia] role in the evaluation process. Teachers in the school had
encouraged this role by waiving their contractual rights in order to
jointly find with the administration and parents new evaluation mechan-
isms. Although many hours of committee time had been spent on the matter,
no formal process had been developed by February. At this time, Ms.
Lawson announced unilaterally that several teachers would not be rehired
^Department of Planning and Research, City School District of
Rochester, Annual Statistical Report 1971-72 and 1972-73.
2
Interview with Ms. Lawson, May, 1976.
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at the school for pedagogical and philosophical reasons. These teachers
had been part of the school's original staff and had wide support among
parents, faculty, and students. Their terminations caused the PAC to
draft a new evaluation policy. Since the school had been founded "in
spirit and in practice as a community of teachers, students, parents,
program administration and Central Office personnel in mutual assistance
and participatory management,"^ the PAC proposed the development of an
evaluation review board. In respecting all contractual rights (Rochester
Teachers Association), this board would be empowered to review all infor-
mation available concerning teacher performance and subsequently make, a
recommendation to the program administrator. Clearly, what was at issue
for the PAC was community involvement in the evaluation of teachers.
However, Ms. Lawson was hostile to the idea of the development of
any review board. It was her opinion that such a board would undermine
her prerogatives concerning evaluation and termination and immediately
sought assistance of a sympathetic Central Office staff. In discharging
the issue, the Central Office administration held that the program admin-
istrator could not delegate her legal authority and allow individuals
other than the teacher in question to inspect or obtain a copy of an eva-
luation. Even if a teacher waived his contractual rights, the district
administration believed that a community review board process would be
"detrimental to the integrity of the observation and evaluation system as
2
we know it. ''
VAC, Evaluation Review Policy , June 19, 1973.
Vdam Kaufman (legal counsel). Memorandum to Frank Tota, Assis-
tant Superintendent of Instruction, June 22, 1975.
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The decline in the commitment to the community involvement during
the second semester coincided with a conservative turn in the instruc-
tional program. In finally asserting her instructional perogatives, Ms.
Lawson had the faculty begin to prepare general behavioral objectives for
each subject matter area. Although many teachers argued that behavioral
objectives were inconsistent with the original principles of the school,
most had become hesitant to openly discuss the matter given the recent
dismissals. The program administrator's action was bolstered by the
action of the Board of Education. As had occurred the previous year, the
Board of Education temporarily eliminated the school from the budget,
only to return it contingent upon the Superintendent's causing the school
to be "restructured somewhat."
1
In June, bowing to the conservative pressure, the school steering
committee recommended that behavioral objectives be adopted and used in
all subject matter areas. Further, it was announed that the program in
the Fall would become "more production oriented", that is, that "activi-
ties should focus on actually producing and marketing a product." The
project in most cases would be a predetermined behavioral objective.
In summary, the second year of the school must be considered
relatively successful. Although it had become more structured, it did
not lose its instructional flexibility and emphasis on the individual
learning process and use of community resources. The experience gained
in the first year together with changes in the school population
1
Minutes of the PAC, May 15, 1973.
^Minutes of the PAC, June 5, 1973.
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contributed to its academic success in which the students demonstratedly
outperformed their counterparts throughout the city in basic skill
growth J In addition, students felt very optimistic about the total pro-
gram showing gains in affective areas as cohesiveness, diversity of
interest and activities, and democratic feelings, while experiencing less
p
apathy, disorganization, and competitiveness. In turn, this success was
reflected in the school's attendance figures (93%) which was the highest
3
in the city.
However, despite these successes, changes had occurred late in
the school year that would drastically affect the school's operation.
Contrary to its original ideals, the school had seen a sharp decline in
community involvement in the administration of the school, and no longer
was the school population representative of the city's racial, socio-
economic and philosophical composition. Lastly, the instructional pro-
gram showed signs of becoming less flexible by becoming more systematized
and organized around behavioral objectives.
i
1973 to Present
The pedagogically conservative trends that appeared during the
second year became predominent in the following years. The structural
and methodological conservatism was reflected in changes in three general
areas: school population, instruction and administration.
^ John B. Russo, An Evaluation of the Interim Junior High , an un-
published Master's thesis, State University of New York at Brockport,
B rockport, NY, September 15, 1973.
2
Ibid .
^
Annual Statistical Report , 1972-73.
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The school population has seen a drastic change. This can be
shown by studying the demographic characteristics of the elementary
schools from which the Interim Junior High draws it school population.
This information has been tabulated in Table 5B (on Page 166). From
this table, the following generalizations can be made:
1. The majority of the students who attend the Interim Junior
High School come from the elementary Schools 16, 37, 23, 35, 29, 19, 44,
21 , 2, and 8.
2. Of these ten schools, seven are from the Wilson Junior High
School feeder pattern (2, 16, 19, 21, 23, 29, 37); two are from the
Monroe Junior-Senior High School feeder pattern (23, 35); one school is
from the Douglas Junior High feeder pattern (8).
3. Of the seven schools from the Wilson Junior High feeder
pattern, the enrollments have remained relatively the same or increased
over the last three years.
4. According to Column G and H, (16, 37, 23, 35) the five
schools with highest numbers of students attending the Interim Junior
High School have a median income of over $10,000. Yet, four of these
five schools have more than 10% of the families receiving AFDC. This
seems to indicate areas that are socially and economically transitional.
5. Using Map 5B (on Page 167), the ten schools who contributed
to the school's enrollment are in regions of white emmigration and non-
white immigration.
This information indicates that the majority of students who cur-
rently attend the alternative school are presently from middle and upper-
middle class areas where children would normally attend Wilson Junior
High School. As the table -shows, the lower the median income of an ele-
mentary school in the Wilson feeder pattern, the less likely a student from
this school would be willing to attend the alternative school. Converse-
ly, schools associated with higher median incomes in this feeder pattern
The information in Table 5B is taken from three sources: Col-
umns A,B,C,D, Department of Planning and Research; Columns E,F,G, Elemen-
tary School feeder pattern information; Columns H,I, BEDS, 1974; see
Appendix C.
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ROCHESTER ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION
-A ,
—
8 c P E F ** 6 H T
Home
# of !ifuderr :s Att|ndinq Enroll- Grades Grades
„
*
1 % on
Intt:rim J mi or High ment 9 - 12 7 & 8 Median ! Public
School 72-73 73-74 74-75 75-76 Trend School School Income Welfare
|
1 NA* 17 14 6 - East East 13,897 1-10
2 NA 14 20 20 + Madi s Wilson 6,936 51-60
3 NA 2 3 8 - + Madis Wilson 4,545 61-70
4 NA 8 15 13 0 Madis Wilson 6,705 31-40
5 NA 2 0 2 0 Jeff Jeff 7,430 71-80
7 NA 4 6 2 0 Marsh 8th 10,727 11-20
8 NA 16 13 19 0 Frank F7 D8 9,406 51-60
6-
9
NA 9 6 3 - Frank Doug 5,936
71-80
41-50
13 HA 11 6 11 + Monroe Monroe 8,908 31-40
14 NA 6 7 6 0 Monroe Monroe 6,481 71-80
15 NA 2 3 4 0 Monroe Monroe 7,072 61-70
|
16 NA 45 58 53 + Madis Wilson 10,117 11-20
17 NA 13 9 9 0 Jeff Jeff 7,857 31-40
19&10 NA 16 14 22 + Hadis Wilson 7,782 41-50
20 NA 1 1 1 0 Frank Doug 7,598 61-70
21 7 16 23 20 + Madis Wilson 9,013 31-40
22 8 6 5 7 0 Frank F7 D8 9,350 51-60
23 45 39 34 31 - Monroe Monroe 10,249 1-10
24 22 14 13 12 - Monroe Monroe 10,622 1-10
25 2 3 3 6 0 East Doug 8,972 11-20
27 11 15 10 7 - Frank Doug 7,244 41-50
28 6 8 8 5 0 East East 10,389
2 9&5S 4 15 27 26 + Madis Wilson 8,156 41-50
30 3 2 1 2 0 Jeff Jeff 9,319 21-30
31 3 4 5 5 0 East East 8,137 21-40
11 =
33
7 9 8 13 + East Doug 10,270
41-50
21-30
34 1 3 3 2 0 Marsh Marsh 9,742 1-10
35 21 24 30 27 + Monroe Monroe 10,267 31-40
36 1 4 9 13 + Frank F7 D8 9,510
37 14 31 30 32 + Madis Wilson 10,721 11-20
38 4 2 1 0 0 Chari Chari 11,236 1-10
39 3 3 2 3 0 Frank Doug 10,443 31-40
|
40 0 0 3 3 0 Marsh Marsh 10,911 1-10
41 0 1 3 4 0 Marsh Marsh 11,221 11-20
S
42 4 3 2 3 0 Chari Chari 11 ,797 1-10
!
43 4 5 2 3 0 Jeff Jeff 10,417 1-10
44 12 25 25 22 + Madis Wilson 10,727 11-20
46 19 14 9 5 - East East 12,300 1-10
49 4 4 1 1 0 Monroe Monroe 11 ,221 31-40
50 4 2 6 5 0 Frank F7 D8 11 ,156 21-30
52 9 8 4 2 - East East 11,325 1-10
*NA = Not Available ** Hadis = Madison; Jeff = Jefferson;
Marsh = Marshall; Frank = Franklin;
Chari = Charlotte; Doug = Douglas
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contribute substantially to the alternative school's population. Wilson
Junior High School is located on the boarder between a predominantly poor
non-white area and a racially mixed middle income area. In 1975, Wilson
Junior High School was 87.8% non-white.^ The evidence indicates that in
recent years, the alternative school's popularity on the city's wests ide
may be, in part, based on the desire of middle-income families to avoid
sending their children to a predominantly non-white school. Put in
another way, with the demise of the Reorganization and Desegregation Plan,
most parents whose children attend the city's elementary schools outside
the Wilson feeder pattern are more likely to send their children to their
neighborhood junior-senior high school.
Instructional ly the program is now geared almost entirly to meet-
ing an extensive list of behavioral objectives. This has meant the intro-
duction of both commercial and teacher-developed learning activity pro-
grams (LAP packs). This formulaic approach to learning usually includes
a prescribed list of activities, materials, and content to be used and
mastered and is accompanied by a built-in evaluation mechanism.
This approach to instruction is especially pervasive in the read-
ing and mathematics curriculum. For example, the reading process has
been broken down into 1000 specific objectives, most of which are con-
cerned with the development of grammatical skills as opposed to comprehen-
sion. Reading for reading's sake which had been the early focus of the
reading program, has become of secondary importance. Where once students
(both skilled and unskilled in reading) had been encouraged to read the
^Department of Planning and Research, City School District of
Rochester, Annual Statistical Report, 1974-75.
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morning paper or Sports Illustrated
, they are now asked to select reading
materials from the learning packets.
The formalization of the reading and mathematic program has not
led to an increase in basic skill proficiency. In terms of the mean
growth in basic skills as measured on standardized tests, the school per-
forms no better than its counterparts throughout the city. 1
In some areas, like science, the movement to behavioral objec-
tives has caused a programmatic reversal. Formerly, students were
encouraged to develop observational and questioning skills, that is,
those skills associated with the scientific method. Today, with the be-
havioral orientation, the questions are already posited for students and
the emphasis is on the improvement of communication skills (writing).
The movement away from experimentation and problem solving in teaching and
learning has tended to discourage the program's creative aspects and the
use of the scientific method as an instructional methodology. Although
still functioning using individualized and open-educational techniques,
the process emphasis is largely a secondary consideration.
These reforms have many advocates in the school community. To
many, these changes are indicative of marked improvement from the seem-
ingly chaotic state that marked the school's formative years. With the
objectification of the program, every task has become specific and
measureable, marked by words, accountability, and efficiency. While once
it was criticized for its supposed lack of structure, it is now the model
‘Department of Planning and Research, City School District of
Rochester, Metropolitan Achievement Test Scores for Junior High Schools.
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of control and prominent as the only school in the district with beha-
vioral objectives for every instructional program. School and Central
Office administrators are encouraging other more traditionally operated
schools to adopt the school's instructional methods. At this time, the
city's mathematics program has adopted many of the instructional objec-
tives developed at the Interim Junior High.
The commitment to community involvement at the alternative school
has also declined in recent years. Where once both professionals and non
professionals were asked to take part in the instructional program,
community involvement is no longer actively encouraged. The decline in
parental involvement at the instructional level accompanied the decline
in relative power of the PAC. Acting more as an informational forum, its
participation in administrative and instructional decision making is now
limited. When differences develop between the program administrator and
the PAC, there is a tendency to fall back on traditional legalistic or
contractual imparati ves
. Nevertheless, the PAC does have the opportunity
in most cases to inspect many of the decisions made within the school.
Also, the school has maintained its commitment to keep parents informed
of all phases of an individual student's program. This has been done by
continuing to use the planning teacher concept in which faculty meet
regularly with the school parents. Overall, the record concerning paren-
tal communication with the staff is enviable by traditional standards,
however, the ideal of parent participation in the decision-making process
has never been realized.
In summary, in the last severai years, the Interim Junior High
School has seen major changes in the school's population, instructional
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methodology, community involvement that are at odds with the school's
original goals. Perhaps it is appropriate that in the beginning of the
1976-1977 school year that the school was relocated. Its new site is
the second and third floors of a sparsely attended elementary school.
Recently built near a slum clearance area, this school building was to
house the students from urban renewal projects that had been promised
following the riots. However, those projects were never completed. In a
sense, to many, it might seem that the school is like the school building
itself— a monument to lost ideals.
CHAPTER VI
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
Introduction
The historical material contained in the previous chapters pro-
vides the information needed to assess modern school reform in Rochester.
This assessment focuses on five questions (Chapter I) suggested by the
radical scholars and serves as an interpretive framework:
1. Is modern school reform a response to demographic changes?
2. Is modern school reform a liberal response to a threatened
social order?
.3. Is modern school reform the result of a discontinuity between
the social relations in the workplace and the social relations in the
schools?
4. Did the coporate sector play a decisive role in determining
the direction of modern school reform?
5. Are the most lasting school reforms those that reflect a more
efficient mechanism for performing the traditional school functions?
In the discussion of each question, an attempt will be made to ascertain
to what degree the historical evidence supports the inferential claims of
the radical scholars and to what extent their insights enhance our under-
standing of the specific community history of Rochester.
Is Modern School Reform a Response
to Demographic Changes?
It is relatively easy to describe the major demographic changes
that were occurring in Rochester in the study period. It is also not dif-
ficult to ascertain what precipitated these demographic changes. On the
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other hand, to gauge to what extent modern school reform in Rochester was
the result of demographic changes will require a more sophisticated' anal-
ysis that will require establishing the centrality of the riots to other
historical events.
Between 1950 and 1960, the city of Rochester experienced a 4.2%
drop in its total population while its outlying suburban areas increased
by 72.0%. Internal to this migration was a 9.3% decline in the white
population significantly composed of upper and middle class white fami-
lies, and a 204.0% increase in a predominantly poor and youthful non-
white population. The cause of the non-white migration from especially
the southern states was the search for economically rewarding employment
in Northern areas (labor mobility). However, despite the displacements,
most non-white workers usually found employment only in unskilled and ser-
vice areas, for which in Rochester there were only limited openings. As
a result, positions in these occupations were soon filled and the conti-
nued migration caused massive unemployment in already deteriorating non-
white areas of the city. This occurred despite the critical shortage of
skilled laborers in Rochester's highly technical industrial sector. Mean-
while, much of the white population, fearing the decline of property
values and aware of the marginal 1 ty of their own economic foothold,
migrated to suburban areas.
The dual migration altered the composition of many of Rochester's
schools. Inner-city schools soon became overcrowded as their racial and
ethnic population also changed. However, these migratory effects can
only explain modifications in the schools objective conditions that per-
haps could have been solved by building additional schools. In other
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words, the migratory effects alone do not' reflect a cause and effect re-
lationship between demographic characteristics and school reform.
Ultimately, demographic changes in Rochester can only be related to
school rerorin through their inter-relationship to the riots of 1964 and
their aftermath.
Demographic changes in Rochester were characterized by many socio-
economic disparities. These contradictions centered around racism and
the unequal distribution of wealth and social services. In turn, racism
and distributive injustice were reflected in poverty, unemployment, sub-
standard housing, inadequate health care, police brutality, and deterior-
ating educational conditions within inner-city schools. Consequently,
these disparities served as the preconditions that eventually caused the
riots of 1964 and eventually provoked a re-evaluation of the city's basic
institutions. This re-examination lead to proposals for such school
reforms as embodied in the Reorganization and Desegregation Plan. What
emerges from this analysis is the centrality of the riots. The signifi-
cance of the riot can be shown by determining its magnitude, general
characteristics, and support within the community. This can best be done
using statistical techniques developed by political scientist Robert M.
Fogolson and Robert B. Hill, in which they determined a "riot ratio"^
{see Table 6A on Page 175). This ratio which was found to be 5:1 reflects
the number of individuals arrested to the number that were actually
involved in the rioting. Using this ratio, the following information can
Robert M. Fogolson and Robert B. Hill, "Who Riots?", Community
Pol itics
,
edited by Charles M. Bonjean, Terry N. Clark, and Robert L.
Lineberry, (New York: Free Press, 1971) pp. 136-149.
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be gained concerning the riot participation in Rochester.
TABLE 6A
Riot
Ratio*
Total #
of Non-Whites
Arrested**
Total Number
of Non
-White
Ri oters***
Total Number
of Potential
Non-Whi te
Rioters*
% of Riot
Area Resi-
dents who
Rioted++
5:1 823 4115 16,136 25.5
The/iot ratio was derived by dividing the number of non-white resi-dents within a particular category by the number of non-whites
arrested within the same category in three cities in which extensive
not data has been generated (Detroit, Los Angeles, and Newark). The
average of the ratios was then calculated and determined to be 5:1.
** This number was calculated by adding the number of Blacks (792) and
Puerto Ricans (31) arrested in the July, 1964 riots.
*x
*ihe total number of non-white rioters was determined by multiplying
the total number of non-whites rioting by the riot ratio.
+ This figure represents the total number of potential rioters and it
is determined by subtracting the non-white populations between 0-9
years of age and those over 59 years of age from the total popula-
tion of non-whites.
++ This percent of residents who rioted is determined by dividing the
total number of non-white rioters by the total non-white residents
of the riot area between 10 and 59 years of age.
Although these participatory estimates may seem high, in fact,
they represent a conservative appraisal given that they are based on 1960
census information and that the non-white population was rapidly growing
between 1960 and 1964. Further, the magnitude of the participation is
given additional credibility when it is remembered that local authorities
called 1500 National Guardsmen over and above the contingent of 500 State,
County, and local law enforcement officers that had already been involved.
A second consideration in determining the significance of the
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nets is the general characteristics of the rioters. In terms of age,
most rioters arrested (975) were between the ages of 20 and 39; with the
largest contingent between the ages of 25 and 29. Of the 166 teenagers
arrested, most comprised the bulk of the 243 individuals that were unem-
ployed. Put m another way, most of those participating in the riots
were employed and had been for some time. These iaevts seem to Indicate,
that
_
those who participated in the riots Mere a relatively stable group
who were rebelling against the unequal and inhumane conditions that they
had been forced to endure.
Lastly, it is important to ascertain the overall community senti-
ment among non-whites in Rochester at the time of the riots. This is
difficult since there is little research available concerning community
support immediately following the riots. However, in a conjectural
sense using data gained by pollster Louis Harris in his 1966 survey of
non-whites in the riot-torn Watts district of Los Angeles, some compara-
tive information can be gained. 1 In this study, Mr. Harris found that
39/o of trie non-whi :.es in the study area would have or were uncertain
about their participation (potential rioters) in the Watts riot. Further,
similar to Rochester, Mr. Harris found that of the 39%, most were from
lower-middle, middle, and upper-middle income levels (employed indivi-
duals) who were 34 years old or younger. When generalized to Rochester,
these figures seem to support a contention that the riots of the 1960's
were representati ve as much of class conflict as it was racial and that
the riots had potentially wide support.
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Overall, the data concerning riot participation, general charac-
teristics of rioters
,
and degree of community support, is highly specula-
tive. However, when if is combined with the historical documentation
concerning the size and types of community responses, the centrality of
the riots to other historical and demographic events begins to emerge and
permits the following generalization. From historical and statistical
evidence, the demographic changes in Rochester necessitated by lower class
labor mobility and fueled by the contradictions in material life and
racism, acted as a catalyst for the riot and eventually at attempts at
economic and institutional reform in Rochester.
Is Modern School Reform a Liberal Response
to a Threatened Social Order ?
Currently, there are many philosophical and ideological discus-
sions concerning the precise definition and role of liberalism in rela-
tion to social and educational reform. Revisionist Clarence Karier
believes that liberalism plays a substantial role as an "ideological
vehicle" for maintaining the economic system; that is, that liberalism's
claims to controlled economy, state planning, and managed change are, in
fact, mechanism for effective and efficient social control of the lower
social and middle classes."* However, radical economists Bowles and
G intis see liberalism's rationalistic and humanitarian emphasis as largely
benevolent. It is their contention that liberal themes have been sub-
verted by the often contradictory social relations of production which
^Clarence Karier, "The Odd Couple: Radical Economists and Liberal
Historians", Educational Studies
,
Vol . 7, No. 3, 1976, p . 1 87
.
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exercise a disproportionate influence over everyday lifeJ The resolu-
tion of such intellectual questions are important but lie beyond the
scope of this dissertation. What is needed for the purposes of this dis-
cussion is a functional definition of modern liberalism.
Modern liberalism (as opposed to the 19th Century laissez-faire
liberalism) has two basic components, rational istc and humanitarian. The
rationalistic component has an ideology that includes the use of state
power, efficient and technologically controlled economic system, and a
general reliance on experts to solve both human and technical problems.
Its humanitarian emphasis stresses the need for community and the use. of
science (psychology) to prevent and eliminate unjust conditions and social
conflict. In both the rationalistic and humanitarian components, the
major thrusts are in the areas of organization, unified values, and what
2
revisionist Walter Feinoerg has characterized as a "science of management".
Given this orientation of modern liberalism, a determination can be made
concerning its relation to social and educational reform in Rochester
during the study period.
The riots represented a mass action by a powerless segment of the
Rochester community. (By "powerless" it is meant those with the inability
Bowles and Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist America
, pp. 224-241.
2
Walter Feinberg, Rhetoric and Reason . The impact of corporate
liberalism on all phases of life is accurately described by John Kenneth
Gailbraith's discussion in The New Industrial State
,
(New York: Signet
Books, 1967), p. 172 , of what he has termed the technostructure of society
and industrial organization. "Much of what is believed to be socially
important is in fact, the adaptation of social attitudes of the goal sys-
tem of the technostructure, are believed to have original social purpose.
Accordingly, members of the corporation in general and the technostructure
in particular are able to identify themselves with the corporation on the
assumption that it is serving social goals, when, in fact, it is serving
their own. 11
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to mobilize institutional resources to achieve a goal.) Composed of
citizens who lacked both money and status, this group gained a sense of
solidarity from their participation in the riot. In turn, this partici-
pation had the effect of breeding further opposition and antagonism, and
eventually lead to organization and activism. The new organizational
forms such as FIGHT and other community groups represented an emerging
force that was willing to function outside "traditional channels". For
an example, the- attempts at voter registration following the riots which
in essence was an attempt to channel discontent into traditional mechan-
isms for dispute resolution was met with little enthusiasm. Rather, .the
non-white community opted for community organization.
While the non-white community sought alternative mechanisms for
alleviating the inequality in social and economic conditions, others in
the community made a more predictable and liberal response. After a
series of obligatory disclaimers the community and business leaders formed
a number of committees or commissions who consulted with a variety of
experts in the areas of race relations, minority employment, and poverty
and ultimately filed a myriad of reports. Most of the reports substan-
tiated the inequalities but sought administrative solutions (more educa-
tion or job training facilities). None seriously questioned the basic
structure and assumptions that served as the preconditions of the riots.
This formulaic response is typical of corporate liberal and bureaucratic
functioning that tends to seek technical solutions rather than struc-
tural reforms.
Saul A1 insky and the FIGHT organization were well aware of the
differences between problem-solving and real political power. Despite
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the tremendous pressure exerted from such powerful conformity-inducing
institutions was the Community Chest and the local media, FIGHT under-
stood that only through gaining and exercising real political and econo-
mic power could the non-white community begin to adequately deal with the
substantive problems of poverty, unemployment, and education. Consequent-
ly, the dispute between Kodak and the FIGHT organization represented a
conflict over the right of the poor to exercise their own power rather
than having it executed in their own behalf.
The movement for educational reform in Rochester also seems to re-
flect liberal characteristics. At first, many individuals both white and
non-white saw the contradictions in the economic and social conditions as
anomalies that could be eliminated by changes within the educational
structure; namely, the reorganization and desegregation of Rochester's
public schools. Reorganization meant more specialization in terms of
grades and curriculum and a humane instructional methodology that was more
individualized. Desegregation while having merit in attempting to attack
racism by equalizing educational conditions nevertheless was an attempt
to see the problems of reform in an institutional way while failing to
address the structural deficiencies. Together, specialization, humanis-
tic emphasis, and predilection for institutional reform over structural
redefinition embodied in proposals for reorganization and desegregation
seem to reflect the liberal mind.
Even at the alternative school level the influence of liberal
thought is highly visible. The demand for and use of Eastman Kodak's
Learning Systems Laboratory by the founding parents, the emphasis on con-
flict resolution techniques as group therapy and value clarification, and
ultimately the initiation of cybernetic approaches and behavioral objec-
tives to the instructional program seem to reflect the liberal reliance
on the expert and commitment to the use of psychology to reduce conflict
and improve instruction within the schools.
In summary, the data seems to indicate that social and education-
al reform in Rochester does reflect liberal philosophy. This is not to
say that these characteristics are malevolent but, rather, that they
shaped and limited both the perceptions of and solutions to the contra-
dictions of the material and social conditions. Historically, as revi-
sionists have shown, the use of social and educational reforms to solve
problems of poverty and inequality have the tendency to cause reformer to
overlook the abject conditions that initially precipitated the problems .
'
This seems to be the case in Rochester, where a troubled social order
made liberal responses that were both humanitarian and rationalistic.
These reforms offered a temporary mechanism that did "buy time" to
diffuse social energy and human potential for reform without seriously
altering the social outcomes. After many years of struggle and with
minimal amount of change, most reforms (reorganization and desegregation)
and reform organizations (FIGHT) have lost their impetus for serious
social, economic, and educational change.
1
Spring, Education and the Rise of the Corporate State , p . 1 65
.
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Is_ Modern School Reform the Result of a Discontinuity
Between the Social Relations in the Workplace
and the Social Relations in the Schools?
The correspondence principle which was originated in the writings
of Karl Marx and applied by Bowles and Gintis in Schooling in Capitalist
America
,
states that individuals are integrated into the economic order
through the structural correspondence between the social relation of pro-
duction (workplace) and the social relations in the reproductive sectors
(schools, political and legal structures, and the family)
. In educa-
tional terms, this means that schools attempt to reproduce the types of
discipline, personal characteristics, and social class identifications
and skills found in the workplace. Using this paradigm, veritical author-
ity structures, teacher-dominated curriculum, grades, and destructive com-
petition are attempts to reconstruct the hierarchical relations, alienated
labor, external motivation, and fragmentation associated with work experi-
ences. Similarly, individual differences between schools financing and
social relations correspond to variations in economic means and social re-
lationships at various strata in the organization of production. Economi-
cally speaking, the values i ncl ucated within the educational establishment
are those necessary for reproducing labor characteristics and markets so
important for the accumulation of capital by an elite class.
The correspondence principle becomes particularly important in its
application to periods of educational reform. It is the contention of
radical economists that despite the parallel relationship between economic
1
Bowles and Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist America
,
p.132.
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and educational systems both have distinct and separate internal dynamics
of reproduction and development; that is, the economic system being in a
state of dynamic transformation evolves more rapidly than the slower
changing educational system. Eventually, the discontinuity in the rates
of change cause a subsequent anomoly between the social relations in pro-
ductive and reproductive sectors. This discrepancy is to Bowles and
G intis the essential catalyst for educational change. In other words,
"educational reform is the more or less automatic reorientation of educa-
tional perspectives in the fact of a changing economic reality.""'
Recent educational historians have found the outline represented
by the correspondence principle to be generally accurate; i . e
. ,
schools
have more or less reflected the larger economic environment wit!) periods
of school reform following major transformations in the productive sector
This, Bowles and Gintis believe, "establishes a strong prima facie case
for the causal importance of economic structure as a major determinent of
educational structure." Some historians, however, (including some revi-
sionists) dispute Bowles' and Gintis
1
causal claims. Clarence Karier
argues that for "production to have preceeded educational change is a
necessary but not a sufficient condition for making the causal claims
that they [Bowles and Gintis] make . " Consequently, Karier believes that
their critique requires more primary source material rather than correla-
tional material to support their causal claims. This distinction between
correlation and causality is important in attempting to apply the
1
Ibid
.
,
p . 237.
2
Ibid
., p.224.
^Karier, The Odd Couple
, pp. 185-186.
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correspondence principle to the analysis of the historical events in
Rochester.
As we have seen in the 1950's and early 1960's, the Rochester
economy experienced a continual expansion in the corporate sector in
technical, electrical, and mechanical areas. Subsequently, this required
substantial changes in the labor force. Using data contained in Table 2G
the changes emerge as follows:
Percent Change of Total Occupation Between 1950 and 1960
% increase
professional and technical
clerical workers
% the same
workers
household workers
service workers
% decrease
managers, officials and proprietors including farmers
craftsmen and foremen
operatives
laborers
Several conclusions can be drawn from this summary data. The labor market
in Rochester was becoming increasingly specialized, white-collared ser-
vice, and lower supervisory. No longer were foremen
,
blue-collar, and
operatives central to the production process. So great was the demand for
skilled, technical, and semi-skilled workers that many believed that the
tight labor market in these occupations would be the "limiting factor" for
future economic growth in the area. In turn, this created several prob-
lems for industrial concerns. Since continued technological advancement
was essential for capital accumulation, new mechanisms were needed to
train and integrate highly skilled and white-collar workers into the
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production and wage-labor system. This was difficult because the new
technology often required individual judgement and specialized skills
formerly not required in the production process. In addition, the tight
labor market in skilled and semi-skilled occupations gave workers in
these areas power to exercise demands for higher wages and benefits, as
well as better working conditions.
These managerial problems were overcome in several ways. On one
hand, yielding to worker demands and on the other, fearing unionization,
business executives adopted "soft-management techniques" for use in the
production process. Managers and administrators gave substantial consi-
deration to employee morale, job satisfaction and improving working con-
ditions, while offering extensive fringe benefits such as salary bonuses,
free dental and medical assistance, and company-sponsored recreational
programs. These programs acted to smooth labor relations and reduce
labor separations. However, the overall production process remained
intact and continued to be highly task-oriented, fragmented and special-
ized, with limited worker participation in the decision-making process.
It is against these changes in the economic conditions and the social re-
lations of production that the validity of the correspondence principle
became apparent in its application to school reform in Rochester.
At the city-wide level, the plan for the reorganization and dese-
gregation of public schools seems to be related to alterations in the
economic sector. The desegregation plan was aimed not only at achieving
equality of educational opportunity but also economic opportunity. The
non-white population in Rochester represented a largely untapped pool of
labor. In demanding access to better and higher quality education through
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community organization, they entered in a critical struggle for economic
survival with lower-middle and lower-class white workers. Although many
of these white workers had gained a skill or technical proficiency, their
economic foothold remained highly tenuous. As many social critics have
noticed, many miodle class families are only one step from poverty.
^
Given this limited grasp on economic security, this surely played into
the fears of lower and middle income families and contributed to their
resistance to the Reorganization and Desegregation Plan. This is not to
say that racism did not play a role in the conflict over the reform plan,
but rather than integration and increased schooling for non-whites was in
part class struggle for educational training and economic survival.
The by-product of this struggle was the resolution of the tight
labor markets. The undertrained and underemployed non-white community
represented a reserve of individuals seeking employment while making only
limited economic demands on employers. Under the aegis of hiring and
training non-whites for the betterment of community relations, the labor
market problems quickly eased. This is helpful in understanding why many
firms (other than Kodak which rightly saw the actions of community organ-
izations as representing a labor movement) easily entertained the idea of
hiring minorities. Clearly, civic-mindedness was enlightened self-
i nterest
.
The reorganization section of the total plan is related to
changes occurring in the social relation of production in Rochester's
economic sector. For example, the rationale given for the reorganization
1
Richard Parker, The Myth of the Middle Class: Notes on Afflu -
e nce and Equality
, ( >\ : York: Harper and Row, 1972).
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of the city's secondary schools into separate junior and senior high
schools is correlated to the skills necessary in highly technical corpor-
ate industries. The rationale was that the reform would facilitate the
development of self-worth and understanding of others, improve self-
ui sci pi me in work and study, strengthen cognitive and analytical skills,
develop moral and ethical values, and advance the concepts and intellec-
tual skills necessary for civic and socially responsible behavior. This
emphasis on the self and social conformity are extremely important if
white collar workers are to be absorbed into the modern production pro-
cess. Furthermore, its ideological implications given the riots and
their aftermath are that poverty and economic problems are solved through
tne enhancement of individual skill attainment and adherence to community
norms
.
More directly, the statements made by the program administrator
of the alternative school supports the correspondence principle.
"Schools haven't changed very much to meet the changing needs of people
1 n this society; we're still teaching in the same way. This doesn't make
sense the way other institutions have changed." Clearly, Dr. Youst and
the founding parents wanted to adopt the types of social relations
involved in the new organizational structures of production. Those struc-
tures in the alternative school included differentiation (individualiza-
tion, specialization) and conservative socialization (vocational guidance
and group counseling). Those structures correspond directly with the
needs of the economic order.
In short, the historical evidence of the Rochester study indi-
cates that school reforms followed production transformations, easied
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tight labor marKets, and attempted to reproduce the types of social rela-
tions embodied in the dynamic changes in the workplace, both at the'
correlative and causal levels.
Did the Corporate Sector Play a Decisive
Role in Determining the Direction of Modern School Reform ?
The political environment is often a measure of how corporations
can circumvent the democratic process and exert tremendous economic and
social power within a community. In Rochester, the political climate was
highly non-partisan. For example, neither the mayor or the city manage
was directly elected by the citizens, rather, they were appointed by the
City Council. As a result, most political parties were relatively weak
and only exerted themselves in relation to issues already established by
various community groups, that is, the political process in Rochester be-
came the interaction of conservative, liberal, civic, ethnic, bureaucra-
tic, and business forces with political parties playing an inconsequen-
tial role. In such an environment, political scientists have found that
corporate and media leaders exert a tremendous force in inducing confor-
mity within all segments of the community. 1 In Rochester, this was
reflected in its paternalism and limited understanding of what was meant
by "community".
This type of political environment often excludes the participa-
tion of members of the disenfranchised lower classes. This occurs for
several reasons. First, the poor lack the time and energy to participate
Robert L. Lineberry and Edmund P. Fowler, "Reformism and Public
Policies in American Cities," Community Politi cs, pp. 701-702.
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in political affairs. Given the emotional and physical strain involved
in most middle and lower class occupations, there is little doubt why
such studies as Work in America and Worki ng found such alienation and
apathy among most Americans. Secondly, political scientists have found
that participation is strongly related to social and structural variables
such as social memberships, education, income levels, and status hierar-
chies. Access to these variables are difficult to attain or denied to
1
most working class citizens. Finally, the continuous subjugation to the
rationalizations and the decisions of others, together with the need to
constantly make emotional adjustments to make conditions bearable, causes
the poor to develop a negative sense of dependency, helplessness and lack
of self-worth. The overall effect of these conditions is that the poor
have few political resources other than mass action to sanction their
economic and social demands. This is precisely what happened in Roches-
ter.
The contradiction in the material and social conditions had
existed for some time prior to the riots of 1964. Up to that historical
moment little attention let alone more outrage and indignation had been
registered with the Rochester community. Largely responsible for this
passivity was the paternalistic attitude fostered by the close associa-
tion between the public and private sectors. Civic voluntarism as prac-
ticed in Rochester was a form of the enlightened self-interest necessary
for social mobility among middle and upper levels of management. In
]
Warner Bloomberg, Jr., and Florence Rcsenstock, "Who Can Acti-
vate the Poor?", one assessment of maximum feasible participation in
Community Politics
,
edited by Bonjean, et al., pp. 150-158.
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turn, this acted as a mechanism whereby corporate and entrepreneurial
ehtes could and did exercise a disproportionate hegemony over public and
private affairs in Rochester, with little or no influence exercised by
the lower classes.
Like the other violent clashes of the 1960's, the Rochester riots
were a call for popular control and political reconstruction by the lower-
middle and lower classes. In Rochester, these groups moved outside tradi-
tional political channels where they had been ignored so long and devel-
oped organizations and mass actions that circumvented the public-private
network, and sought the resolution of their grievances directly in the
corporate office. Advocating traditional labor tactics, FIGHT and Saul
Alins ky made the battleground for social reform the economic sector. As
the Kodak-FIGHT controversy represents, this approach seriously questioned
the legitimacy of the economic system itself, that is, the primacy of
ownership, hierarchy, and hegemony of production.
The circumvention of traditional legal, social, welfare, politi-
cal, and educational institutions created serious problems for corporate
and public leaders. With the legitimacy of the economic system and their
control at stake, the most basic problem was to return equilibrium to the
system by channeling the criticism to the institutional level. As the
many community reports issued following the riots verify, the economic
system was considered basically sound but its institutions were no longer
sensitive to problems and segments of Rochester society. Accordingly,
what needed changing were the institutions and not the system. Subse-
quently, community reports called for a massive re-examination and reform
of Rochester's basic institutions.
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Specifically, the Reorganization and Desegregation Plan was an
attempt to alter the unequal conditions in the educational sector while
diverting attention from the economic sources. In this area, concessions
and reform were accomplished without jeopardizing basic economic and
social phenomenon. Moreover, the corporate sector would aid in this
educational effort by developing vocational education programs, organi-
zing_ and participating in human relation seminars, and contributing to
the development of social agencies and counseling programs. In this con-
text, the traditional power structure could predetermine the issues
(racism, legal and social organization, and education) while reasserting
their legitimacy and hegemony. In the end, after many attempts at reor-
ganization and desegregation as well as other social and school reform,
the non-white community understood this dynamic and opted for limited
community control.
At the alternative school level, the impact of corporate control
was also felt. As the earlier discussions have indicated, the corporate
model became the main organizational scheme. In addition, their repre-
sentatives (from Kodak and parents espousing liberal philosophy) were
rapidly integrated and permitted to participate in educational decision
making traditionally considered outside their domain with little resis-
tance. For example, they were allowed to participate in the hiring of
school personnel, the development of programmatic structure and content,
and the evaluation of individuals and programs. Consequently, the
school's organizational model and personnel in no way contradicted corpor-
ate social relations and needs. Moreover, the methodology for which they
were in part responsible provided a suitable market for many of their
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commercial products. These included such educational software as film,
mi cro-fiche, audio-visual aids, and programmed instructional materials
produced by such local firms as Xerox and Eastmand Kodak.
In summary, corporate leaders in Rochester were able to maintain
their hegemony through their active participation in the definition and
resolution of grievances and the acceptance by many in the community of
corporate liberal philosophy. As a result, corporations exerted a subtle
but nonetheless pervasive force in the determination of both the percep-
tion of problems and the limits of reform. With individual consciousness
so closely tied to that of the corporate mind, reforms become, as Gabriel
Kolko found during the Progressive Era, "the political rationalization of
business and industrial condi tions ... operated on the assumption that the
general welfare of the community could best be served by satisfying the
needs of business. 1 Reform as the rationalization of business values
does not represent a contradiction in terms, rather it seems to be the
logical response given the economic environment. As historian James
Weinstein has said, 'In a society dedicated to material progress, busi-
nessmen should lead, using a philosophy not aimed at understanding the
world but changing it to their own advantage." 2 Therefore, the contradic-
tions involved in efforts at reform lie not with reformers but with the
economic system itself. Consequently, in Rochester corporate leaders and/
or their representatives were able to blunt socio-economic criticism by
Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation
of American History
,
1900-1916, (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1963), pp.2-3.
2
James Weinstein, The Capitalist Revolution: A History of Ameri-
can Society Through 1890-1919
,
{New York: Pegasus, 1 970). :
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channeling reform energy into institutional
formulated under their supervision.
areas where reforms can be
A*2g__tjlg__Mo s t Lasting School Reforms
Jj2gsgJ]TatJefTect
_a More Efficient Mechanism
Traditional School F.mrHnnc ?
Revisionist historians and radical economists contend that educa-
tional reform has been both a liberal and cyclical phenomenon. During
the Pr °9 res si ve Era, liberalism was expressed educationally in such
reforms as manual training, vocational ism, civics, guidance counselling,
compulsory attendance, kindergarten, and the development of junior and
senior high schools. As responses to the urbanization and industrializa-
tion, these reforms reflected a strong anti-urban bias, need for social
control, and unrelenting faith in the expert, as well as corresponding to
the social relations needed for the new modes of production. In addition,
the radical scholars conclude that changes in school organization and
methodology gave the illusion ofmajor reform and renewed faith in the
accommodating capacity of the economic and social system. However, these
scholars have found that over a period of years as the socio-economic
crises have subsided most reforms were either eliminated or have become
more conservative where far from their humanitarian and pedagogical ori-
gins they emphasized social discipline and order. Having come full
circle from an apparent leadership role in social and economic reform,
the lasting school reforms reasserted traditional functions of sorting,
socializing, and holding students while reaffirming the socio-economic
order.
The type of socio-economic upheaval that was prevalent at the turn
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of the century was again prominent in the early and mid-1960's in Roches-
m°“t recent ttisis period, the disenfranchised were minor-
Uy groups who were seeking a larger role in society. It has been our
contention that the violent and non-violent disruptions, together with
the alienation surrounding the increasingly technological orientation of
work had caused a threatened Rochester society to initiate liberal
reforms in which education, government (welfare), and business were to be
ameliorative agencies for social and economic inequality.
In education, the major attempt at reform was the school Reorgani-
zation and Desegregation Plan. The plan itself had humanitarian and peda-
gogical origins. However, this focus was soon lost when it was reduced
to a bitter fignt for social and economic survival among the lower classes.
Although some pedagogical reforms were enacted in traditional classroom
settings, with the plan's annulment the overall school organization
reverted to its original status as the schools became increasingly aliena-
ted and segregated.
Although these events suggest a cyclical phenomenon suggested by
the radical scholars, they are by no means persuasive. At no time did
the reorganization plan ever become fully activated. While. the plan's
advocates were planning its implementation, others in the community were
preparing its elimination. The City Council, by resorting to political
deception in calling for new elections and reducing allocations, doomed
the plan before it was ever fully implemented. Without a reasonable
chance, it would be inaccurate to suggest a truly cyclical phenomenon.
However, in the study of the alternative school, the cyclical effect is
more fully evidenced.
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alternative school's original ear of operation was marked bvconsiderable nexibility in the school organization and methodology asw;n as having extensive parental involved in the school's dec, Mon-making apparatus. However th^nni + a.,a , throughout the second year, the school becameincreasingly more conservative in if f
,
,
7V ln lts st^ctural outlook. The increaseddemands by the Board of Education and re Central Administration for more
accountability and
"restructure**, necessity hces itatea changes that were in line
ra itional school organization and functioning. As a result, in
recent years the program has become highly structured and teacher-direc-
ted while permitting less meaningful parental in i9 P involvement. Furthermore
the school has become a haven for those -f • ifamilies who do not want to send
he,r Chi,dren t0 a ,arsely non-white and inferior school.
Specifically, the pedagogical reforms initiated at the school
were representative of liberal school reforms throughout the country
during the study period. For the most cart thnc *1 p > these reforms such as indi-
vidualized instruction, value cl arifi rationc , open educational methods
among others, seem too romantic responses to a violent and highly struc-
tured society. But in a different sense, these reforms like their pro-
9 ressi ve corollaries were in fart ,, ,n fact, the real embodiment of anti-urbanism
and lack of respect for life. Jonathan Kozo, explains this paradox in
his book Free Schools:
endea V^°to
S
exist
n
withiII
0
a moJa^vacuim ^TheT^’ ° r With truth >and protected lives white neonle iS aon" T5 passive ’ tranquil
police, well
-demarcated ghetto While rhn 1 °
n s
^
ron9^ armed
walk the city streets in fear on Honda f
and others
young people in the free schools of Vermont shuttle thei
pi7 vl J
e9ed
looms back and forth and speak of love and
r hand "
They "do their thing." Their thina is ,
9dni ‘: process -"
century houses, and a box of baby turtles somehn^
f?° d ’ ej9hteenth
be starvation, broken glass,
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pu
!'.^ieir bodies on the
one moment of the golden afternoSn tn
^V^ning or sacrifice
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Most reforms initiated durinn th * < ,u u nng this period rpflprtoH + 1,^P iuu ejected the narrow outlook
suggested h, Kozo, that educational reform could somehow substitute for
rr and~— -“-—
:
ignore tne preconditions of the c n n- n Q
.,
.
socio-economic upheaval and misplacetheir social responsibi 1 ity Presenflv
.. ..
]y ’ rather than benign or innocent
misdirection, as many might claim, the continued use of some reforms show
subtle mechanism for social control. Foexample, the use of behavioral nKi +•objectives in individualized instruction
individualized instruction with a behavioral basis shows the
capacity to perform the traditional school functions more efficiently
ar trom them original goals, this type of individualized
, earning can
ecome an efficient mechanism fan sorting students. Oespite using con-tent, language, and methodologies that often are foreinn ,l g to many minority
groups, this type of instruction Dernptm+a +.
.
P P tuates the commonly held myth that
ts wi 1 have an equal opportunity at success. Although chang-log the methodological elements, the basic formula for success remains'
unchanged; competitive achievement tests. These tests ha„» h• ve been shown in
a n™ber of st“dies to work against lower social „„classes while giving the
appearance of meritocratic sortina ing. i n addition, individualized
1
JOJlQthdD KOZO]
, Prep Srhnnlc / d .l
P-10. —00 (Boston : Houghton Mifflin, 1972),
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instruction which emphasizes private^ ^^ ^
specific rather than genera! goals, promotes the type of socialization
necessary for the technological workplace. In other words, individuals
who w„, work independently and follow rules and regulations, while
responding to external rewards.
In summary, despite attempts to alter the structure and content
of instruction in Rochester, most major reforms initiated in recent years
have not survived the reform period. Those reforms that have continued
to exist on a limited scale seem to have capability to perform the tradi-
tional school functions efficiently while preparing students for future
industrial roles.
Summary
The general interpretive framework of the radical scholars
suggested in Chapter I seems to be supported by the historical events
that shaped efforts towards reform in Rochester during the study period.
Demographic changes necessitated by inequalities in material and social
conditions acted as a catalyst for the riots of 1964. In response, the
community initiated liberal reforms that were both rationalistic and
humanitarian and that sought to quel, the incipient rebellion. In part
,
these reforms were both formulated by and served the purposes of corpor-
ate leaders. Subsequently, many reforms were withdrawn and those that
remained reflected the social relations in the workplace and performed
schooling's traditional functions more efficiently.
It is difficult to make generalizations from the historical study
of modern social and school reform in Rochester. In part this difficulty
originates in Rochester's uniqueness among metropolitan areas. Rochester
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was chosen for the study because its demographic, economic, social, and
educational characteristics seemed ideally suited for the type of analy-
advocated by both the radical revisionists and economists. The close
association between the public and private sectors, the social upheaval,
the sophistication of the liberal and non-white organizations, and the
highly technologically oriented corporate sector, provided the environ-
ment described by radical scholars necessary for reform. However, most
metropolitan areas do not have these composite characteristics or have
them to a lesser degree, thus making generalizations uncertain.
There are other limiting factors which preclude comprehensive-
statements due, on the one hand, to the ideological immaturity of educa-
tional revisionism and, on the other hand, the application of radical
economic thought to education. As exemplified by the recent changes in
the revisionists' ideological perspective by such prominent revisionists
as Michael Katz and Joel Spring, as well as the continuing debate over
the role liberal and economic philosophy in school reform among the
radical scholars, the theoretical framework is still being formulated,
and these scholars are just beginning to understand with any precision
the internal dynamics of the reform process in a capitalist society.
Until this theoretical and ideological framework is more fully developed
around such concepts as the correspondence principle, generalization in
the form of causal claims will be tentative.
The methodological and ideological difficulties associated with
the study of social and school reform in Rochester gives the interpreta-
tion a parochial and conditional status. Yet, these difficulties do not
seriously undermine the integrity of the arguments raised by the radical
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scholars. Rather, they point to the need for additional community
studies that will permit generalizations and ideological refinements.
Such research might include a sophisticated analysis of the relationship
between vocational requirements, educational reforms, and labor market
shortages. Also needed are additional studies of educational reform in
which socio-economic and demographic variables are different qualitative-
ly and quantitatively from those in Rochester. Additionally, as Clarence
Karier has suggested, primary historical studies are necessary to deter-
mine the precise relationship between liberal educational philosophy and
economic structure.
Although the period studied in Rochester was atypical in some
respects, the history of reform in Rochester may show the pattern of the
future. As the economy continues to become technologically oriented, it
will require new types of skilled laborers and social relations of pro-
duction. In such an environment it will be increasingly important for
schools to reproduce the types of highly trained individuals that will
work independently in organizational hierarchy and who will accept the
prevailing socio-economic conditions as given. This will require new
educational methodologies and philosophies that will legitimate the sys-
tem and veil its contradictions. Some examples of this are already
forthcoming. At a recent Kodak School Services Symposium at Rochester
Institute of Technology (Fall, 1976) for school supervisory personnel,
the topics under consideration were "Developing Media to Fit Alternative
Learning Needs", "Programmatic Innovations in Training at Kodak",
"Building Quantitative Skills Through Vocational Education", "Recent
Partnerships in Career Education Locally", and "A Corporate Psychologist
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Looks at the New Breed of Employee". All of these topics seem to indi-
cate corporate concern with changing educational methodologies so that
they correspond to the types of skills and social relations found in the
workplace. Another less obvious example is the emergence in cities like
Boston and Madison (Wisconsin) of plans for the reorganization of school
districts through the development of alternative schools in order to
circumvent desegregation and other issues concerned with distributive
social justice
.
1
As these examples seem to indicate, educational reform
continues to provide the labor needs for corporate leaders while serving
as a bromide for social and material inequalities. In so doing, educa-
tional reform and reformers are betraying their noblest ideals and
blunting consideration of more substantial and egalitarian alternatives.
'The National Alternative Schools Program at the University of
Massachusetts is currently documenting the pervasiveness of the misuse of
alternative schools as a substitute for desegregation and a detention
center for students with disciplinary problems.
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appendix a
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RIOT AREA
USING CENSUS TRACT DATA
Tract Number CITY
Total population
Age distribution
% under 18 vears
/° 36 years to 64 years
% 65 years and~over
Non-white - number
% of total population
Foreign born - number
% of total population
1960
318,61]
29.6
56 .4
-14 .0
24 ,228
Rank
Highest (i;
% Change Lowest (89/i3)
3-950 1950-60 1960 flsTT
332 488
24,0
65.0
11,0
-2^6.
42 .044
-13-2
Forei gn stock* (I960 only) - numbe r
% of total population
Ethnic concentration by country
[over 5% foreign born in 1950, or
over 10% foreign stock in 1960]
Education of persons age 25 and over
io with 8 years or less
120,528
7,845
2.4
-4.2
208.8
49 , 127
-14.4
14.8 I
r
na
37.8 na
Italy
41 .6 45.7
/o wun ±j years or more 13 .1 11 .7 IMedian number of years completed 10.
1
9.6 1 1
Median income
Families & unrelated individuals $5,104 $3,076Families (I960 only) $6,361 ! na
Labor force - total j138.013 ,151.167
-8.7
j% ot population over 14 57.4 S 56.7 j% unemployed 5.9 1 5.7 j ]% females 39.6 35.2 i
Occupation - total employed 129.843 to A* O CD -8.8
/0 Professional-Managerial
. 18.2 17.9% Service Workers-Laborers
. .15.5 13 .
5
—
Mobility
- % moved 1955-1960 45.2 na
!
Housing units - total [ 107 PQS
-LGJUml 6,0% vacant
4.0
j
1.6% deteriorated & dilapidated 14.7
j
na i
Households = occupied housing unj ts 102.997 * 99.437% one-person units 20.2 ! 11.3 I% renter occupied 43.6 i1 48.6 I
ersons per household 2.97 j 3.18
persons per multi-person household 3.46 i 3 . 4 5 r
Population in group quarters r 113,106 16 ,400 ! -20.
1
« ol total populaTion 4.i| 4.91
1
Tract Number 1 210
Rank
Highest ( 1 )
% Change Lowest (90)
,- 1960 1950 1950-60 1960 1 195
Total population 1.015 1 .236
-17
—
Age distribution
% under IS years 11.9 8.0 87% 19 years to 64 years 69.5
J
70.9 9
oo
% years and over 18.6
|
21.1 I 12 1
4—
Non-white - number 110 84 .31 n i
% of total poDulation - 10.8 6 .7
! 20
Foreign born - number 80 1 195 -59 n
% oi total population 7.9 15.8
1 7 R 3 q
Foreign stock* (1960 only) - number 254 na |% oi total population - 25.0 • na ! sn
Ethnic concentration by country .
[over 5% foreign born in 1950, or
over 10% foreign stock in 1960]
.
education of persons age 25 and over
% with 8 years or less 56.8 65.5 11 g% with 13 years or more 12.6 6.0 33 50Median number of years completed 8.6 8.4 80 76
Median income
Families & unrelated individuals 51 , 551 $910 87 86
Families (1960 only) n np na
Labor force - total
'
506
"
655 -22.8
% of population over 14 54.8 56.3 1 75 63
% unemployed 14.6 20.6 4 J 1
% females 12.3 18.6 1 89 88
Occupation - total employed 432 519 -16.8
% Professional-Managerial 12.0 12.5 48 49
% Domestic-Labor 46.6 50.6 3 1
Mobility - % moved 1955-1960 CO
:
O
L
Ni na 1
Housing units - total 202 178 13.5
% vacant 3.0 5.1 49 2
% deteriorated & dilapidated 12.9 na 42
Household.. - occupied housing units 196 180 8.9
% one-person units 61.2 44 .4 5 1
% rental units 89 . 9 i 88 .
0
5 4
persons per household 1 .90 2.29 84 84
persons per multi-person household
j
.3.32
..
3 .33 38 70
Population in group quarters J 823 -21 .9
% of total population 63.3 j_ 66 .
6
1 L_
Tract Number 2 211
Rank
Highest ( 1 )
Total population
1960
664
% Change Lowes
1950 1950-60 1960
t (S9/S8)
1 • 1950
1,219
-45
.
5
Age distribution
% under IS years 36.9 26 3 1 1
/o IS years to 64 years 54.2 61.8 73
24! Ofi
82
7o bo years and over 8.9 11.9
t 80 27
Non-white - number 10 7 42.9
1 30
% of total population 1.5 .5 35
Foreign born - number 102 292
-65.1
% of total population 15.4 24.0 30
j 5
Foreign stock* (I960 only) - number 343 na
% of total population 51.7
!
na 13
Ethnic concentration by country Italy Italy
22
l
!
3
[over 5% foreign born in 1950, or
over 10% foreign stock in 1960]
Education of persons age 25 and over
% with 8 years or less 53.8 71.5
% with 13 years or more 9.5 1 .
5
42 88Median number of years completed 8.8 5 . 0 65 8S
Median income
Families & unrelated individuals- no np
Families (1960 only) np na — —
Labor force - total ' | 238 538 -55.8
Vo of population over 14 i 51 0 56 .
8
86 57
% unemployed
j 5 9 12.5 40 5
% females 37,0 27.7 66 85
Occupation - total employed 224 471
-52.4
% Professional-Managerial 7.1 11.8 79 54
7° Service Workers -Laborers 15.6 26.0 35 5
Mobility - % moved 1955-1960 37.0 na 67
Housing units - total 210
?
313
-32.9
% vacant 15.2 2.9 1 11
% deteriorated & dilapidated 37.6 na 10
Households = occupied housing units 178 304 -4 1 .
5
7o one -pens on units 10.7 S 15.5 j 77 15
% renter occupied 74.2! 73.7 15 1
1
persons per household 3.73 3.51 3 16
persons per multi-person household) 4.06 3.97 j 6
1
3
Population in group quarters 0 152
% or total population 0 j_ 12.5 j 89 8
Tract Number 3 212
Rank
Highest (1)
% Change Lowest (S9/SS)
1960 1950 1950-60 I960
j
1950
Total population 2,058 3 , 28S -37.4
Age distribution
% under IS years 2S.3 15.3 61 81
% IS years to 64 years
! 63.0 74.7 7 1
% 65 years and over S
. 7 10.0 82 49
Non-white - number
: 1,409 1,320 6.7
% of total population 63.5 40.2
! 3 2
Foreign born - number 78 201 -61.2
% oi total population 3.8 6.1 88 88
Foreign stock* (1960 only) - number 20S na
% of total population 10.1 na 88
Ethnic concentration by country
[over 5% foreign born in 1950, or
over 10% foreign stock in 1960]
Education of persons age 25 and over
% with 8 years or less 55.8 46.1 15 49
% with 13 years or more 9.3 15.8 45 19
Median number of years completed 8.6 9.4 79 40
Median income
Families & unrelated individuals SI, 894 31,563 86 83
Families (1960 only) $4 , 2S3 na SO
Labor force - total 964' 1,750 -44
.
9
% of population over 14 62.2 61 .
3
12 9
% unemployed 14.7 11 .0 3 9
% females 47. S 37 .
1
4 15
Occupation - total employed 822 1 , 557 -47.2
7o Professional-Managerial 12 .
9
11.8 43 55
% Service Workers-Laborers 40.9 26
.
0
6 6
Mobility - % moved 1955-1960 66.4 na 3
Housing units - total 753 1 .017 -26.0 1
% vacant 7.
4
9 y 3 1 13
% deteriorated & dilapidated 29.1 5 na 15
|
Households ~ occupied housing units 697 985 -29.2 1
% one-person units 31 .7 30.7 12 7
% renter occupied ( 81.6
|
85.1 9 6
persons per household 2 .79 i 2.49 73 81
persons per multi-person household 3.62
j
3.15 20 80
Population in group quarters 112 837 -86 .
6
% of total population £uAJ 25.5 i 9 ‘2
Tract Number 4 213
Rank
Highest ( 1 )
% Change Lowest (90 )
Total population
Age distribution
% under IS years
% 19~~years tTTT' vp.^7
% 65 years and oveT^
Non
-white - nu mb e
r
%_oi total populati^i
foreign born - number
/j of total population
^£glgIL^ock^l 9S0 only) - number
t oi total population
Ethnic concentration by country
[over 5% foreign born in 1950, or
over 10% foreign stock in 1960]
Education of persons age 25 and over
/j with 8 years or less
% with 13 years or more
Media n_ number of years completed
Median income
& unrelated individuals
Families (I960 only) ~
Labor force - total
% of popu lation over 14
% .unemployed
% females
Occupation
- total employed
% Professlonal-Manageria
% Domestic-Labor
Mobility
- % moved 1955-1960
Housing units - to tal
% vacant
/j deteriorated d i lapidated
Household s occupied housing units
% one-person unit s
% rental units
persons per househoIcT
persons per multi-person househo ld
Population in group quar ters
‘/j of total population
,.1960 1950 1950-60 I960
Tract Number 11
Total population
Highest (1)
% Change Lowest (89/83)
T960 1950 s 1950-60 1960
'
505
Age distribution
% under 1 8 years
% 18 years to 64 years"
43.2
1,188
18 .4
% 65 years and ovor
hon-whl te " number
t 51.8 j 70.0
4 5^0 j
-57.5
% of total population 442 456
-fiZ.,.5
Foreign born - number
% of total population 15 148
Foreign stock* (I960 only) - numbe r
% of total population ~~
Ethnic concentration by country
[over 5% foreign born in 1950, or
over 10% foreign stock in 1960]
Education of persons age 25 and over
% with 8 years or less
37
7.3
% with 13 years o r more
"
Median number of years completed
12.4
85
_82_
-89.9
na
na
Median income
Families & unre lated individuals
Families (I960 only) '
Labor force - total
% of population over 14
% unemployed
% females
74.4 69.4
-DH- 4.8
-S-J? L2_
89
89
_HP_
-HE-
_IiQ_
42 .
1
Occupation — total employed
% Professional
-Mana ge rial
% Service Workers
-Laborers
-PP-
-42.3
-554„
-55., 1.
16.9
_2ILL
89
-76
.
5
-125
.6.5
! 61.7
Mobility - % moved 1955-1960
Housing units - total
% vacant
% deteriorated k dilapidated
Households
- occupied housing units
62.7
135
-455
J-UfL
40.6
259
-M-
-5LJ-
% one-person units
% renter occupied
-135.
persons per household
t 3 70 2 88
persons per multi-person household r
,, 37
-1—20 . Q
-!-£.7.4
-73
.
9
-47.9
-88
15
-81
10
5.5
554_.irbliL.5
^44
S9 .4
22.
Populatlon in group quarters
~~ *
;
—
— —
>o oi total population
335
! 1 .2 28.2 i
-98.2
55
^1950 data v;c re adjusted for i960 boundary change
1950
79
-35.
49
_£5
83
-&L
75
87
-5Z.
,75
JL5
70
_5L
Tract Number 12 215
% Change
1950 1950-60 I960
Rank
Highest (X)
Lowest (S9/88)
Total population
Age distribution
% under 13 years
% 18 years to 64 years
% 65 years and over
Non-white - number
% of total population
1950
Foreign born - number
% of total population
Foreign stock* (1960 only)
% of total population
Ethnic concentration by country
[over 5% foreign born in 1950, or
over 10% foreign stock in 1960]
Education of persons age 25 and over
% with 8 years or less 64.5 l 73.2 4 £h with 13 years or more 3.4 | 2.3 81Median number of years completed 7.8 6
.
3
Median income
Families & unrelated individuals ;$2 , 491 $1,962 84 81Families (1960 only) $3,444 na 85
Labor force - total 663 1,463
-54.7 r% ol population over 14 58.0
|
57.8 F53 49% unemployed 25.6 I 11.3
—
l% females 37 . 0 ! 32.9 68
Occupation - total employed 493 1,295
-61.9
% Professional-Managenal 2.7 7.3 89 87h Service Workers-Laborers 52.9 41.8
“
2 2
Mobility - % moved 1955-1960 64.4 na 6
Housing units - total 524 921 43.2
% vacant 8.8 1 2.2 8 19% deteriorated & dilapidated 69.5 ! na 2
Households = occupied housing units 478 898 -46
.
8
% one-person units 22.4 i 17.0 18 1
4
% renter occupied 80.5 ! 78.5 1 2 9persons per household 3.48 ! 3.41
L
7 33persons per multi-person household) 4.20 ! 3.90 4 4
Population in group quarters I i5 9 ! 244
-75.8
/o oi total population 3.4! 7.4 16 12
Tract Number 13 216
Total population
1960 ' 1950 1950-60 I960
Rank
Highest ( 1 )
Change Lowest (S9/88)
5,008
Age distribution
% under 18 years
lo 18 yea rs to 64 years
/o 65 years and over
hon-whi te - number
% of total popular
-l rm~
Foreign born - number
% of, total population
47.2
4,885
28.1
47.0 j 64,5
5.8 I 7.4
2.5
3,305 1,051
66.0
j 21.5
570 * 1,281
11.4 26.2"
Foreign stock* (I960 only) - numbe r
% of total population
Ethnic concentration by country
[over 5% foreign born In 1950, or
over 10% foreign stock in I960]
Education of persons age 25 and over
% with 8 years or less
% with 13 years or more
“ '
Median number of years completed
Median income
Families & unrelated Individuals
Families (1960 only )
~ ~
Labor force
1 ,051
21.0
60.1
5,3
8.5
total
% of population over 14
% unemployed
% females
214.5
-55
.
5
U.S.S.R
58.4
3.4
8,2
'$3.676 IS2.307
$4,318
1,703
58.7
12.8
38.5
Occupation - total employed
7° Professional-Mana gerial
% Service Wo rke r s -Laborers
1,485
4 6.0
39.1
Mobility
- % moved 1955 -1960
Housing units - total
2,176
57.9
10.8
35.4
1,938
10.3
23.9
63.8
% vacant
% deteriorated & dilapidated
1 ,375
6.8
44 .
9
Households occupied housing units
% one-person units
renter occupied
persons per household
persons per multi
-person househo14
Populat ion in group q uarters
/o of total popu lation
1.283
12.9
1,417
21 .7
-23.4
1.6
1,388
81.3
3.89
4.32
9.4
-3.0
88
87
48
83
69
81
75
79
40
50
85
-7,7
15
71.4
3.43
3.68
_2_7
.5'
128
lIj
j
-78.9
60
10
51
1950
20
40
80
21
74
81
76
48
10
30
63
33
15
29
16
25
Tract Number 64 217
Rank
Highest (1)
% Change Lowest (89/88)
1960 1950 1950-60 1960 1950
Total population 5,041 5,112 -1.4
Age distribution
% under 18 years 34.1 25.3 15 39
% 18 years to 64 years 54.5 63.1 i 67 65
% 65 years and over 11.4 11.6 r61 31
Non-white - number 1,572 44
% of total population 31.2 .9 9 23
Foreign born - number 405 557 -27.3
% of total population 8.0 10.9 77 60
Foreign stock* (1960 only) - number 1 . 161 na
% of total population 23,0 na 82
Ethnic concentration by country
[over 5% foreign born in 1950, or
over 10% foreign stock in I960]
Education of persons age 25 and over
% with 8 years or less 40.8 44.3 55 55
% with 13 years or more 9.8 7.3 39 43
Median number of years completed 9.9 9.6 39 38
Median income
Families & unrelated individuals $4 , 648 $3,217 60 42
Families (1960 only) $6,056 na 47
Labor force - total 2,100 2,240 -6.3
% of population over 14 58.4 54.8 . 48 77
% unemployed 7.0 2.6 31 79
% females 38.6 34.2 49 45
Occupation - total employed 1,952 2,181 10,5
% Professional-Managerial 13.8 14.6 41 40
% Service Workers -Laborers 24.2 12.6 13 38
Mobility - % moved 1955-1960 54.4 na 24
Housing units - total 1,635 1,560 4.8
% vacant 5.4 1.3 28 47
% deteriorated & dilapidated 25.4 na 23
Households = occupied housing units
1
1,547 1,541 .4
% one-person units 16.2 8.4 36 35
% renter occupied 48.2 44 . 1 42 46
persons per household 3.26 3.31 28 42
persons per multi-person household 3.70
|
3.52 13 40
Population in group quarters 0 15 __
% of total population 0 . 3 89 70
Tract Number 65 218
1960
Rank
v
Highest ( 1 )
% Change Lowest (39/88)
Total population
Age distribution
% under 18 years
% 18 years to 64 years
% 65 years and over
Non-white - number
% of total population
Foreign born - number
% of total population
Foreign stock* (i960 only) - number
% of total population
Ethnic concentration by country
[over 5% foreign born in 1950, or
over 10% foreign stock in 1960]
Education of persons age 25 and over
% with 8 years or less
% with 13 years or mo re
Median number of years "completed
7.3
Median income
Families & unrelated individuals
Families (1960 onlv)
9.4
$4,260
Labo r force - tota
1
% of population over 14
% unemployed
females
Occupation - total employed
% Professional -Managerial
% Service V/orkers^-Laborers
Mob 1 1 i t y moved 1955-1960
$5,772
1,449
65.7
12.8
40.3
4.1
8.9
$3,010
1,383
58.1
4.0
55
45
66
58
4.8
29.6
1,263 { 1,326
I 28
5,0 12.0
29.6
Housing units - total
54,2
vacant
1,026
% deteriorated &. dilapidated
Households = occupied housing units
% one-person u nits
% renter occupied
6.7
19.5
957
15.2
na
1,007
1.3
na
-4.8
87
1.9
11
26
17
15.4
pe rsons per househo ld
pc rs on.s per multi -person household
52.7
j 3 . 39
Hope la i Ion in group quarters
Vo of total populate
3.83
.2
994
8.4
48.2
40
-3.7
32
42
38
3.62 X
11
24
j
-75,0
j
-JLi t~69-
3.255 3.404
-4.4
iaou
37.3 27.7 8 2252.5
1 60.9
! 82 8710.2 11.4
| 74 35
1 1,498 133
! 46.0 3.9 7 11
161 364
-55.8
4.9 10.7
— j 85 64
525 na
16.1 na 84
—
45 41
46.3 51.4
66
50
56
85
62
79
52
27
46
36
38
35
27
Tract Number 90 219
Rank
% Changeloan irtr ^ . _
Highest ( 1 )
Lowest (89/88
Total population 581
1950-60 1960 1950
578 1.9
Ace distribution
% under 18 years 2.0 89
> la years to b4 year3 [. 72.7
I% 65 years and over | 25 3
j 1 I 3
Hon-chlte - number 11
% of total population
1 1.8
I |
j
34
Foreign born - number
% of totaj. population
135
23 0 T
Forclfrn stock* (1960 only) - number
% of total population
272
46 8
na
] i
7
1
f
Ethnic concentration by country
(over 5% foreign born in 1S50, or
over 10% foreign stock in I960]
education of persons age 25 and over
% with 8 years or less
U.S.S.R
na
i 28
4147.8
with 13 years or more 15.2 i
1 23Median number of years completed 9.3
i 49
—
Median income
Families & unrelated individuals $2,568 83Families (1960 only) np na
Labor force - total
. 446
» of population over 14 76.5
i 1% unemployed 5.8
f
j
42
/o females 41.0
| 23
~
Occupation - total employed 416
n Professional
-Managerial 29.1 —
—
1 1
* Service Workers
-Laborers 18.2
_+
fit
Mobility
- % moved 1955-1960 P6.2 . 1na
i
1
j 4
Housing units - total 538 i
% vacant 12.5
I
4—
n deteriorated & dilapidated 19.7 na
|
i
j 30
—
Households = occupied housing units 471
'l T
% one-person units 83.9
—«
i% renter occupied 100.0
i 1persons per household 1.21
j
!
—
r-
( ~Ti 9
-
persons per multi-person household 2.32 i 8 9
Population in group quarters 18 |
i
I
a oi total population
j 3 1 j H± " i 78
appendix b
COMPOSITE MAPS FOR CRITICAL DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES
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appendix c
THE DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES
OF ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS IN ROCHESTER IN 1970
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APPENDIX D
CONSTITUTION OF POLICY ADVISORY COUNCIL
The Policy Council of the
Interim Junior High School
The "Interim" Junior High School is to be unique in its structure
and its responsiveness to the community which it serves. The School
embodies a bold attempt to implement a more humanistic and personalized
phi 1 osophy of education, and should become a working model which might be
adopted by traditional schools. The belief of those who have nurtured
the idea into reality and of those who have dedicated themselves to
implementing the concept is that a "Policy Council" is basic to the
entire project.
This Council is responsible to the Board of Education for the
long-range development and maintenance of the Interim Junior High School.
The Council will be composed of representatives of the immediate school
community - students, staff and parents of students in the school. To
meet its responsibilities to the Board the Council will propose basic
policy for the school. Policy decisions, implemented by appropriate
Board resolution, will affect the general overall operation of the
school; and the impact of these decisions will be viewed in terms of
weeks, months or years as differentiated from day to day decisions which
require immediate response by the professional staff.
Accountability Model for the Interim Junior High School
Subject to overall responsibility in the Board of Education, the
Council, Director, Staff and Students will carry the responsibility for
the operation of the Interim Junior High School to meet its learning
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goals. The model for accountability is:
Students - accountable to teachers
Teachers - accountable to Director
Director - accountable to the Policy Council
Policy Council - accountable to:
]• The Board of Education
(a) Report to the Board (including an annual educa-
tional, operational and budget audit).
(b) Respond to Board requests for information.
(c) Submit one and three year plans annually.
2. The Superintendent of Schools
(a) Report on School development bi
-monthly,
(including an annual educationa, operational,
and budget audit).
(b) Cooperate with procedures as they coordinate
with Learner-Centered Education and the policies
of the school
.
(c) Budgetary accountability.
(d) Respond to requests for information.
3. Parents of students enrolled at school
(a) Respond to requests of individual parents.
(b) Hold "town" meetings twice each year
(1) October and March
(2) Present one and three year plans for open
review, discussion, and improvement
(c) Publish bi-monthly reports on school developments.
(d) Publish policy statements of school, noting
recommended changes.
(e) Report of annual educational, operational and
budget audits.
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Responsibility of Policy Council
Three basic functions are performed by the Policy Council. It
develops and recommends to the Board policy statements, systematically
reviews policy statements (at least annually), and reviews educational
practices.
1. Policies should be recommended to the Board in the following
areas (to be evolved by the present committee):
School Philosophy
Student Goals
Curri cul urn
School "Climate"
Community Involvement and Resources
Parental Involvement
Staff Utilization and Improvement
Staffing Procedures
Evaluation
Budget Development
Cost Effectiveness
Dissemination
School Volunteers
Future School Developments
(Other topics will evolve as the Policy Council grows)
2. Goals and Objectives:
(a) Advise the Board in the formulation of broader educational
goals and long-term objectives of the school which will give direction to
the Director and staff. The method of implementation is determined by the
staff and Administrator.
(b) Review these goals and objectives with the Board and with
the staff at least annually, to assess the need for change and for evalu-
ation of practicabil ity.
(c) Review with the staff and Director the learning objectives
established by the staff for students, to note areas of need, strength, or
redi recti on
.
3. Educational Practices:
The Program Administrator is accountable for all of the educa-
tional practices of the school. The Policy Council observes school prac-
tices, holds open discussions regarding the translation of policies into
programs, and publishes annual reports on educational, operational, and
financial outcomes. Specifically, the Policy Council:
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(a) Cooperates with appropriate Central Office Staff on thp
ter
P
Board°of°Educatior!?
0 ^
'
S bUdSet t0 be sutaitted t0 the Roches-
program and
(b) Publishes a written audit of each year's expenditures.
(c) Publisnes an annual evaluation of the school's educational
operational procedures.
educational
(d) Conducts a cost-effectiveness study, which will
audit and the budget.
relate the
(e) Conducts
staff and Administrator
grams and practices.
open discussions
,
at least quarterly, with the
in a joint effort to translate plans into pro-
(f) Works cooperatively with the staff and Administrator todevelop the active involvement of parents and the mechanisms for coordi-
nating and facilitating that involvement. There will be varying levels ofinvolvement and the Council will keep parents informed of the needs and
ways of utilizing their capabilities at all levels.
(g) Works cooperatively with the staff and Administrator toinvolve students, staff and parents in staff selection, development and
evaluation. In practice, the representative group will cooperate with
appropriate Central Office staff and make recommendations to the Adminis-
trator. Such recommendations will be reviewed by the Administrator and
submitted to the Board.
4. Staff:
,
The effectiveness of this school will be a direct function of
tne extent to which the Council and the school staff operate in a close,
harmonious relationship.
Operations
The total Policy Council meets at least ten times each school
year, and establishes procedures for meeting its responsibilities in each
of the areas identified above. Decisions are made by simple majority of
members present at a regular announced meeting. The Council may estab-
lish more restrictive procedures in cases where consensus is vital.
The Policy Council sets up appropriate committee structures to
implement its responsibilities. Committees, with the exception of the
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permanent evaluation committee, have a one year term, but can be renewed
as required. Consultants and other specialists may also be engaged by
the Policy Council.
The initial committee organization might include:
Goals and Objectives
Parents and Community
Evaluation
Budget and cost Effectiveness
Membership and Terms of Office
The Policy Council will include parents, staff, and students.
The present committee must work out procedures for selection so the
Policy Council is broadly representative. The image of the Council
membership as honorary must not be allowed to develop. Requirements and
obligations of membership must be clearly stated and the necessary com-
mitment secured of prospective members. The term of office shall be two
years for parents and staff. Half of each group should be elected each
year. Student terms shall be one year. The Policy Council is composed
of:
Parents 6
Staff 5 (Program Administrator is permanent member)
Students 4
Total 15
The Policy Council elects a chairman from among the parent repre-
sentatives to serve a term of one year.
Additional Suggestions for Membership and Terms of Office
Two proposals have been made:
242
13 members
4 parents - one elected to represent each quadrant of the city
4 staff - selected by staff by simple majority vote
4 students - selected by students by simple majority vote
1 program administrator
17 members
5 parents - two from Monroe district, on each from Charlotte,
West, Frederick Douglass
5 staff - including director
5 students - two from Strong, one from each of Anthony
2 consultants
This is suggested by these enrollment figures:
210 Monroe
79 Charlotte
124 West
87 Douglas
This representation can be shifted as enrollment shifts.


